University of Nebraska at Omaha

DigitalCommons@UNO
Student Work
5-1-1971

Constitutionalism, human concerns, and the Dominican revolution
of 1965
Cynthia Schneider
University of Nebraska at Omaha

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork

Recommended Citation
Schneider, Cynthia, "Constitutionalism, human concerns, and the Dominican revolution of 1965" (1971).
Student Work. 514.
https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork/514

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by
DigitalCommons@UNO. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Student Work by an authorized administrator
of DigitalCommons@UNO. For more information, please
contact unodigitalcommons@unomaha.edu.

CONSTITUTIONALISM, HUMAN CONCERNS, AND
THE DOMINICAN REVOLUTION OP 19&5

A Thesis
Presented to the

&

Department of History
and the

Faculty of the Graduate College
University of Nebraska at Omaha

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

W
Cynthia Schneider
May 1971

UMI Number: EP73152

All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.

Disswtsrtion Publishing

UMI EP73152
Published by ProQuest LLC (2015). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code

ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 4 8 1 0 6 - 1346

Accepted for the faculty of The Graduate College of
the University of Nebraska at Omaha, in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts.

Graduate Committee
Name

' Department
A-

hairman

0

PREFACE
I began this study with the intention of concen
trating on the American military intervention in the Dominican
Republic during the Dominican Revolution of 1965 .

1 soon

discovered that there already existed a vast body of litera
ture on the intervention and on the events of the Revolution
itself.

Yet, most of the available material contained little

background information and only an occasional, superficial
examination of the underlying causes of the civil war.

In

addition, much of the writing reflected a strong preoccupation
with the idea of constitutionalism as a cause of the Revolu
tion.

Such a preoccupation seemed strange indeed, in view

of the fact that the Dominican constitutional tradition has
been one of the most chaotic in all of Latin America.

At this

point, I became interested in determining whether or not
constitutionalism had suddenly become a viable force in
Dominican political life.

I, therefore, decided to abandon

my original idea of studying the intervention; and, instead,
I began to examine early and recent Dominican constitutional
history.

Surprisingly, my research led me to discover some

of the many societal tensions which were at the root of the
1965 crisis.

My research also demonstrated that in the spring

of 1 9 6 5 , despite the emphasis on constitutionalism, it was
ii

iii
human and social concerns, and not political ideology, which
disposed Dominicans to resort to collective violence*

Many persons have helped me in this endeavor, but I
especially want to thank Dr* Paul Beck for his helpful
suggestions and patient assistance*

Gratitude is also due

Mrs* Betsy Laird, of the Inter-library Loan Office, for her
many efforts on my behalf.

I would also like to acknowledge

my indebtedness to the Columbus Memorial Library of the Pan
American Union in Washington, D.C..

The bibliographical

material and the vast collection of Latin American books and
periodicals at the Columbus Library were indispensable in the
preparation of this study.

Omaha, Nebraska
May 1971
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INTRODUCTION
Since the early days of the Spanish conquest, Dominicans
have lived with chaos, poverty and instability*

Once the

administrative head of the Spanish new world empire, Santo
Domingo*s initial prestige began to decline with the discovery
of gold and silver in Mexico and Peru.

Fewer than fifty years

after its establishment, the little settlement at Santo
Domingo found itself virtually abandoned.

Even chroniclers

did not bother to write anything about Santo Domingo^ first
250 years.

Few early records remain, and little is known

except that the colony barely existed, and that only occasional
attacks by pirates interrupted the monotony of life on the
island*
From time to time, the English, Dutch, and French
raided the colony.

These raids, plus Spanish trade restric

tions discouraged commerce and settlement*

Even though the

French part of the island flourished, the Spanish portion
stagnated, sinking lower and lower.

In 179^ Toussaint L 1Over

ture and the French colonial forces drove the Spanish out of
Saint Domingue.

Finally, the Treaty of Basle in 1795 forced

the Spanish cession of Santo Domingo, and the entire island
then passed under French control.
As a result, many of the Spanish colonists began to
emigrate to neighboring Puerto Rico, Cuba, and Venezuela.
1

2

Thus, began the first of many such migrations of prominent,
white Spanish families.

With them, also went most of the

members of the Spanish religious orders.

In the decade be

ginning 1?95 9 Santo Domingo lost over one third of its
population— the primary representatives of the country's
wealth, education, and cultural tradition.*
The Haitians dominated Santo Domingo until 1809 when
the Spanish colonists revolted and voluntarily re-incorporated
themselves into the Spanish Empire.

Unfortunately, Spanish

rule did not end oppression; the recovery of the Spanish
throne by King Ferdinand VII ushered in another period of
subjugation.

In 1821, Santo Domingo again revolted, this time,

against Spain; and the leader of the independence movement,
Jose Nunez de Caceres, requested admittance into Simon
Bolivar's newly formed Republic of Gran Colombia.

Before the

request could reach Bogota, Haiti's President, Jean Pierre
Boyer, marched into Santo Domingo and forced the colony to
submit to Haitian rule.
So began another period of degradation for the people
of Santo Domingo, with many of them being killed or victimized
by the occupation forces.

When the Haitian government at

tempted to turn the entire island into a negro state, the
remaining white Spanish families and the Catholic clergy began

1
(Caracas:

Juan Bosch, Trujillo: Causas de una tirania sin e.ienrplo
Libreria Las Novedaaes, 19^9)> p. 71.

to depart.

Haitian authorities encouraged this exodus since

emigration would leave the Haitians free to expropriate the
property of white landowners and the Catholic Church hierarchy*
The Haitians occupied Santo Domingo from 1822 to 18*Mf,
and the long years of barbarous rule brought further decline
and economic ruin*

Santo Domingo remained a primitive, rural

country which appeared to have been 0by-passed by the main2

stream of history *9

Everyone who could, left; those who

remained fought among themselves*

By the eve of independence,

poverty, anarchy, and unrest had become endemic*
Not all Dominicans passively accepted Haitian rule*
In I 838 Juan Pablo Duarte, Rosario Sanchez, and Ramon Mella
founded the Trinltarlos. a secret revolutionary organization
working for liberation from the Haitians*

On February 27,

18*j4, the Trinltarlos easily overcame their Haitian oppressors
and proclaimed the independence of the Dominican Republic*
The long struggle for independence had lasted almost
fifty years, but the new republic was ill-prepared for selfrule*

Dominicans had never accumulated the experience and

skills required for dealing with their social and political
problems.

Steeped in poverty, most of the people were illit

erate peasants who barely subsisted and who never exercised
a voice in their government*

Their leaders came from the

upper classes; but they, too, were untrained and lacked any

2
Bosch, Truiillo: Causas. p. 70.

kind of administrative experience*

Principally interested

in personal power, the leaders grappled with each other and
kept the country in a state of constant turmoil*
The political history of the entire nineteenth and
most of the twentieth centuries was singularly divorced from
issues of any kind*

In its entire independent history, the

single, most outstanding feature of Dominican politics has
been the violence of political antagonism and the absence of
differences of principle among the existing political parties.
Personalities of the leaders, not ideology, dictated party
divisions.
Prom 18M* to m o d e m times, Dominican history has been
a long record of the struggles of the caudillos who were "in"
to retain their power, and those who were woutw to return to
power

.^

For almost a century, rival leaders and their fol

lowers fought back and forth across the countryside, scrambling
for executive or local control.

However, the parties were not

unalterably composed of the same individuals.

•V

The leaders,

as well as the rank and file, continually drifted from one
group to another, with a constant shuffling and reshuffling
of political alliances.

•^Latin Americans have a strong disposition for caudil
los. The caudillo embodies the program of his political
partisans; he is the platform of his party. This is what is
called nersonalismo in Latin American Politics* See Charles
E. Chapman, MThe Age of the Caudillos: A Chapter in Hispanic
American History,” Hispanic American Historical Review.
Vol. XII (August 1932), 281-300.
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Confrontations between opposing sides had nothing to
do with differences over public policy.

In the early days

of the Republic, it appeared that Issues might be the basis
for political alignments when the parties divided over the
question of annexation or independence.

The former Trini-

tarios. led by Duarte, initially held power and were intent
on maintaining the country's independence.

General Pedro

Santana, the first President, continued to fear Haitian in
vasion; and, therefore, supported the idea of placing the
republic under the protection of some major power.

At first

the annexationists were designated as “conservatives,* and
those supporting complete independence were called “liberals."
This division based on issues lasted only a short time.
Following the exile of Duarte, parties seldom took clearly
opposing positions.

No designated group of men adhered per

manently to any set views on the question of annexation.
Instead, the party in power usually espoused the idea of
annexation, while the opposition supported independence.
Before long, the annexationist party split, and
Santana's followers became known as Santanistas.

The other

faction led by Colonel Buenaventura Baez were called Baecistas.
Again nothing ideological distinguished the two new parties.
Both groups were equally conservative, dictatorial and dedi
cated to the idea of a foreign protector.

The Dominican

people continued as before, never knowing anything of politics

6
based on political dialogue.**
Governments continued to rise and fall with frequent
regularity as the Republic alternated between periods of
anarchy and despotism.

Occasionally, liberal leaders appeared,

briefly established new parties based on ideology, and even
managed to gain control of the government.

However, these

well-intentioned governments never retained power long enough
to make a lasting impact.

Instead, the squabble for leader

ship continued as before with the two parties see-sawing in
and out of power, only changing labels from time to time.
The Roios and Azules later replaced the Baecistas and the
Santanistas. but only the names were altered.
For many years, Santana's fear of the Haitians per
sisted, and in 1861, he finally succeeded in proclaiming the
re-incorporation of the Dominican Republic as a part of the
Spanish dominions.

By 1865* the War of Restoration once again

gave the Dominican people their independence, but the restor
ation brought neither peace nor stability.

For a time, from

1882 to 1889, the dictator, General Ulises Heureaux, put an
end to disorder; but he also brought the republic to the brink
of bankruptcy.
By the turn of the century financial mismanagement had
become chronic, and the Dominican Republic was hopelessly in

lL

Pedro Troncoso Sanchez, Estudios de Historia Politics
Dominicana (Santo Domingo: R.R. Julio D. Postigo e hijos
Editores, 1968 ), p. 161.
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debt abroad.

In 19059 when European creditors threatened to

intervene in order to collect their debts, Theodore Roosevelt
applied the famous Roosevelt Corollary and established a
financial receivership.

With precise efficiency, the United

States agents proceeded to pay off the foreign bondholders
and even created a treasury surplus.

All went well until

1911 when the assassination of President Ramon C ace res again
plunged the nation into financial and political chaos.

The

United States then attempted to restore order by intervening
in the political affairs of the nation.

When an anti-United

States faction revolted against the existing government in
May 1916, President Woodrow Wilson sent in the United States
marines and completely occupied the nation.

Prior to the United States intervention, the style of
politics in the Dominican Republic remained the same— only
the names of the leaders varied.

In the twentieth century,

Juan Isidro Jimenez and Horaeio Vasquez dominated the struggle
for leadership.

The earlier Ro.ios and Azules now became the

Jimenistas and the Horacistas; and as before, they constantly
changed groupings, moving back and forth from one party to
another.

Until the American occupation in 1916, politics

followed the same rhythmic pattern— revolutions, declarations
of support, battles, sieges of the capital, take-over, pro
visional government, some form of legitimizing electionfollowed by dissension, counter-revolution and a complete
renewal of the cycle.

8
Constitutional history followed a parallel pattern.
Despite elaborate constitutional provisions, constitutional
processes never decided vital issues.

Revolution and politics

went hand in hand, and revolution became the accepted method
of transferring power.

Always the first act of a successful

take-over was that of promulgating a new constitution in
accordance with the ideas of the new leader.

Each counter

revolution brought with it the abrogation of one constitution
and the establishment of another.

In less than a century of

independence, from 1844 to the time of Trujillo*s assassina
tion in 1961 , Dominicans promulgated twenty-seven constitutions
and were governed by fifty presidents.

In a certain period

in the last third of the nineteenth century, eight constitu
tional texts were approved in eight consecutive years--l874
to 1881; three in the four years between 1 865 and 1868.

On

three occasions— during the years 1854, 1858, and 1929 — two
constitutions were approved in the same year.

Five times,

constitutions previously abrogated were reinstated.

Four

presidents— Baez, Hereaux, Vasquez and Trujillo— promulgated
more than one constitution during their terms.

No constitu

tion lasted more than ten years, but the most stable has been
the first, that of 1844 which was modified in 1854.-*

Chile:

^Jesus de Galindez, La Era de Trujillo (Santiago de
Editorial del Pacifico, 195^)» P* 191*
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The number of constitutions is perhaps misleading
because of the Dominican practice of promulgating new con
stitutions instead of enacting amendments.

The Dominican

essayist Pedro Henriquez Urena declares that the Dominican
Republic has had only two constitutions— the liberal one of
1844 and the autocratic one of December 1854.^

The majority

of the documents have been simple revisions of previous con
stitutions with little substantive change.
The various Dominican presidents have always carefully
followed constitutional forms, while at the same time utterly
disregarding the sanctity of the constitution.

Sumner Welles,

in Naboth’s Vineyard, charges that "the twentieth century
dawned in Santo Domingo without even the vestige of a tradi7
tion of constitutional government or practice.
What, then, does constitutional tradition mean to the
Dominican people?

Was Welles correct in saying that to the

average Dominican *constitutional government is but an empty
Q
phrase?"
Does the Dominican nation attach any importance
to a formalized constitutional order?

Has the Dominican

Constitution ever been real in the sense that it is a

^Jesus de Galindez, La Era de Tru-iillo. p. 192.
^Sumner Welles. Naboth*s Vineyard: The Dominican
Republic. 1844 to 1924 (New York: Payson and Clark, 1928)
II, p. 902.
8Ibld., p. 904.
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fundamental law under which people are governed and under
which their liberties are safeguarded?
tion merely nominal?

Or is the Constitu

Karl Lowenstein defines a nominal

constitution as one which is "merely a declaration of con
stitutional intent, a blueprint which expects to become a
reality in the future.

Its habitat is in nations where

Western constitutionalism is implanted into a colonial and/
o

or agrarian feudal social structure."^

What is the reality of constitutionalism in the
Dominican Republic?
Jesus de Galindez notes that in Latin America the
people and their leaders instinctively revere the idea of a
constitution, but seldom do they apply its principles in
practice.

Almost never is the constitution a basic document

under which people are governed.

Usually, it is a program

of political action imposed by the predominant group.

For

this reason, it changes as frequently as-governments come
and go.

The constitution is not permanent; instead, each

new regime quickly writes into another constitution the
methods and principles it cares to apply. 10
In his article dealing with Latin American con
stitutions, J. L. Mecham asserts that Latin American

^Karl Lowenstein, "The Value of Constitutions in Our
Revolutionary Age" in A. J. Zurcher, ed., Constitutions and
Constitutional Trends Since World War II (2nd ed.) (New
York: New York University Press, 1955)» p. 205*
10Galindez, La Era de Tru.llllo. p. 189.
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constitutional attitudes differ radically from those of
Anglo America.

To Anglo Americans the constitution is

fundamental law and must be observed, while to Latin Ameri
cans, it is in most cases merely a declaration of ideals
and objectives.

To Anglo Americans, the constitution is

sacrosanct, for Anglo Americans prescribe to the principle
of government by law.

To Latin Americans, the constitution

is usually a useful and convenient guide and program which
must bend to the principles of government by men. 11
Despite great discrepancies between constitutional
principles and their application, Latin American nations
still attach importance to a written formalized document.
Constitutions serve a useful purpose since they describe the
organization, structure and powers of the government, even
though the constitution makers do not delude themselves that
they are building upon achieved democracy.

Even dictators

feel the need to use constitutions to give an air of respect
ability to their regimes.
The reality of Dominican constitutionalism has been
much the same as that of other Latin American countries.
Early independence produced a constitution based on western
political tradition, but in almost every case a caudillo
emerged to carry on by force and authority what could not

11

J. L. Mecham, "Latin American Constitutions:
Nominal and Real," Journal of Politics. Vol. XXI (May 1959)>
258-75.

be arranged by compromise and cooperation.

Most of the time,

the Dominican Constitution has been an instrument for the
attainment of power and for the preservation of special
interests,

Sumner Welles declared that "instead of being

regarded as a sacred charter of the peoples* liberties, the
Constitution has been considered a • , , source of advantage
to legitimize the caudillo's power."

12

Other times the

nation*s charter has been the written expression, in legal
form, of that which has already been accomplished.

Fre

quently the Constitution has been used for propaganda value.
At times it has served as a statement of goals, but seldom
has it been an instrument for the pursuit of happiness for
all of the people.
Only after the assassination of the dictator, Rafael
Leonidas Trujillo, did Dominicans begin to look at their
Constitution in a different light.

By 1962 a newly awakened

populace began to view the Constitution as more than a mere
statement of goals.

After the election of Juan Bosch as

President, many Dominicans, who had previously been excluded
from the political decision-making processes, began to think
of the 1963 Constitution as an instrument which, at long
last, could fulfill their personal aspirations.

Unfortun

ately, aspirations met frustrations when Juan Bosch and his

1 belles, Naboth*s Vineyard, p. 90^.
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reform constitution were overthrown in September of 1963*
In April 1965, the Dominican Republic erupted into
bloody civil war.

From the beginning, the rebels called

themselves "constitutionalists" and the loyalists were
called "anti-constitutionalists."

The battle cry of the

revolution was, "a return to constitutionalism with Juan
Bosch and the Constitution of 1963 ."
After one hundred years of chaotic constitutional
tradition, why were Dominicans suddenly willing to fight
and die in the name of constitutionalism?

Had the idea of

a government based on fundamental law become a vital force
in Dominican life?
To determine the answers to these questions, this
work will briefly examine Dominican constitutional history
and the role that constitutionalism has played in the past.
This study will also deal with the Trujillo legacy, the
rising expectations experienced by Dominicans after the
dictator's assassination, and the influence of Juan Bosch
on political attitudes.

All of these facets of Dominican

life have a direct bearing on the violence of April 1965*
It is also necessary to examine and compare the
Constitutions of 1962 and 1963 , along with the debates that
centered around the draft Constitution of 1963 *

The enact

ment of the Constitution of 1963 polarized Dominican society,
but it must be pointed out that the constitutional dispute
was only one of many causes which contributed to the

14
ultimate breakdown of the Dominican society.
To truly understand the failure of constitutional
government in the Dominican Republic, one must probe deeply
to look for the root causes.

It Is necessary to consider

the recurrent historical pattern of chaos, violence, and
political and economic stagnation which have characterized
Dominican life since before the days of independence.

In

addition, it is essential to keep in mind the destabilizing
effects of earlier American interventions and the political
bankruptcy bequeathed to Dominicans by the Trujillo dicta
torship.

Against this background of past failures, one must

juxtapose the rising tide of expectations which Dominicans
began to experience with the assassination of Trujillo.
In 1961, all Dominicans began to sense new possi
bilities ahead.

During the Trujillo regime, much of the

populace had been made to feel a part of the nation.

In the

presidential election of 1962, Juan Boscb further aroused
the political consciousness of the masses; but, even more
important, he instilled in them a feeling of hope.

At the

same time, those groups and individuals who had gained
positions of power and wealth during the Trujillo era be
came acutely aware of their own vulnerability and were
fearful of being displaced.

The result was a situation in

which fears clashed against rising hopes.

These and other

societal tensions manifested themselves as a struggle over
the Constitution of 1963.

In reality, however, the consti-

15
tutional dispute was merely a surface aspect of the deeper
dissensions and fragmentation in the society.

Most Domini

cans knew nothing of constitutional concepts or ideological
principles.

Fundamentally, Dominicans contended with one

another over basic human concerns.

The deprived and ex

cluded fought for improved social and economic benefits— a
higher standard of living, opportunities for employment, a
chance to educate their children.

Opposing groups and

individuals sought to gain personal power, to retain privi
leges, or to preserve social, political, and economic
positions previously attained.
This study will attempt to examine these human con
cerns as well as the question of constitutionalism in order
to determine the real sources of conflict in the Dominican
Revolution.

CHAPTER I
DOMINICAN CONSTITUTIONS
Dominicans have lived under many constitutions.
Colonial Spain initiated the constitutional process in 1812
when the Dominicans voluntarily rejoined the Spanish Empire.
The Spanish Regency brought the Dominicans under the juris
diction of the Constitution of Cadiz and granted the
Dominicans representation in the Spanish Assembly.

In 1814-,

the Spanish monarch, Ferdinand VII, regained the throne and
immediately abrogated the Cadiz Constitution, ushering in an
era of absolute rule and oppression for Spaniards and Domini
cans alike.
When a revolution in Spain forced Ferdinand to
restore the Constitution of 1812, the Dominican independence
leader, Nunez de Caceres, seized the opportunity to proclaim
the independence of "Spanish Haiti" on November 30 » 1821.
Caceres* Declaratory Act of December 1, 1821, outlining the
provisional lines of the government he hoped to establish,
reflected the influence of the "French Declaration of The
Rights of Man."1

Unfortunately, Dominican hopes for

1Creat Britain, Foreign Office, British and Foreign
State Pacers, 1830, Vol. VIII, "Dominica: The Declaratory
Act of 1821," p. 557.
16
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independence were short-lived, and a few months later, Haitian',
armies once again marched across the Dominican border; thus,
*

preventing the application of the Caceres document.
During the Haitian occupation from 1822 to 1844,
Dominicans were governed under two Haitian constitutions.
Several prominent Dominicans, among them Buenaventura Baez,
served in the Haitian Assembly and participated in the Haitian
Constituent Assembly of 1843.

At the same time, however,

Dominicans plotted to free themselves from Haitian rule.
In 1844, upon the proclamation of the independence of
the Dominican Republic, a Constitutional Convention met at
San Cristobal and drafted the first Constitution of the Re
public, the Constitution of 1844.

Fashioned along the lines

of the United States Constitution, the Dominican charter
divided the functions of government into the classic execu
tive, legislative and judicial branches, and announced that
the government would be unitary, civil and,, representative,
and would follow the presidential form.
The document empowered the Senate and Chamber of
Representatives to enact legislation and to pass legislation
over an executive veto.

The President, who was to serve a

four year term, would be ineligible for re-election.

The

Constitution granted him broad administrative and appointive
powers, and he was to be assisted by ministers chosen by him,
but subject to interpolation by Congress and the Provincial
Governors.

18
The Constitution proclaimed that Dominicans are bora
"free and equal as regards their rights," and that slavery
would be abolished forever.

2

An elaborate statement of human

rights guaranteed individual personal liberties such as pro
tection during arrest and trial, freedom of speech, press,
assembly, and the right of petition.

The document also

guaranteed the inviolability of property, home, and corres
pondence.
Roman Catholicism was declared the state religion,
but there would be no privileges or fueros (trials of reli
gious personnel by special ecclesiastical courts), no
ecclesiastical ownership of property nor civil collection
of Church revenue.
The first Dominican charter also established the
principle of free elementary education.
By almost any standard, the Constitution of San
Cristobal was liberal.

In the 19th century, all of the

constitutions of Latin America reflected the influence of
eighteenth and nineteenth century Western political tradition.
Nevertheless, as Franklin J. Pichardo Franco points out in
his book, La Republica Dominicana. Clases. Crisis y Com
mandos . in Latin America there was a basic difference.

In

Brit, and For. St. Papers. 1865, Vol. XLVI.
"Dominica: Constitution of February 27, 1854," p. 1320.
Note: This provision is the same in both the 1844 Consti
tution and the 1854 document. A complete copy of the
original 1844 Constitution is not available.
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the United States and Europe, this liberal spirit was the
product of economic and social development and above all,
the rise of the middle class*

"In our country," Franco points

out, "liberalism has always remained only a spirit and has
never been tied to material reality."-^
The Constitution of 1844 proclaimed popular sover
eignty, but it did not provide for popular suffrage.

As

Franco points out, the first Constitution contained a subtle
mechanism which prevented participation by the masses in the
political life of the country.

Voting requirements disen

franchised a large segment of the population by employing the
complicated apparatus of an Electoral College composed of
electors who were chosen by another body:
bly.

The Primary Assem

Article 160 of the Constitution stated that in order

to vote in the Primary Assembly, an individual must be "a
landed proprietor, public employee, officer in the army or
navy, have a patent for the exercise of some profession or
trade, be a professor of some science or liberal art, or be
a renter of a farm in active cultivation." 4
The Constitution gave to the Primary Assemblies the
duty of choosing from each commune, the electors who would
form the Electoral College of the province.

Article 163 then

■^Franklin J. Pichardo Franco, La Republica Dominic ana.
Clases. Crisis y Commandos (Habana, Cuba: Casa de las
Americas, 1966), p. 148.
Brit. & For. St. Papers. Vol. XLVI, pp. 1322-23.
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assigned to the Electoral College the function of electing
the members of the Chamber of Representatives, the Chamber
of the Senate, the members of the Court, and the President
of the Republic.^
Thus, from the very beginning, a small group of those
who had been the most active participators in the fight for
independence were able to defend the interests of their
class and consolidate their power under the banner of the
caudillo.Santana.
''

4

The first Primary Assembly had chosen Santana as the
first President of the Republic*

On the premise that such

a power was necessary to defend the Republic against Haitian
encroachment, Santana forced Article 210 upon the Convention.
This article, which has since been a part of almost every
Dominican Constitution, stated that during a war the President
could declare a wstate of siege,* and he could freely organ
ize the army, mobilize the national guard* suspend all
constitutional guarantees and privileges, or take any
measure necessary for the defense and security of the nation.
The President could give all orders and decrees without
authorization from any other governmental body*
Ten years later, liberal forces, not satisfied with
the first document, set out to reform it.

A lengthy preamble

to the Constitution of February 27, 185^, explained the
specific purposes of the new provisions.
-’Brit. & For. St. Papers. Vol. XLVI, p. 1324-.
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The new document eliminated Article 210, and in the
preamble stated that in either war or peace the powers of
the executive must always be exercised along constitutional
lines*

Further, the preamble emphasized that "having laid

aside the almost dictatorial power conferred by Article 210,
the Executive will apply to every social grievance the
necessary remedy but must give Congress a detailed account
of its proceedings."^
The February 185^ document instituted the office of
Vice-President with the specific purpose of providing continuity should the President die, resign, or be removed.

"By

this means the deplorable consequences of all mere temporary
periods will be remedied, and the imminent dangers constantly
threatening a headless . . .

government will be averted."'

In this way the writers of the revised Charter hoped to make
future de facto revolutions impossible.
The February Constitution also re-organized the
judiciary and made the Supreme Court more independent by
stating that "no power of the State is competent ever to
g
invalidate the decisions of this supreme tribunal . . . ."
The new constitution even attempted to infuse more
vigor into local governing bodies by assigning special powers
to the corporations exercising municipal authority.

6Brit. & For. St. Papers. Vol. XLVI, p. 1317.
7Ibid.. p. 1316 .

8Ibia.. p. 1317.

The
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writers of the document stated that they hoped that in this
manner the "citizen would early acquire a political education."9
This new liberal document, with its high hopes, lived
only a brief life; for when Santana returned to the presi
dency later that year, he imposed his autocratic Constitution
of December 1, 185^.

The Santana document sharply reduced

individual rights, restricted the franchise even more, and
made the Electoral College more indirect.

It reduced the

Congress to one house with no authority to enact laws without .
executive approval.

Santana added another article which

further facilitated the aggrandizement of executive power.

„

Article 35 of the December Constitution empowered the Presi
dent to take all necessary action to preserve the country
not only in time of war, but also in time of emergency.

In

addition, the December document provided that constitutional
amendments would be in the hands of a constitutional conven
tion to be convoked, not by the Congress, but by the
President.1^
Thus began the pattern which has dominated Dominican
constitutional life since independence.

The two constitutions,

the Constitution of San Cristobal of lSkk, amended in February

9Brit. & For. St. Papers. Vol. XLVI, p. 1318.
10
Otto Schoenrich, Santo Domingo: A Country With a
Future (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1918)» P* 52.
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1854, and Santana's Constitution of December 1, 1854, became
the basis for all future constitutions.

Constitutions, like

the caudillos. see-sawed in and out of existence, and Domini
can constitutional history mirrored its political history:
numerous interruptions in the constitutional life with the
constant abrogation of one document and the re-instatement
of another.
Though there were variations, the pattern always
remained the same.

Occasionally, liberal leaders succeeded

in gaining power, at which time they proceeded to further
liberalize the 1844 Constitution.
tution of February 19, 1858.

Such was the Moca Consti

This document instituted direct

election by secret ballot, of all elective officials except
the national Senators.

This same charter abolished the death
11
penalty for political crimes.
As usual, the Moca Constitu
tion lasted only a brief period though it was reinstated
again on January 24, 1865 when Dominicans$ for the last time,
proclaimed their independence from Spain.

The 1865 document

introduced universal manhood suffrage and extended the secret
ballot for all elective offices.

This continued to be the

basic liberal constitutional form until the American occupa
tion in 1916.

Later constitutions such as the one of March 24,

1874, while retaining Homan Catholicism as the official re
ligion, established religious toleration.

Subsequent

11Brit. & For. St. Papers. 1866, Vol. XLV1II.
"Dominica: The Constitution of 1858," p. 1071*
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constitutions added freedom of teaching and abolition of the
death penalty to the bill of rights.
Such a recitation of liberal provisions might lead one
to believe that Dominicans were governed by an enlightened
fundamental law.

The trend toward liberalization was not

consistent; rather, it was alternately liberal and autocratic.
Between the promulgation of the liberal documents, the auto
cratic Constitution of December 1854 was reinstated on
September 27* 1858; April 19* 1866; April 23* 1868; and
September 14, 1872.

The Constitution of July 28, 1879 re

duced individual rights, restricted the franchise and made
the electoral system more indirect.

The Constitution of

November 23* 1881, once again empowered the president uni
laterally to assume all constitutional authority in time of
emergency.

It militarized regional and local governments by

providing for combined civil and military governors and local
rule by an army commandant.

This document did, however,

retain most previously established rights, direct elections
and universal manhood suffrage.

The Constitution of Novem

ber 1 5 * 1887* differed only in that it reverted to indirect
election.

The Constitutions of June 12, 1896, and May 21,

1903* were all modeled on that of 1887.
The only substantial twentieth-century changes were
found in the Constitutions of June 11, 1907* and February 22,
1908.

Using the United States as a model, the 1908 document

provided that the Congress be renewed in three parts, and
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the Chamber of Deputies was to be renewed by one-half every
two years.

The 1908 document retained indirect election and

abolished the vice-presidency.
By 1916, the American military occupation suspended
all constitutional authority and placed Dominicans under
martial rule.

Upon withdrawal of the United States military

forces ten years later, Dominicans once again wrote a new
Constitution which was promulgated on June 13, 1924.

It

reinstated the vice-presidency and a direct electoral system,
abolished the renewal of Congress in parts, and it disenfranchised members of the armed forces and the police.
Subsequent constitutions remained essentially unaltered ’
until the second Constitution of the Trujillo period.
Thus ended the first period of Dominican constitution
alism.

Tracing and following its tortuous path is difficult

indeed, but one certain pattern emerges— the pattern of
constantly recurring instability.

General Rafael Leonidas

Trujillo was soon to impose order and end this pattern, but
at an extremely high cost to the Dominican people.
Constitutionalism Under Tru.iillo
During the thirty years of the Trujillo dictatorship,
the Constitution no longer remained the instrument of privi
lege and self-interest for caudillos and their followers.
Instead the Constitution served only one person:
Trujillo.

General

A look at constitutionalism under his dictatorship
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will reveal the many ways in which Trujillo twisted the
Dominican Constitution to serve his own ends*
In 1924, following the withdrawal of the American
occupation, Horacio Vasquez was elected President and brought
a few years of relative freedom and order to the Dominican
Republic.

In March 1930, the Vice-President, Rafael Estrella

Urena, launched a revolution against Vasquez, who by that
time was weak and ailing.

General Trujillo, who now con-,

trolled the nation1s army, refused to defend the Vasquez,? .
regime.

Vasquez resigned, and Trujillo, pushing Urena aside,

proclaimed himself a presidential candidate.

On May 16, 1930,

Trujillo won the Presidency without opposition.
Trujillo put an end to political disturbances, but
continued the practice of promulgating new constitutions.

He

governed under four different documents, all of which were
basically the same.12

His Constitution of June 19, 1934 did

not visibly change the earlier 1924 document.

On January 10,

1942, Trujillo enacted his second constitution which enfran
chised women, eliminated the vice-presidency and broadened
individual rights pertaining to social welfare.

The Consti

tution of 1947, essentially a restatement of its predecessor,

12Texts of the Trujillo constitutions may be found as
follows: June 12, 1934, Brit, and For. St. Papers, 1939* Vol.
CXXXVII, p. 421; Constitution of January 10, 1942, Ibid., 1952
V. CXLIV, p. 1136. January 10, 1947, R. H. Fitzgibbon, The
Constitutions of America (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1946), p. 299* December 1, 1955, Pau American Union,
Constitution of the Dominican Republic (Washington, D.C.:

.

1955 )
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added more social welfare provisions, proclaimed freedom of
education, and made primary instruction obligatory and sub
ject to the supervision
The Constitution

of the state*
of 1955 further expandedwelfare

provisions; made it obligatory for illiterates to be educated;
required the state to act for the improvement of housing and
working conditions; and pledged state assistance to the
dependent elderly and poor*
hibited the maintenance

The 1955 Constitution also pro

of programs or

with Communism and praised

Trujillo as

doctrinesaffiliated
"The Father of His

Country."
Article 11 of the 1955 Constitution contained a new
feature in the form of Concordat between the Holy See and
the Dominican Republic "in accordance with the Law of God
and the Catholic tradition of the Dominican Republic.11 Signed
in 195^» the Concordat with the Vatican was held to govern
Church-State relations, and it granted vast concessions to
the Church.
On the surface, none of the Trujillo constitutions
seemed ill-conceived.

All continued to assert the principle

of civil, republican, democratic and representative govern
ment.

In appearance Trujillo governed the Dominican Republic

constitutionally with a structure similar to any typical
Western democracy.

There was, however, no relationship

between the written precepts and the practical realities.
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Once in office, Trujillo established control over the
entire governmental apparatus.

First and foremost, he

bolstered his control through the power of the armed forces.
In addition, Trujillo used the Dominican Constitution as
another of his principal vehicles for wielding autocratic
authority.
Trujillo ruled absolutely, but always within a consti
tutional framework.

Above all, he maintained the external

forms of democratic rule and appeared to observe them
meticulously.

Trujillo followed the Constitution to the

letter, but the letter was one thing and its daily application
quite another.

The Constitution was a facade which hid the

excesses of his dictatorship and masked his absolutism.

In

the words of Jesus de Galindez, constitutionalism under
1^
Trujillo was a "parody." J
Since 1844 when Santana added Article 210, almost all
Dominican constitutions have granted wide“emergency powers
to the chief executive.

Article 49of the Constitution

empowered the President,

in case of disturbance of the public

peace, to decree a state of siege and suspend individual
rights.

Nevertheless,

it was not the authority to rule

decree which was the chief source of Trujillo*s power.

by

The

1^Galindez, La Era de Trujillo, p. 189*
^ T h e Constitution of 1949* Unless otherwise speci
fied, all citations of the Trujillo constitutions will refer
to the text of the 1949 document.
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real mechanism of control during the Trujillo dictatorship
was the facade of constitutional democracy which he adopted
and presented to the outside world; while, at the same time,
perverting all of the guarantees and safeguards set forth
in the Dominican charter.
Numerous illustrations may be cited to demonstrate
the ways in which Trujillo made the Constitution a vehicle
for absolute control.

For example, Title I of the Constitu

tion states that the government is divided into three
branches, each being independent in its respective functions.
All of the functions are meticulously spelled out.

In

addition, all local and national officials were to be
directly elected for a period of five years.

This was the

letter of the Constitution; the reality was another matter.
Three branches, each independent of the other never existed
during the Trujillo regime, nor was any official actually
elected for a period of five years.

Only-the individual

power of Trujillo existed--a power which he derived through
his role as chief of the Partido Dominicano.

It was through

the party that Trujillo found his most effective machinery
for the total domination of the Dominican political system.
Trujillo registered his Partido Dominicano with the
Central Election Board on March 11, 1932, and the party
statutes were the perfect vehicle for the manipulation of
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Dominican s o c i e t y . E v e r y t h i n g was concentrated in the hands
of the Chief of the Party.

The statutes established branches

in every community and province.

The Chief of the Party,

directly or indirectly appointed all local, provincial or
national officials.
ject to his approval.

All decisions and nominations were sub
He named all paid employees, authorized

all expenses and had legal authority to interpret the statutes
as he wished.
The Partido Dominicano was not confined to a few
important followers of Trujillo.

It was a mass organization,

and almost anyone who was important belonged.

No one in

public, professional,or business life could survive outside
the party.
Moreover, in actual practice, the party became a part
of the official government.

The Chairman of its Central

Committee served as one of the Secretaries of State.

The

expenses of the party and the cost of its programs were met
by a flat 10 per cent deduction from paychecks of all members.
If the members were employed by the government, the Treasury
withheld the deductions.

l fi

1 *5
<For the text of the statutes of the Partido Domini
cano. see Jose F. Penson, El Partido Dominicano (Ciudad
Trujillo: Imprenta Arte y Cine, 1958)> PP* 68-74.
16
Hobert D. Crassweller, Tru.iillo: The Life and Times
of a Caribbean Dictator (New York: The Macmillan Company,
1966), p. 99.
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It was through this party machinery that Trujillo
exercised his political power.

But the key to understanding

Trujillo*s total centralization of authority is found in the
Dominican Constitution itself.

Article 16 of the Constitution

states that
When vacancies of Senators or Deputies occur,
they will be filled by the corresponding Chamber,
which will choose the substitute from the panel
presented by the appropriate organization of the
political party to which the Senator or Deputy
who gave rise to the vacancy belonged.
This provision fit in perfectly with Article 39 of the
statutes of the Partido Dominicano.
powerful weapon.

Here was Trujillo^ most

Article 39 requires that "all elected

officials deliver written but undated resignations to the
17
Chief of the Party upon election.n 1
The Partido Dominicano, of course, was the only party,
and Trujillo was the Chief of that party.
unsigned resignations in his desk.

He kept those

If a legislator or a judge

or any other office-holder defied the party line, he could
expect to wake up the next morning and read of his resigna
tion in the newspaper.

Trujillo applied this device to every

elective and appointive office in the nation.
branch of government was independent.

No person or

There was no guarantee

that an elected official would serve out his constitutional
term.

1 ^Franco, Crisis y Commandos, p. 153»
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Legislators rubber stamped legislation, never attempt
ing to oppose Trujillo^ decisions.

The Supreme Court, too,

was theoretically an independent branch of the government and
had the power of judicial review.

Jesus de Galindez, though

he states that he cannot give exact documentation, charges
that Dominican tribunals did not dare to make decisions that
criticized the constitutionality or the legality of laws
approved by the Congress or actions taken by the government.
The outward appearance of a co-equal three branched govern
ment was nothing more, argues Galindez, "than a masquerade
18

covering an obedient court and congress.w

.

h

The key, of

course, to this obedience was the unsigned resignation in
accordance with the statutes of the Partido Dominicano.
In addition to nullifying the independence of the
three branches of government, Trujillo perverted the Consti
tution in other ways.

The Constitution provided for elections

under the supervision of a Central Electoral Board and in
accordance with the principles that the law and the Consti
tution indicated, but Trujillo falsified returns or
manipulated them to further his own ends.
In addition, Trujillo did not hesitate to revise the
Constitution to strengthen his personal economic powers or
to give himself special powers for the benefit of his private

18
Galindez, La Era de Trujillo, p. 199*
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or family affairs.

In 1959 Trujillo added a modification to

the 1955 Constitution, Article 107* which said that the
property of persons who exercised the office of President
or Vice-President, as well as their widows or heirs, shall
have the highest protection of the State.

In no case could

the President or Vice-President be subject to prosecution,
restrictions, expropriation or dispossession, total or
partial, of any part of his public or private authority.
And so, the mockery continued.

19

For any meaningful

provision of the Constitution, Trujillo used the technique
of perverting the application to his ends.

Though he placed

little value on the precepts of the Constitution and never
vacillated in modifying it to remove obstacles which stood
in his way, he was always careful to give a constitutional
appearance to even the most minimum details.

The will of

Trujillo was omnipotent but always artfully concealed under
constitutional trappings.

Such methods had a profound effect

on the later political life of the Dominican people.

1^Franco, Crisis y Commandos, p. 156 .

CHAPTER II
THE SETTING
"Pero un regimen politico no es un hecho
aislado sino el fruto del arbol nacional.
Es en las raices del arbol donde hay que
buscar la razon de que el fruto sea sano
o enfermo.w Juan Bosch1
The Ghost of Tru.iillo
Thirty years of the Trujillo dictatorship reshaped
the character of Dominican society and profoundly altered
the socio-economic structure.

These far-reaching changes

brought with them a legacy which contributed in "a major way
to the disorder, frustration and chaos of the post-Trujillo
period and ultimately to the 1965 breakdown of the system
into revolution and civil war."

2

In order to understand why Trujillo was able to
transform Dominican society, it is necessary to return to
1916 and the American military occupation which ended the

Juan Bosch, Tru.iillo: Causas. p. 12. Translation:
WA political regime is not an isolated fact, but the fruit
of the national tree. One must look at the roots of the tree
to determine whether the fruit will be healthy or diseased."
2

Howard J. Wiarda, Dictatorship and Development: The
Methods of Control in Trujillo*s Dominican Republic (Gainesville, Florida: The University of Florida Press, 1968),
P. 193*
3^

long period of caudillo politics.

Several aspects of that

period distinguish the history of the Dominican Republic from
that of most other Latin American countries.

It was these

differences which help to account for the ease with which
Trujillo came to dominate Dominican society.

It is essential

to note that at the time that the United States established
military control in the Dominican Republic, the traditional
triad of "oligarchy," "church," and "military" did not domin
ate Dominican society.

Dominican social history differs from

that of most Hispanic nations in that Spanish control and
influence was neither continuous nor strong.

In addition,

the repeated large scale emigrations of important landholders
and the Catholic clergy, plus the complete absence of a
unified military force, prevented the consolidation of a
ruling elite.
Examination will reveal that throughout its inde
pendent history, the Dominican Republic hajs lacked a powerful
oligarchy.

With the first Spanish withdrawal in 1795* many

of the elite families began their series of emigrations from
Santo Domingo.

Successive Haitian occupations further

diminished the Spanish population,and most of the important
white families were either killed or fled.

The exodus of

these more prosperous and educated members of the society
precluded the emergence of a group of large and powerful
landowners.

Furthermore, political disorders prevented the

growth of commerce and industry as an alternative source of
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wealth*

In the nineteenth century a small group of pres

tigious families emerged at the top, tout their influence was
primarily social and did not rest on an economic base.

Thus,

the elite families were not wealthy or powerful; but were,
instead, "insecure and unable to exert political control.
In addition, the Church, though powerful had not been
the strong we11-entrenched force that it has been in other
Latin American countries.

It, too, had been weakened by the

Spanish withdrawal in 1795 •

After 1822, Haitian occupation

authorities deliberately tried to destroy what was left of
the Church as an institution by expropriating property and
deporting priests.

Since that time, the Church had never

regained its wealth or power.

h,

Last, and most significant, before the American occu
pation, the Dominican Republic had not developed a national

■^Abraham P. Lowenthal, "The Dominican Republic: The
Politics of Chaos," reprinted from Reform and Revolution,
edited by A.von Lazar and R.R. Kaufman (Allyn and Bacon, Inc.,
1969) by the Brookings Institution (Washington, D.C., 1969 )*
For more on the oligarchy see Wiarda, Dictatorship and
Development, p. 99; Macio Antonio Mejia Ricart, Las clases
sociales en Santo Domingo (Ciudad Trujillo: Liberia Dominicana, 1953)» PP• 23-24; Juan Isidro Jiraenez-Grullon, "Estructura de Nuestra Oligarqhia," Listin Diario. December 12,
1964, p. 7; Juan Bosch, Trujillo: Causas de una tirania sin
ejemplo, pp. 56-71«
^See Wiarda, Dictatorship and Development, p. 144;
Wiarda, "The Changing Political Orientation of the Catholic
Church in the Dominican Republic," A Journal of Church and
State. VII, Spring 1965, 238-254; Juan P. Pepen, La Cruz^
senala el camino: influencia de la iglesia en la formacion y
conservacion de la naclonalldad dominicana (Ciudad Trujillo:
Editorial Duarte, 1954); William Louis Wipfler, The Churches
of the Dominican Republic in the Light of History (Cuernavaca,
Mexico: Centro Intercultural de Documentacion, 1966).

military institution.

Shortly after the Spanish coloniza

tion, the Haitians began their long occupation of Santo
Domingo.

While neighboring countries fought their wars of

national independence, in Santo Domingo, rival bands and
their caudillos fought among themselves.

When the Dominicans

finally prepared to oust the Haitians in 1 8 ^ , Haitian
strength had declined to a low level; and it was not neces
sary to muster a strong unified military force.

With only

the help of the caudillos and their followers, the revolu
tionaries easily overcame the Haitians.

After independence,

the military chiefs once again split into small bands whose
<
members were loyal only to their respective leaders.^
Hence, contrary to the accepted opinion in almost
every piece of writing on the Dominican Republic, a powerful
triad of oligarchy, church and military did not control
politics and the economy.

Instead, as Abraham Lowenthal

insists, "the Dominican scene could be described as exactly
the reverse:

1

an insecure grouping of elite families, a weak

^Marvin Goldwert, The Constabulary in the Dominican
Republic and Nicaragua: Progency and Legacy of the United
States Intervention (Gainesville: University of Florida
Press, 1962); Luis F . Mejia, De Lills a Tru.iillo: Historia
contemporanea de la Reoubllca Dominicana (Caracas: 194*0.
p. 1^7: Sumner Welles. Naboth*s Vineyard: Max Henriques
Urena, Los Estados Unidos y la Renublica dominicana: la
verdad de los hechos. comprobado nor datos y documentos
oficiales (Havana: Imprente El Siglo XX, 1919)•

38
£
and dependent church and no national military institution*"
Thus, as Lowenthal points out, "a power vacuum existed which
was filled by the continuous, virtually unchecked struggles
of caudillos and their a d h e r e n t s * B y 1916, the United
States, fearing that its security and financial institutions
were threatened, thought it necessary to intervene with a
military occupation.

This total intervention had a crucial

bearing on the future history of the Dominican Republic and
especially on Trujillo and the armed forces*
Attributing the turmoil to the lack of a national
military institution, the United States set about organizing
a non-partisan National Constabulary*

Before the intervention,

This is the approach taken by Abraham Lowenthal in
his essay, "The Dominican Republic; The Politics of Chaos."
Lowenthal expresses his personal dissatisfaction with the
available literature on the Dominican Republic* He explains
that while working in the Dominican Republic as a Ford Foun
dation Training Associate from 1964 to 1966 , he experienced
first-hand many of the events others have ‘discussed in print.
Reading various published accounts, hefound it difficult to
match his own perceptions and those of Dominican friends
with what he found in most of the available literature on
the Dominican Republic.
Lowenthal also challenges the discussion of Latin
American History in terras of the supposed triad of "oligarchy,
church and military." He charges that this "conventional
approach," which has been espoused by writers such as Frank
Tannenbaum, Ten Keys to Latin America and James Bryce, South
America: Observations and Impressions. is "being discarded
bit by bit," as sociologists examine the area's history and
current situation.
I wish to express my indebtedness to Lowenthal for
this line of reasoning. This work will not attempt to sup
port or refute Lowenthal's assertions in regard to other Latin
American countries; however, my own research tends to support
Lowenthal*s opinion on the role of the "triad" in Dominican
history.
7

1Lowenthal, Politics of Chaos, p* 53*
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the Dominican military establishments were fragmented and
inept.

Power was divided between the national government and

the provincial governors and was easily accessible to the
members of the warring political factions.
With the organization of the Constabulary, the United
States introduced a new power factor into the politics of
the Dominican Republic.

United States officers of the inter

vention replaced the traditional elites in government, and
provincial rulers were stripped of their military power.
Enraged by such intervention, members of the elite refused
to serve as officers, little realizing that they were for
feiting their already weakened political power.

The United

States military government found it necessary to call upon
new social elements to fill the officer corp of the Constabu
lary.

Representative of this social change was the middle8
class officer, Rafael Leonidas Trujillo.
The result of the United States intervention was the
centralization, unification and modernization of the Dominican
armed forces.

By organizing a relatively stable institution

in a society totally lacking in firmly-rooted institutions,
the United States authorities helped make it possible for the
head of the newly established military force, General Trujillo,
to seize power and to retain control for thirty years.

Q

Trujillo's father was a small, not very successful,
businessman.
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In assessing the far-reaching effects of the American
intervention, Marvin Goldwert, in his monograph on the Con- '
stabulary, asserts that
. . . viewed in retrospect, the Constabulary
policy represented a tragic simplification of
the causes of Latin American instability and
chronic militarism. The broad chasm between
democratic forms and political and socio-econom
ic realities in the Dominican Republic doomed q
the non-partisan constabulary from the outset.

*

The newly centralized, unified, and modernized Constabulary,
after the withdrawal of the marines, quickly became converted
:
V
into an instrument for the rise and consolidation of the
dictatorship of Trujillo.

This same military apparatus be

came the chief buttress of Trujillo*s power and made it
possible for him to maintain absolute and monolithic control.
Once in power, Trujillo*s system of domination
reached into every aspect of Dominican life.

Howard Wiarda

points out that Trujillo was not the typical caudillo.

In

stead he used the techniques of the modern totalitarian state.
His near monopoly over national life allowed him to control
the day-to-day existence of the entire population, and Min
so controlling the Dominican society, he completely trans
formed its structure.*110

q
^Goldwert, The Constabulary. p. vi*
10Wiarda, Dictatorship and Development, p. 195*

No longer was the Dominican Republic a country ruled
by regional caudillos squabbling over local spoils.
performed the function of a unifying dictator.

Trujillo

Before 1930#

the Dominican Republic was a collection of separate towns
jr.•v■

and villages immersed in local and personal political con
flicts.

Trujillo built roads, improved transportation, and

modernized communication by creating a powerful radio network
At the same time, previously isolated elements were beginning
to be uprooted, mobilized and organized.
became more complex.

The entire society

Trujillo destroyed most of the old

order, but as new groups arose, he kept them subjugated.

No

group or individual was ever allowed to wield any influence.
When Trujillo came to power, poverty and illiteracy
were widespread; the economy was exclusively agricultural.
Trujillo*s rule began the transition to modernity and ended
the country*s semi-feudal order.

Trujillo also performed the

function of an economic nationalist.

On behalf of himself

or his family, he purchased foreign holdings and brought most
of the national wealth into Dominican hands.

He thereby

transformed the pattern of the economy, and upon his death
most of his personal holdings plus the holdings of the state
became public patrimony.

As a result of the assumption by

the state of ownership of all the properties of the Trujillo
family, the Dominican Republic in 1968 had a higher percent
age of its Gross National Product in the public sector than

bz

any country in the hemisphere except socialist Cuba .*1

These

holdings were tremendous and the stakes involved later be
came one of the chief sources of conflict during the Bosch
12
regime and the Revolution of 1965*
Even though such economic activity was chiefly for his
own ends, Trujillo brought capitalism and industrial develop
ment to the Dominican Republic*

He began or expanded many

industries, notably those concerned with producing flour,
peanut oil, cement, paper and glass.

Between 1936 and 1956,

the industrial work force expanded four times; electric production multiplied fifteen times. J
changed from regional to national.

The import-export pattern
Santo Domingo became the

commercial and financial administrative center of the country.
Industrialization brought rapid urbanization, an
expansion of governmental activities, and the emergence of
new social groups.

11
Lowenthal, Politics of Chaos, p.
12
Official sources revealed that Trujillo^ share of
the national wealth had amounted to the following: bank
deposits, 22#; money in circulation, 25#; sugar production,
63#; cement, 63#; paper, 73#; paint, 86#; cigarettes, 71#;
milk, 85#; wheat and flour, 68#; plus the nation^ only air
line, its leading newspapers, and the three principal radio
and television stations. Hispanic American Report. XV:1114
(Events of December 1962 ).
^ 1 figures taken from Dominican Government publication
21 Anos de Estadlsticas Dominicanos (Ciudad Trujillo 1957)
show the industrial work force in 1936 to have been 20 ,301 ;
in 1956 it was 75*000. Electricity production was 13*4 mil
lion KW in 1936; 20**. 5 million KW in 1956. The Dominican
Republic^ total population during this period barely doubled.

**3

In fact, by the time of Trujillo's death, the Domin
ican power structure had been completely altered.

The

military was no longer the haven for the second sons of the
elite.

Because the elite had shunned the Constabulary,

military officers were now coming from the middle rather
than the upper classes.

The old local leaders who decided

policy and put presidents into office had long ago been sub
jugated by Trujillo.

Moreover, Trujillo stripped the

traditional elites of the remainder of their waning strength.
Because the elites had excluded him from membership in their
social clubs, Trujillo deliberately set out to destroy the
power of the "first families."

He expropriated much of the

remaining property of the elites and forced them into exile
or economic impotence.

By 1961 the elites--about 5 per cent

of the population— remained a closed social aristocracy, with
local prestige but with no capacity for political action.
On the other hand, many of Trujillo's followers
managed to accumulate great personal wealth or obtain high
military or governmental positions.

Thus, just below the

traditional elites, there emerged an upper class of new rich,
whose members held great economic and political power al
though they did not have distinguished family backgrounds.
Many of the business community were recent immigrants.
Between the new rich and the lower classes, an
embryonic middle sector began to develop.

For the first

time, increased agricultural production under Trujillo

****
generated enough income to support a commercial and. pro
fessional class consisting of salaried urban clerks and
department heads, white-collar workers, small business men,
professionals, teachers,and lesser government officials.
The base of society continued to be the masses of
poor, largely illiterate, peasants, sharecroppers,and day
laborers.

Slightly above them but still considered a part

of the lower classes were those with jobs in industry or
commerce, small tenant farmers,and owners of tiny plots of
land.

During the Trujillo regime, the lot of the lower

classes remained unchanged except that many of the rural poor
migrated to the cities, thereby creating an urban proletar- ,
iate. 1**
During the Trujillo era, Dominican society had changed
and had become increasingly mobile.

Nevertheless, though

many had gained wealth and new social positions, not any
person or group shared power with Trujillo.

Political parti

cipation had expanded and Dominicans had been made to feel a
part of the nation, but there were no organizations for their
participation.
been forbidden.

Political parties other than Trujillo's had
From 1930 to 1961 Trujillo exercised near

absolute control over all aspects of the social, political,

1**
On social stratification see Wiarda, Dictatorship
and Development: Mejia, Las clases sociales: Manuel Troncoso
de la Concha, "La clase media en Santo Domingo," Materiales
para el estudio de la clase media en America Latina. IV
(Washington, D.C. : Union Panamericana, 1950) .

military, economic, educational, and intellectual life.

^ ^.

Because of the total control concentrated in his hands,.
Trujillo's death produced a complete vacuum.

.
■ *■

*

No group institution or individual could begin to fill
the void.

Trujillo brought the Dominican Republic into the

twentieth century, but he had never given Dominicans any
experience in democratic methods and procedures.

He had not

provided even the most minimum institutional strength which
might have facilitated an orderly transition after his death.
When John Bartlow Martin, the American Ambassador sent by
the Kennedy Administration, arrived in the Dominican Republic
in 1962 , he summed up the situation when he said that
. . . there was simply nothing here to build
upon— no government, no labor unions, no free
civic association, no men experienced in govern
ment (they were dead, in jail, or in exile), no
money, no work, no going economy, no civil service,
no democratic traditions, nothing.^5
The socio-economic groups of the country were deeply
divided.

The rural peasantry remained isolated, unorganized

and inarticulate.

The urban labor forces had not been per

mitted to form unions.

Parties and interest associations

were weak, and all sectors of the society competed to fill
the leadership vacuum.

^John Bartlow Martin, Overtaken by Events: The
Dominican Crisis from the Fall of Tru.iillo to the Civil War
(New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1966}, p. 196.
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At the time of Trujillo's death, Max Frankel, writing
in the New York Times, observed,
The 69 year-old Generalissimo, who ruled for
thirty-one years, left more than a power vacuum
in his capital. In the Dominican Republic he has
left an ideological void, a people unaccustomed
to governing themselves and unschooled in any
political doctrine except the jungle doctrine
that the strongest shall rule.1®
Especially, Trujillo's method of observing forms while
committing brutal and monstrous acts, his practice of rais
ing men from obscurity to power and eliminating them in
disgrace, had left a deeply engrained and all-persuasive
negative attitude in the Dominican people and had a lasting
effect on the conduct of Dominican politics.

Following

Trujillo's death,the people were cynical and skeptical about
public activities.

Abraham Lowenthal speculates that "per

haps the most corrupting effect of the Trujillo period on
the Dominican policy has been the development of this set
17
of attitudes." f Building a democratic institutional
structure based on trust and loyalty would be difficult
indeed.
Such was the legacy that Trujillo bequeathed to the
Dominican people.

*^New York Times. June 4, 1961, p. 4.
17
{Lowenthal, Politics of Chaos, p. 56 .

^7
Hunger and Hope
“Since I am so poor, I need a house and
some money, because I am suffering terrible
hunger• There are days when we don't even
eat at all . . . ."18

1

Paradoxically, at the same time that Dominicans were
growing increasingly skeptical, the death of Trujillo
brought a wave of optimism, and Dominicans began to experience a rising tide of expectations•

By 1962 they began to

identify the attainment of their social and economic aspir
ations with the fulfillment of political values expressed
in their many constitutions*
Throughout their troubled history, the Dominican
people and leaders held fast to the ideals expressed in their
charters although fulfillment had not once been achieved.
The tragic history of continuous failure and frustration had
left the Dominican people disappointed; but despite their
unfruitful experiences, they gave no thought to replacing
their values with radically different substitutes*

Pew

Dominicans understood democracy and the institutions through
which it actually worked, but all seemed to be aware of the
benefits it had brought to the people of the United States.
They believed deeply that the establishment of democracy in

18
Lloyd A. Free, Attitudes, Hopes and Fears of the
Dominican People (Princeton, N. J . : Institute for Inter
national Social Research, 1965),
9*
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their own country would somehow alleviate the poverty, pri
vation and stagnation in their own society*
This attitude is dramatically demonstrated in the
results of Lloyd Free's public opinion survey taken in April
1962.

In answer to the question:

We are clearly entering a new era in our country's
history in which there will be an opportunity to
choose a new governmental system and a way of
life . . . is there any country which comes to
mind in this connection • • • which has a politi
cal system and a way of life that you admire and
would like to see followed?
sixty-five per cent answered that they wanted a system modeled
on that of the United States.1^
The extent to which Dominicans equated political
values with social and economic aspirations can also be seen
in Free's survey.

When asked “What really matters in your

own life and what are your wishes and hopes for the future?"
seventy-two per cent wanted an improved standard of living
for self or family, sufficient money to 1-ive better or to
live decently; make ends meet and to have relief from poverty
and want.

When asked about their chief worries, seventy-six

per cent mentioned deterioration or inadequate standard of
living, poverty, e t c . ^
Whether expressed as aspirations or as fears, these
lists of personal preoccupations demonstrate the potential

^Free, Attitudes, p. 3«
20 Ibid.. pp. 7- 8 .

appeal of political platforms or programs having to do with
housing, landownership, employment, public health, and edu
cation.

The figures show that of all the issues, the greatest

in the mind of most Dominicans was that of improved living
standards.

*

But even more significant was the fact that

Dominicans identified improved living standards not only as
a personal but as a national problem.

Free felt that this

indicated that the “revolution in rising expectations had
taken hold in the Dominican Republic in a form which had
political meaning for the society as a whole."

The Dominicans

appeared to view economic betterment as a national political
problem to be solved by the Dominican government.

Free

believed that "this high degree of political awareness in
itself, constituted a potentially explosive factor in an
already surcharged situation."21
Free suggested that even more fraught with danger were
the answers to questions asking Dominicans to rate themselves
on a ladder in regard to where they thought they personally
stood five years ago, in 196 2 , and where they would stand in
the future.

According to the answers given, clearly the

Dominicans as a whole had no sense whatever of personal pro
gress from past to present.

Irrespective of the factor of

the lack of personal progress, all socio-economic groups felt
that they were badly off.

21

The lowest personal rating that

Free, Attitudes, p. 13*
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the polltakers had ever recorded was a ^.6 among Brazilians*

,

The Dominicans rated themselves at 1*6*

*

22

^

Mr* Free speculated that perhaps the intensity of

*

frustration was the result of earlier widespread expectations
that the overthrow of Trujillo would usher in the "era of the
promised land*w

The writers of the survey indicated in

strong language that

/;

whatever all the factors may be, we feel confident
in alleging that an extremely serious situation of
popular discontent and frustration, fraught with
a dangerous potential for upheaval, exists in the
Dominican Republic* Never have we seen the danger
signal so unmistakably clear. ^3
^

.

Nevertheless the survey also showed that there still
appeared to be hope for the future as evidenced by the
optimism of most of the participants.
One of those who sensed the popular frustration,

but

still felt optimistic about the future, was Juan Bosch, who
had recently returned to the Dominican Republic to participate
in the elections of 1962 .

It would be impossible to discuss

constitutional government in the Dominican Republic in 1962
and 1963 without also discussing Juan Bosch.

22Free, Attitudes, p. 15
23Ibid.. p. 1 7 .

CHAPTER III
JUAN BOSCH

_s

Juan Bosch1s election to the presidency in 1962
precipitated an irrepressible conflict which began with the
drafting of his reform Constitution of 1963 .
When Bosch arrived in the Dominican Republic in 1961
shortly after the May 30 assassination of Trujillo, Joaquim
Balaguer still retained his post as President, the same
position he held during the Trujillo regime.

Freed from

Trujillo's control, Balaguer tried to build popular support
by reducing the price of basic goods, increasing freedom of
expression, allowing formation of opposition parties and
permitting exiled leaders to return.

Nevertheless, he was

unable to maintain support and resigned after a few months.
A seven man Council of State (Conse.io de Estado) , which was
to serve as an interim government, replaced Balaguer.
On September 16, 1962, the Council of State enacted a
new constitution which remained in effect until the promul
gation of Bosch's 1963 Constitution.

Transitory provisions

of the 1962 document called for national elections to be held
on December 20, 1962.

Those provisions also instructed the

Council to call for the election of representatives to a
Constitutional Revisionary Assembly and provided that
51
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candidates elected to the National Congress would also serve
as delegates to the Assembly.
Most of the provisions of the September 1962 Constitu
tion were identical to those in the last Trujillo Constitution
except that the praise of Trujillo and the prohibition against
Communism had been omitted.
State was left in tact.

The Concordat between Church and

The only substantial changes dealt

with new additions to the social welfare and human rights
sections.

Among these was the right to expropriate Tru.lil-

lista property.1
In mechanics and formal pronouncements, the 1962
Constitution appeared to be adequate.

However, in the period

following the fall of the dictatorship, many Dominicans looked
upon the Constitution as a reminder and a symbol of the
Trujillo tyranny.

That document brought to mind not only the

Trujillo constitutional abuses, but also the terror, corrup
tion and oppression of the entire Trujillo era.

These

connotations soon became a source of growing resentment.
Moreover, in the minds of many people, the 1962 Constitution
was identified with the Council of State, a moderately con
servative business oriented group.

This group was closely

associated with the National Civic Union Party (Union Nacional,
Civica) (UNC) to which most of the Council members belonged.

The Constitution of the Dominican Republic. 1962
(Washington, D.C.: The Pan American Union, 1 9 6 * 0 Title 2,
sec. 9* This article will be discussed more fully in the
next chapter.
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The Council of State was not a reactionary group
controlled by the oligarchy as some maintained.

It had "

initiated a good many reforms though it had avoided basic
reforms which might change the status quo or the economic^
'.i
political, or social order. Nonetheless, those who wanted
active reform disdained the Council as being oligarchic and
Tru.iillista.

Others merely felt that the Council had not

moved fast enough in this time of rising demands.

Thus, a

good many reform groups and individuals placed the blame for
lack of reform on the Constitution of 1962.

Perhaps, more

than any other person, Juan Bosch was responsible for the new
demand for constitutional change.
To understand the conflicts that developed around the
Constitutions of 1962 and 1963» it is necessary to understand
the role played by Juan Bosch and his Partido Revolucionario
Dominicano (Revolutionary Dominican Party) (PRD).
Juan Bosch was fifty-three years oJLd when he returned
to the Dominican Republic after 26 years of exile.

A writer

and political scientist, who was largely self educated,
Bosch was born in La Vega, the son of a Catalonian builder
and a Puerto Rican mother.

In his early years, he had made

some effort to come to terms with Trujillo, but after 1937*
he went into exile, actively opposing the dictator.

He spent

some of his time in Costa Rica, Venezuela, Puerto Rico and
the United States.

During 19 years of his exile he lived in

Cuba, but he left in I960, convinced that Fidel Castro had

5 1*

betrayed the Cuban Revolution,

- . \, /
While in Cuba in 1939 > Bosch7 d

founded the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD)•

r

r\ J

The PRD was a non-Communist leftist organization based
on the same ideology as the Cuban Revolutionary Party

^

(Autentico), the Accion Democratica of Venezuela, and the
Popular Party of Puerto Rico.

These were parties appealing

to large dispossessed masses with promises of greater parti-.
cipation in the economic and social life of the country,
greater freedom from internal dictatorships, and independence
from imperialistic international control,

2

Bosch believed that the PRD could solve many of his
country's difficulties.

Fiercely proud of his Dominican

nationality and imbued with a deep love of country, Bosch
often brooded over his nation's problems.

In his book, Un

finished Experiment, he described his feelings:
My poor country— from its first day of life as
a republic, it had a multitude of political leaders
who dedicated their capacity and strength to look
ing for a mother country to which to surrender our
independence . . . . I suffered in my living flesh
. . . . In my infancy, I had seen lowered from
public buildings the Dominican flag in order to
hoist in its place the flag of North America, and
no one could imagine what that meant to my little
soul of seven years . . . . The man of today
comes pre-figured in the child of yesterday • • • •
I can be sure that at the age of ten I felt ashamed
that Santana, who annexed the Republic to Spain in
1863, and Baez, who wanted to surrender to the
United States were Dominicans . . . . As I passed

2
Jose A. Moreno, Barrios in Arms: Revolution in Santo
Domingo (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh
Press, 1970), p. 16.
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through those years, that pain and that shame
were converted into a Dominican passion . • .
when I was called to be the leader of a political
party . . . I took good care to always conduct
myself as a Dominican who had pride in his
nationality.3

*

Upon his return to the Dominican Republic, Bosch was
determined not only to make his PRD a force in Dominican
politics, but also to educate the masses and to communicate
to them his pride in the Dominican nation.
Returning to participate in the elections of 1962,
Bosch arrived at an auspicious moment.

Free elections in the

Dominican Republic were an unprecedented event.

Since 1844,

in thirty-two presidential elections, only four were free,
and only two were conducted by direct popular vote. 4 Great
expectations were in the air!
Prior to the election campaign, Bosch and his PRD
were practically unknown.

The Union Givica Nacional (UNO)

and the Fourteenth of June Movement (1J4) had captured most
of the interest of the politically minded.

The UNC was the

party in power after the ouster of Balaguer, and many of its
members had been closely connected with Trujillo.

The Four

teenth of June Movement was composed of young, strongly
nationalistic revolutionaries who had operated underground

^Juan Bosch, The Unfinished Experiment (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), P* 162. This book was first
published in Mexico in 1964 under the title Crisis de la
Democracia de America in La Republlca Dominicana.
4Moreno, Barrios, p. 17.

since Trujillo's suppression of the Castro-supported invasion
!&>■
of the Dominican Republic in 1959. These two divergent r
t-

parties often cooperated with each other.

By 1962, however,

the two parties split,and the UNC became the party of the
right.

As late as 1962, the UNC was alleged to have harbored

some members of the Communist party.^

The 1J4 became the

party of the extreme left although most of its members were
from the upper middle class.
When Bosch became the candidate of the PRD, he took a,
completely new approach to Dominican politics.

Directing his

attention to the masses, he discussed problems on a national
level.

Bosch believed that his chief task was that of

developing a political awareness among the lower classes.
The PRD immediately set out to build a party organization.
The leaders devoted themselves to setting up committees in
rural areas and urban neighborhoods, municipalities and
provinces.

They also spoke on the radio and organized

rallies.^
Slowly and patiently, Bosch himself tried to educate
the people by talking to them almost every day on the radio.
Using simple language they could understand, he tried to
instruct them in the ways of democracy and the rule of law.

^Theodore Draper, "The Roots of the Dominican Crisis,"
The New Leader. May 24, 1965, p. 4.
^Bosch, Unfinished Experiment, p. 72.
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He talked to them about such things as:
and how does it function?
of the Dominican Republic?

What is democracy,

What are the economic problems
How is Dominican society organ-

4-

ized?^
"In speaking of democracy,* Bosch wrote in his book,
"I explained what a constitution is and what laws are, how
the separate powers of the government function and are inter
related, how and why people vote, and what a political party
O
is."
Bosch also spoke to them about economic problems--such
things as balance of payments, foreign exchange, the dif
ference between foreign and domestic markets.
In talking to them about the organization of Dominican
society, he told them that the masses were and always had
been subjugated by a minority.

He used the term "tutompotes."

a Dominican colloquialism meaning "big shot," to describe
the upper class.

For this, he was often accused of inciting

class conflicts.
Above all, Bosch emphasized that he and the PRD wanted
to be not a party of distinguished people, but rather a party
of the great popular masses; and from the first he and the
PRD went after the masses.

In describing his approach, he

said that

^Bosch, Unfinished Experiment, p. 85*
3Ibld.. p. 78.

58
• . . it would have been foolish to have tried to
win over the people with money. There was not
enough money in the world to give each of them
what they needed. But it was not foolish to con
vince them that they had the right to be given
the opportunity to obtain what they need.”
The PRD's slogans of "Dignity against Money* and "Land
and Dignity" attracted the intellectual and the landless
peasant alike.

At the same time, according to Bosch1s book,

the PRD gained more and more people from the lower-middle
class.

"Our strategy was to

go out after the masses . . .
■

)

who also pulled in a sizable part of the lower stratum of
the lower middle class.

And in the wake of the latter would

come a few of the middle stratum."1^
No one doubted that Bosch1s strategy had worked.
electoral sweep was tremendous.

His

The official vote showed

that he had received 619»^91 votes out of a total of 1 ,05 ^,9 ^
cast— 58 per cent.

His opponent Viriato Fiallo of the UNC

received 317,327 votes— 30*08 per cent.

The Social Christian

candidate who came in third polled only 5*8 per cent of the
total.11
After the election the American Ambassador, John
Bartlow Martin, wrote that
. . . clearly, Bosch's mandate was overwhelming.
He had the votes of the campesinos. of the dis
placed campesinos in the cities . . . of

^Bosch, Unfinished Experiment, p. 78.
10Ibld.. p. 74.
11Martin, Overtaken By Events, p. 306.
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Trujillistas, of Castro/Communists ^”who had
been urged by the party not to vote in the *
electionJ and of the relatives ofsoldiers
and the police--of nearly everyone • • • •
In ray opinion, the vote showed the existence
in this Republic of a deep and powerful
revolutionary current.

-;

.
‘
k.
*

.;

;

•-A

1 .*

*

These people wanted a better life, and Bosch somehow
convinced them he would give it to them.
ginning, Bosch excited controversy.

But from the be

The London Times

described Bosch as "the type of President the country needs,
free of jingoism, anxious to attract foreigninvestment,
IQ
serious about land reforms." J

\
*.-

\

Ambassador Martin, despite a close friendship with
Bosch, often worried about Bosch's ability to govern the
country.

In speaking of Bosch's personality, Martin said that

Bosch was brilliant but unstable and reckless, that he was
complicated and moody, a "concealed man with few friends • • •
arrogant and vain and streaked with martyrdom."

Martin

asserted that "throughout his tenure Bosch feared plots dark
as the inside of a cave.

His was a dark and conspiratorial

mind," a quality which Martin thought might be essential to a
man trying to survive exile and politics but not necessarily
helpful to a President.

lli

12 Martin, Overtaken By Events, p. 306.
-^Hispanic American Report. XV, no. 12 (Events of
December 19^2), p. 1113.
1 it

, ,

Martin, Overtaken By Events, p. 3 ^ *
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* *
Dan Kurzraan, a newspaper man who reported the Civil
War of 1965, viewed Bosch from a different point of view ^
when he noted that
...

Not even his best friends derived comfort
from his tendency to react emotionally and some
times irrationally to situations requiring
coolness and a tough skin . . . . But if Bosch
lacked a tolerant spirit, he did not vent his
intolerance in violence, force, or dictatorship.
He refused to let his bitterness and prejudice
dilute his moral convictions or sway him from
the path of democracy.*5

'4
^ ;

It must be emphasized that Bosch's temperament was
typically Dominican.

J. B. Hernandez, writing in the Domini

can newspaper El Carribe. said that "if anyone from Alaska
asked me to define our national temperament, I would answer
one word:

tropical.

Our manner of being is like the weather
and atmosphere that surrounds our island."16
Ambassador Martin, himself, admitted that "vanity,
pride, posturing, rigidity, hopelessly grandiose dreams,
volitility and instability, an almost child like refusal to
assume responsibility:

these were flaws in Bosch's character
as they were flaws in the Dominican character." 171

*^Dan Kurzman, Revolt of the Damned (New York:
Putnam's Sons, 1965 )> p. 97.
1 El Carribe. Feb. 18, 1963 , p. 6.
17
'Martin, Overtaken By Events, p. 71o.

G. P.
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At the same time that the Dominicans elected Bosch as
president, they also selected the members of a Revisionary
Constitutional Assembly.

According to the law that governed

the election, the new Congressmen would also make up the
Revisionary Assembly.

If that body had not completed its

task by February 27, 1963, their alternates would serve in
the Chamber of Deputies until the Congressmen had finished
the revision of the Constitution.

In January 1963, the first

free assembly in thirty-three years met to write a new
constitution.
Although the banner of Bosch's movement was political
democracy, in his campaign he had emphasized a program of
social and economic reform.

He pledged a revolution, but a

peaceful one; therefore, it appeared almost certain that the
Constitution would be revolutionary.

Speaking to the people

in a homecoming speech, Bosch declared that "the people voted
for a democratic revolution" and that this, revolution cannot
be given to them if "we do not have a revolutionary Consti
tution."

Again and again he emphasized this same approach.

“The Dominican Republic is forging a new image. . . .

This

national image must be engraved now in their Constitution.
•

•

11

18

The delegates to the Revisionary Assembly, predomin
ately PRD members, interpreted their victory as a mandate
to carry out Bosch's reforms.

18

Martin, Overtaken By Events, p. 325*

CHAPTER IV
*
THE CONSTITUTIONS OP 1962 and 1963

.. K'\,
'"

^

The Constitutional Revisionary Assembly completed its
work on April 29, 1963.

United States Supreme Court Justice

William O. Douglas assisted in the preparation of the new *
Dominican fundamental law.

The 1963 document embodied many

of the principles of previous documents, and in regard to
mechanics and organization of government, the 1962 and 1963
Constitutions did not differ fundamentally.
As in most earlier constitutions, both announce that
the government is essentially civil, republican, democratic,
and representative; and that the government is divided into
legislative, executive, and judicial branches.

These three

branches are independent in the exercise of their respective
functions.1
Both the 1962 and the 1963 Constitutions expressly
state that sovereignty resides inherently in the Dominican
people, and both documents are explicit on the principle of
non-inte rvent ion.

The Constitution of the Dominican Republic. 1962
(Washington, D.C.: Pan American Union, 1965).
Constitucion de la Reoublica Dominicana. 1963 (Santo
Domingo: Ministerio de Educacion, Bellas Artes y Cultos,
1963). All citations from the text of the Constitution of
1963 are translated from the Spanish by the present writer.
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The 1962 Constitution provides for a President and a
Vice-President elected every four years by direct vote.
President cannot immediately be re-elected.

The

The President

is Commander of the armed forces.

The enumerated powers of ^
t.■"'
the President include appointing and removing cabinet and
sub-cabinet officials, promulgating laws and regulations,
ensuring collection of revenues, declaring a state of siege
and also declaring a state of national emergency in case of
grave danger when Congress is not in session.

He is also

empowered to make contracts, control the armed forces, defend
the country, prohibit entry of and expel undesirable aliens,
and grant pardons.

The President and Vice-President may not

resign except before the National Congress.
The powers of the Executive under the 1963 Constitu
tion do not differ substantially from those of the 1962
Constitution except that under the 1962 document, the
functioning of the ministries is regulated by law; whereas,
under the later one, this power is given to the Executive.
The 1962 Constitution provides for a Senate and a
Chamber of Deputies elected by direct vote every four years,
with alternates for Senators and Deputies.

Exclusive powers

of the Senate include electing judges of the Supreme Court
and of inferior courts and trying impeachments.

The Chamber

of Deputies has the sole power to impeach public officials.
The Chamber and Senate constitute the National Assembly,
which is largely ceremonial in that each chamber operates
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independently of the other.

Both constitutions empower the

Congress to levy taxes, approve or reject the budget, create
or abolish political divisions, declare a state of siege or
national emergency, create or abolish the courts, approve or
reject requests for extraordinary expenditure, grant loans,
and approve or reject treaties.

The Congress also has the

power to interpellate ministers on authorization of* the
President, approve and reject contracts submitted by the
President and legislate on all matters not within the compe
tence of another branch of the government or contrary to the
Constitution.
Regarding congressional powers, the 1963 Constitution
differs only in that the Congress is specifically empowered
to refuse to authorize loans made by the executive power
against the credit of the nation.

In addition, Congress may

interpellate ministers on its own authority, and may author
ize or refuse to authorize the alienation.of real property
by municipal governments.
The 1962 Constitution establishes a Supreme Court of
at least seven justices, the Chief Justice to be named by
the Senate.

Its exclusive jurisdictions include actions

involving the President and Vice-President, members of the
Congress, ministers, judges, and diplomats; hearing appeals
of causation; and acting as ultimate court of appeal.
The 1963 Constitution differs only in that it pro
vides for nine Supreme Court Justices.

Other provisions

regarding the Supreme Court are virtually unchanged.

- . ,,v

The 1962 Constitution provides that laws contrary'to
it are null and void and forbids retroactive effects of laws
unless favorable.

„

V'

Both the 1962 and 1963 Constitutions divide the

•
’T

country into municipalities and the National District.

There

are no provincial legislatures,and the governors are ap
pointed by the President.

Both constitutions provide for

popular election of the municipal councils, which in theory
have some degree of autonomy; but both the 1962 and 1963
documents provide that autonomy might be restricted by
statute.
Both the 1962 and 1963 documents provide that the
Constitution may be amended if a proposal is presented in
the Congress, supported by one-third of the members of either
chamber or if it is submitted by the executive power.

A law

declaring the need for amendment must be passed by a twothirds vote in each chamber.
It is evident that the newly completed 1963 Consti
tution did not alter the form of government nor the
organizational pattern of its institutions.

Indeed, in

mechanics, the 1963 document did not differ fundamentally
from that of 1962 or any other previous Dominican charter.
Moreover, with a few exceptions, most of the individual
rights in both the 1962 and 1963 Constitutions are the same
as those which Dominicans began to include as far back as

1 8 ^ in their first Constitution.

*

The 1962 Constitution guarantees freedom of conscience
and worship; freedom of association; and freedom of expres
sion without censorship, with the latter right subject to
penalties for persons who threaten the honor of individuals,
the social order, or the public peace.

Also guaranteed are

freedom from arbitrary imprisonment, double jeopardy, and
self-incrimination.

The 1963 Constitution has an amplified

list of individual rights including freedom of belief and
conscience, association, speech, movement within and without
the Republic, and access to the courts.

The 1963 Constitution

also forbids military arrest and imprisonment and deportation.
Dominican constitutions often make religious pro
nouncements.

Earlier, Trujillo established a Concordat with

the Holy See, which was continued in the 1962 Constitution:
wTITLE III
Concordat”
Article 11. Relations between the Church and
the State are regulated by the Concordat between
the Holy See and the Dominican Republic, in ac
cordance with the law of God and the Catholic
tradition of the Dominican Republic.
The 1963 Constitution makes no mention of the Concordat.
In addition to organizing the government and enumer
ating individual rights, both constitutions did not ignore
the social role of the government.

Both the 1962 and 1963

Constitutions expanded social welfare pronouncements.

When the Council of State enacted the Constitution of
1962, the Council enlarged the already existing social welfare
section of the Trujillo document.

Trujillo had introduced

several provisions based on the assumption that the govern
ment should regulate social and economic affairs in an effort
to achieve social justice.

But, of course, to Trujillo,

constitutions were mere facades:
therefore, he was never
jf
concerned with implementing his welfare provisions.
The Council of State recognized that it is the duty
of the state to promote social welfare, but in the 1962
Constitution the role of the state is generally passive.
Primary stress is on the role of the individual.

The preface

to the Human Rights section of the 1962 Constitution announces
the aims of the state, but not the extent to which the govern
ment will participate in achieving those aims.

However, the

words "maintenance," "protection,” "improve himself,” indi
cate the general philosophy of the 1962 Constitution.
"TITLE II
Human Rights”
Article 8. The effective protection of the
rights of the human being and the creation and
maintenance of the means which will permit him to
improve himself JT Italics mine 7 progressively
within a system of individual liberty and social
justice, compatible with public order, the general
well-being and the rights of all, are recognized
as the principal aims of the State. In order to
guarantee the accomplishment of these aims the
following standards are set:
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The 1962 Constitution affirms freedom of work and *
encourages the establishment of proper working conditions,
but there is no definite commitment to go beyond minimum
'
■ ■*

protections.

o

^

Article 8.
(3) Freedom of work. The law shall, as required
by the general interest, establish the maxi
mum working day, days of rest and vacations,
minimum wages and salaries and their forms
of payment, social security, the partici
pation of nationals in all work, and in
general all provisions for State protection
and assistance for workers that may be con
sidered necessary.

,

v

v

,

The 1962 Constitution deals with a number of other
economic rights, all of which support the idea of social
security as a protection against unemployment, sickness,
disability, and old age.

The 1962 document also offers

paternalistic protection to the elderly and assistance to the
poor:
Article 8.
(15) The State shall continue the progressive
development of social security so that one
day every person shall enjoy adequate pro
tection against unemployment, sickness,
disability, and old age.
(16)

The State shall offer its protection and
assistance to old people in a manner
determined by law, in order that their
health shall be preserved and their well
being ensured.

(17)

The State shall offer social assistance to
the poor. This attention shall consist of
food, clothing, and insofar as possible,
adequate housing.
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The Human Rights section of the 1962 Constitution
affirms the right of freedom of enterprise and prohibits
private monopolies:
Article 8.
(^) Freedom of enterprise* Monopolies may be
established only in favor of the State or
State institutions. The creation and
organization of these monopolies shall be
done by decree-law of the executive power*

?

The 1962 Constitution contains a provision protecting
the right to own property.

This is the original Trujillo

provision, modified in 1962 to give the state the right to
use confiscated Trujillo property to "repair the moral and
material damage" done by the dictatorship*

This section also

establishes procedures for agrarian reform:
Article 8*
(9) The right to own property* This, however,
may be taken over for a duly justified
reason of public benefit or social interest,
and after fair compensation. In cases of
public disaster compensation need not be
paid in advance. A general confiscation
of property is prohibited, except as punish
ment of persons guilty of treason or
espionage in behalf of an enemy during a
time of legitimate defense against a
foreign state or guilty of abuse or
usurpation of power or of any public
functions for purposes of enriching them
selves or others. In these last cases the
property acquired by the State through
confiscation ordered by law will have first
priority as means of repairing the moral
and material damage caused by the usurpa
tion or abuse of power or public function.
The law may establish special procedures
for acquisition by the State of areas or
portions of rural lands that may be needed
for introducing and developing adequate
systems or agrarian reforms, in which case
the same law shall regulate the form of
indemnity or compensation*
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Continuing a principle established in earlier Domin
ican constutitons, the 1962 document declares it is the
duty of the state to guarantee free, compulsory elementary
education:

•••/, •': I*

Article 8.
(6) Freedom of education. Elementary education
shall be compulsory for children of school
*
age and for all those who for diverse reasons -*
have not previously been able to enjoy this
right. It is hereby declared a duty of the •
State to furnish a basic education to all
inhabitants of the national territory and
to take the necessary steps to eliminate or >
prevent the reappearance of illiteracy.
•
Both elementary education and the education
offered in vocational, art, commercial,
manual arts, and home economics schools
shall be free. These duties of the State
presume on the part of persons inhabiting
the territory of the Republic the correla
tive obligation of attending the educational
institutions of the country in order to
acquire at least an elementary education.
The State shall strive for the widest pos
sible dissemination of science and culture,
thus adequately facilitating all persons
to benefit from the results of scientific
progress.
The 1962 document takes a special interest in the
family and announces broad protection for mothers and
children.

The state also encourages the establishment of

the family homestead:
Article 8.
(14-) With the aim of strengthening its stability
sind well-being, its moral, religious, and
cultural life, the family shall receive the
broadest possible protection from the State.
The law shall provide the necessary means
for protecting maternity and, in particular,
mothers, during a reasonable period before
sind after childbirth. One of the principal
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objectives of the social policy of the State
is declared to be the constant reduction of
infant mortality and a sound development of
children. The establishment of the family
"homestead** (bien de familial is also
declared to be of high social interest.
The State shall encourage family savings
and the establishment of credit, producer, v- 7
distribution, and consumer cooperatives
and any others that may be useful.
In addition, the Constitution of 1962 provides for
property agreements between husband and wife.

However, the

1962 document does not mention divorce:
Article 8.
(19) Husband and wife may freely arrive at
their marriage agreements or elect any
system adopted by law, which shall always
establish the system of separation of
property and prescribe what shall govern
in the absence of special provisions, the
following characteristics being understood
to be inherent in this system of separation
of property:
(a) that each spouse shall
retain the ownership, administration,
enjoyment, and free disposition of his or
her property; (b) that any renunciation by
the wife of the right to recover the adminis
tration of her property which she had entrusted
to her husband is void; and (c). if after ten
years of a marriage under separation of
property, one of the spouses dies, his or
her creditors, heirs, legatees, or successors
may not, for any reason, initiate any action
against the surviving spouse for the resti
tution or return of property.
When the Revisionary Assembly met, they incorporated
most of the preceding welfare pronouncements into the new
1963 document; but in addition, to expanding social rights,

the 1963 Constitution directs the state toward a stronger,
affirmative role.

Juan Bosch had charged the Assembly with

the task of writing a revolutionary constitution.

To the
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majority of the delegates to the Assembly, the existing 1962
Constitution had not gone far enough.

A comparison of the

social welfare provisions of the two constitutions will reveal
sharp philosophical differences.

It was these differences

^

which led to the overthrow of the Bosch government in Septem
ber of 1963 and ultimately became a contributing cause of
violent conflict in the Revolution of 1965.
*

Though both the 1962 and 1963 documents affirm human
rights and the dignity of man, the 1963 Constitution does
not conceive of these rights as limited to the individual, but
considers them as social and economic in their ramifications.
Human rights are affirmed by stressing social goals and their
implementation.

In the 1963 document, emphasis is always

on the state as the agent who will guarantee social rights.
Moreover, not only must the state take a larger role in using
its positive powers, the 1963 Constitution explicitly requires
that the government exercise its responsibility.

The 1963

Constitution specifically charges the state to use its power,
not merely to promote. but to guarantee the welfare of
society and the individual.
Primarily the 1962 Constitution concerns itself with
the organization of government, while the 1963 document concentrates on the organization of society.

,

The basic divergence

in the two constitutions lies in the attitude of each toward
the way in which society should be organized and to the
degree of authority given to the state for carrying out the
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nation's goals.

In this respect, a wide gap exists between

the two documents.

,

^

^

Dominicans have written twenty-seven constitutions, ^
all of them basically the same; but the 1963 RevisionaryI
Assembly created a constitution which differs radically from
all earlier documents.

Although unchanged in mechanical

forms, the philosophic content is a wide departure from all
previous Dominican charters.

By adopting a completely new

attitude toward the role of the state, the Assembly created
a totally new constitution.
had been altered.

Even the format and arrangement ,

In all previous constitutions, the opening

statement customarily begins with a description of the nation
and its government.

The 1963 document opens with a statement

of "Fundamental Principles" and four pages of social welfare
declarations, each one stressing the rights of society over
the rights of property and the individual.
is significant.

Even the order

Those articles dealing with the right to

work, to social security, to organize and conduct strikes
are followed, rather than preceded, by the rights of initia
tive and property.

Above all, the 1963 Constitution outlines

goals for society and makes sweeping proposals for social
change.
To understand and evaluate the disputes which later
arose over the Constitution of 1963» it is necessary to look
at the controversial portions.

The 1963 Constitution begins

with a statement of fundamental principles which set the tone
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for the entire document*

Throughout, the emphasis' is always

on such words as "guarantee," "Public Power," "social*needs,
and "duty of the state,"
declares its aims:

At once the 1963 Constitution
v

6
"

■ '■"

"FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES”
Article 1 * The basic ends of Public Power are:
(a) to protect human dignity and promote and
guarantee its respect;
(b) to work toward the elimination of the
obstacles of the social and economic order which
limit the equality and the liberty of Dominicans
and which oppose the development of human personality and the effective participation of all
in the political, economic, and social organiza
tion of the country*

;
• ,

The 1963 Constitution establishes a new attitude of
the state toward the function of work, when it announces
that the principal existence of the Dominican nation is in
work:
Article 2*
The existence of the Dominican nation is
principally in work. Work is declared to be
the primary base of its social, political, and
economic organization and it is established as
the inevitable obligation of all Dominicans*
Therefore:
(a) The right of work is recognized for all
persons, and the State is obligated to promote
and guarantee the conditions which are indispensible for making the exercise of this right
effective.
(b) It is the duty of every citizen to
develop, through his own selection and his own
abilities, an activity or function that con
tributes to the material and spiritual progress
of the nation.
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(c)
Mendicity and vagrancy, and any other - • ,
social vices which are opposed to the consecration of work as a fundamental principle of the
’, c r
existence of the nation, is declared a public
i ^
calamity.
^
V

*

"

The 1963 Constitution proclaims the right of private
initiative, but makes it clear that such a right must be
subordinate to the public good.

.*

Article 3. Freedom of private initiative is
declared. Nevertheless, it cannot be exercised
to the prejudice of human liberty, dignity or
security. The law will determine the measures
and controls necessary to insure a complete
compatibility between private economic effec
tiveness and social interests.

t

\

‘

:

Article
For the general norm, property must
serve the progress and welfare of society.
In the announcement of fundamental principles, public
officials are prohibited from using their positions for
personal gain:
Article 5. It is declared a crime against the
people to remove public funds, take advantage of
positions inside the organization of the State,
its dependencies, or its autonomous entities, or
to obtain illegal economic advantages for personal
gain.
It is also a crime for persons in the same
position to deliberately distribute economic
advantages to his associates, family, friends,
and relatives.
The same law shall be applied to accomplices.
The law requires restriction of illicit appro
priations. 2

2

All provisions which are basically the same as
those in the 1962 Constitution or which are non-controversial
have been omitted from this analysis.
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Article 9.

The laws are not retroactive.

V v

’

t»

•

:

In pronouncements on work, the 1963 Constitution f
differs widely from earlier charters.

The 1963 document I ^ !,

does not merely emphasize the promotion of work by the state,
but instead announces the guarantee of work itself.

In
■

,

i

addition, the Constitution recognizes the right of workers
to participate in the benefits of industry:
"ECONOMIC AND ETHICAL SOCIO RELATIONS
Section I

v - •

OP WORK"
Article 13. All forms of work are under the
supervision and protection of the State. The
principal duty of the State is to occupy itself
with the formation of workers organizations.
Article
People who
for work have the right
tation. The State will
providing that which is

are disabled or untrained
of education or rehabili
assist the disabled in
necessary for subsistence.

Article 15. Union organization is unrestricted
with the provision that the unions are democrat
ically organized and that they be registered in
the local and central offices of the Department
of Labor.
In contractual arrangements between management
and workers of the same enterprise, and always
when dealing with unions of equal nature, where
there is more than one union, the State will only
recognize the one affiliated with the majority of
workers.
Article 16. The government is dedicated to freedom
of work and shall establish according to the general
interest maximum hours, days of rest and vacation,
wages, social security— in general all the benefits
of the protection which the State considers neces
sary or useful for the benefit of work. ^f*This is
basically the same as Article 8 of Section 3 of
the 1962 Constitution. j

~
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Article 17# Equal pay for equal work regardless,
of age, sex or station.
t
Article 18. The State recognizes the right and the
duty of workers to collaborate with businesses in
the form and according to the limits established by
law in order to elevate the workers socially and ;
,
economically and also to respond to the necessities *
of production.
*.
*

Article 19. In every enterprise (industrial,
agricultural, commercial or mining) the workers
have the right to participate in the benefits of
the enterprise, recognizing the legitimate interests of the management and the other factors of
production.

i
7,
’
'

The law will fix the limits and form of this
participation.
.

'x

Article 20. The law recognizes the right of
workers to strike and management to suspend work
(lockouts), except in public service. Rules for
regulating strikes and lockouts shall be set down '
by law in conformity with the interest of workers
and management and social necessities and national
security.
Article 21. The rights and benefits established by
this section in favor of workers as well as those
made by law cannot be abrogated.
In the 1963 Constitution the use and retention of
property are conditioned by the social good.

The 1963 docu

ment allows the right of property; but allows the state, in
the interest of the public good, to expropriate if there is
fair compensation:
Article 22. The State recognizes and guarantees
the right of property: Since the ends of property
must serve progress and benefit the welfare of
society, expropriation shall take place in the
cause of the social interest by virtue of pro
ceedings that shall be organized by law.
To fix the indemnification, the State shall
keep in mind the interest of society on the one

<

;
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hand and the interest of the proprietors on the
other.

h

Indemnification in litigation shall be decided
.u
by the courts in conformity with the law which
shall keep in mind the preceding paragraph. In
such cases, the State shall take possession of the
property without waiting for the decision ofvthe
courts. In cases of adjudication and forced sale,
the State shall acquire the property or the value
representing the property within the norms fixed
■?
by law, and measures shall be adopted for reverting s
the property if necessary to the persons expropriated.
'
The 1963 Constitution limits ownership of excessively
large (latifundio) or small (minlfundio) landholdings. 'The
state also reserves the right to decide who should own land.
Neither corporations nor foreigners may freely acquire land.
Article 23. Possession of excessive land by
persons or private entities is declared contrary
to the collective interest. Consequently, lati
fundio s are prohibited regardless of the form in
which they originated.
The law will fix the minimum size of land
that a proprietor, whether an individual or an
entity, can possess, keeping in mind ecological,
economic and social factors.
Corporations cannot acquire property in land
unless it is to be directed to the widening, en
largement, and promotion of the welfare of the
populace or for the installation of industrial
plants and commercial establishments in conformity
with legal regulations. These entities may, in
rural zones, acquire the lands necessary for
factories and improvements.
Exempt, as the law shall determine, from this
provision are credit institutions which can acquire
property in land which has been given as a guarantee
of its credits, also cooperatives because of the
high socio-economic ends which they pursue. The
law may establish other exemptions as necessary.
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Article 24. Minifundio is declared uneconomic
and anti-social. The law will determine what V
understands minifundio to be and will dictate tl
measures necessary to reach integration and
economic unity.
Article 25. Only Dominican individuals have the
right to acquire property in land. Nevertheless,
the Congress may authorize the acquisition of
lands in urban zones for foreigners when it is
in the national interest.
The law shall regulate the renting of land to
people or corporations who are not Dominicans.

*

The resources of the subsoil and of the sub
marine platform belong to the State, no matter
, 1 J
who, nationals or foreigners, has concession of
their exploitation. The property of underground * k
mines is inalienable.
.
The 1962 Constitution encourages the establishment of
the family homestead, but
wider provisions

the 19&3 Constitution

relating to the right of every

to own a comfortable, sanitary home.

containsfar
Dominican

Not only does the 1963

charter prohibit seizure of the home from creditors, but it
also announces that the state will assist those who do not
have the necessary resources.
Article 26. Each Dominican family should possess
his own residence, comfortable and clean, and in
the event of
the lack of necessary economic re
courses they
shall be distributed by the State
with the cooperation of the beneficiaries in
accordance with their earnings and economic
possibilities, all in accordance with plans made
by competent agencies.
The family cannot be deprived of the family
home. The family home is inalienable and not
subject to seizure.
Article 27. The law will determine the extension,
composition, and value of family estates which
shall be inalienable. . . .
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The 1963 Constitution also provides for the; usesof
state lands and the division of excessive landholdings for '
the purpose of agrarian reform.

The state recognizes that1
%
the establishment of the family homestead in land is in ^the
highest public interest:

^

^ ^

Article 28. Each rural family which does not have
sufficient land has the right to be given the same,
with the size and parcels of land being proportioned
according to the conditions of the land, and of the
necessities and capacity to work, and also giving
to them the adequate means of assuring economic and
social progress of the community.

V
v.
•f
;
'

The State will assist the agrarian institutions, associations or unions to assure that
>•. 1 '
those who cultivate the land will reach the highest
standard of living possible.
Consequent with this principle and for the ends
proposed, it is declared that the dedication of
f1
lands of the State to the plans for agrarian reform^
and the division of lands which exceed maximum
limits prescribed by the law and the sale of these
lands to the farmers, is declared to be in the
highest social interest. If there is a lack of
purchasers, the State will acquire the land pre
viously divided for later transfer to the farmers.
Article 29. The State will encourage the creation
of cooperatives. . . .
An extensive section in the 1963 Constitution deals
with monopolies and announces that anyone attempting to
limit or eliminate competition will be penalized:
“Section III
OF THE SOCIAL ECONOMY"
Article 30. Monopolies in favor of private indi
viduals are prohibited. The following will be
prosecuted according to the law:
(a)

Those who are dedicated to the monopoly or
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concentration of articles of necessary consumption
with the purpose of causing a rise in prices of
the articles.
r
. * •■■■

k. ^

(b) Anyone who manipulates industrial distributors,
merchants or managers of public services with the
intent to fix prices above normal, divide the mar- ‘ ^
kets, negate a commercial pact, or link the sale or,.7:.Pa
rent'of a product with another, or by whatever mode . ‘
limit or impede the free traffic of industry, in
ternal or external commerce, or public services.
*
(c) Anyone who directly or indirectly discriminates
in pricing among producers or sellers of equal
category in external or internal commerce, when
such discrimination has the effect of limiting the
free intercourse or creating a total or impartial
monopoly.
Anyone engaged in manipulation or creation of
combinations which are prejudicial to the public
and, one social class, or the collective interest.

H

■

The 1963 Constitution also charges the state with
assisting rural and urban cooperatives and guaranteeing a
just price for agricultural produce:
Article 31. It is the duty of the State to
guarantee to farmers a sure and advantageous
market. So that those interested in their own
initiative shall receive the most beneficial
price, the State will be responsible for obtain
ing a suitable price for agricultural products.
The following provision became extremely controversial
because the state announced that property owners whose land
appreciated because of public works must cede the profit to
the state:
Article 32. In cases in which the value of land
or property increases, and the increase has been
produced without private effort or capital and
only because of the action of the State, the pro
prietors shall cede the benefits to the State
according to proportions established by law.
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Article
The State will
is necessary to create free
to offer related exemptions
ment of the industry of the

authorize whatever
ports and zones and
that favor the develop
country.

%

Special mention is also given to education in the
\
■■t .
1963 Constitution. The state will not only guarantee free
elementary education, but will provide gratuitous secondary
education as well.

The Constitution proclaims "Freedom of

Teaching," sind places the school system under the supervision
of the state.

In addition, the state will give special pro

tection to the teaching profession:

I

"Section IV
OF EDUCATION AND CULTURE"
Article 35. The right of all Dominicsins to
education is recognized and the State is obligated
to take all necessary measures to guarantee the
complete exercise of this right. . . .
Article 37. Freedom of teaching is guaranteed and
science is proclaimed as the basic fundamental of
education. The State shall have in its charge the
organization, inspection and supervision of the
school system, in order to procure the achievement
of the social ends of the culture and for the best
intellectual, moral and physical formation of those
being educated.
Article 38. Because of its social transcendance,
teaching is raised to a public function. There
fore the Public Powers are responsible for the
elevation of the standard of living of each
teacher and the distribution of means necessary
for the perfection of his knowledge in order to
protect and safeguard his dignity so that he can
dedicate himself to the exercise of his elevated
mission without economic, moral, religious or
political pressures.
Article 39. The State will give to all the in
habitants free primary and secondary education.
Primary education is obligatory for all residents
in the country of school age.

<
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Article *K). The State will strive to dispense the
highest university, professional, vocational and ? / 5
technical teaching to workers and farmers*
A ^
'V *'i

Recognizing the duty of the state to safeguard the
social development of the family, the 1963 Constitution
t• ' s<,

provides special protection for maternity, and assumes ”
responsibility for neglected children.

All children are

equal before the law whether b o m in or out of wedlock.

The

Constitution recognizes common-law marriage and allowsV
dissolution of marriages (divorce) by mutual consent or on
demand by either party;
"Section V
OP THE FAMILY*
Article
. The Public Powers shall promote
through adequate economic measures, the formali
zation and stabilization of the family and its
consummate ends.
Article 42. The State will offer special pro
tection to marriage and the family, to the
pregnant woman and to maternity and to the child
from its birth until its complete development.
Article ^3. Children without distinction shall
enjoy the same opportunities of social, spiritual
and physical development.
Article
The father and the mother have the
obligation of feeding, educating and instructing
their children, and the children to respect and
assist the parents.
Article *4-5. The State will protect children from
abandonment or moral or material exploitation.
Article **6. Matrimony is recognized as the legal
foundation of the family and it is declared that
matrimony presupposes an absolute equality of
rights for both the members, including financial
arrangements•

f

8^

Article 47. The married women shall enjoy all
civil legal rights. For disposition of immovable
property and community property, both members of
the union must give consent.
Article 48. No matter what its nature, legal' .
state, or condition, the marriage may be d i s solved with the accord of both members or by the
demand of either one of the two, in the manner
and for the causes established by law.
The law will determine in which situations
unions between persons with the capacity to con
tract marriage can for reasons of equity and
social interest grant economic arrangements
similar to those of marriage.

i
^

(

Article 49. It is prohibited for public officials
to expedite certifications indicating whether the
child is born in or out of wedlock and in general
all qualifications relative to the nature, and
character of the filiation except that which the
law establishes.
Section VI of Part I of the 1963 Constitution deals
with health.

Many of these provisions are the same as those

included in the 1962 document and none are controversial.
The remainder of the 1963 Constitution, Part II, deals with
the organization of the government.

Upon examination, it becomes obvious that the 1963
Constitution makes a definite effort to anchor human rights
to the "welfare state."

Throughout, the 1963 Constitution

clearly proclaims that the state is committed to a policy
of regulating for the good of society by exercising the
positive powers of government.

Henceforth, state and private

resources would be allocated to public needs.

The recurrent use of such concepts as "public vs.
private interests"; "social good"; "property must serve the
'•V

v

progress and welfare of society"; "the primary duty of the ’
state is to concern itself with the training of workers and
improvement of their skills"

all such concepts emphasize

the idea of the state as a positive force.

The PRD Assembly

had created a "blueprint for a welfare s t a t e . T h e ’contest
over whether or not the "blueprint" would be accepted was

y

yet to come.

-^Howard J« Wiarda, "Contemporary Constitutions and
Constitutionalism: The Dominican Republic," Law and Society
Review. II (June 1968), p. 396.
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Juan Bosch had pledged a revolutionary constitution,1
and plainly, the Revisionary Assembly had written one.

The

comprehensive nature of the welfare program of the 1963
Constitution indicated a deliberate policy of social and
economic reform which emphasized the power of the state to

^

intervene in the economy on behalf of the welfare of the
general society.
to fulfill

Here was an attempt by Bosch and the PHD

their campaign promises to bring a better life

thoseDominicans

who hadlong been

to

excluded from the fruits

of the economy.
Nevertheless, not everyone agreed with the goals and
ideals set forth in the Constitution.

A 101 gun salute

accompanied the promulgation of the Constitution on April 29,
1963* hut the entire nation did not rejoice and applaud the
work of the Revisionary Assembly.

Though the elections had

given Bosch overwhelming support, some sectors of the society
viewed his victory with misgivings— although uneasy, they
waited.

It was not long before apprehension became intense

anxiety, especially among members of the property-owning
classes.
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Only a few weeks earlier, great optimism had*swept * *
the nation as the Revisionary Assembly prepared to meet.

The

independent daily, El Carribe. expressed many of the Domini;•'»*•
can hopes for the future:
On the Constitutional Assembly which will
meet in a week depends the orientation of the
institutional life of the Dominican Republic.
f' ;
We are about to initiate one of the most
*, .
important accomplishments in our contemporary
* *history. This is the first constituent assembly ,
in decades truly elected by the people.*
Prom the beginning, the newspapers reported the * “
activities of the Assembly and printed detailed descriptions
of each projected provision.

With each new revelation,

isolated but unorganized opposition began to appear.

On

January 29, while the Assembly deliberated, El Carribe pre
maturely leaked a copy of the draft Constitution.

Its

,

publication sent shock waves through much of the business
and landholding community.
religious groups as well.

Some of the provisions frightened
As the text of -draft reached the

public, reaction came immediately.

2

The American Ambassador, John Martin, attending a
party a few evenings later, spoke with some of the members
of the outgoing Council of State, with whom the Ambassador
enjoyed a cordial relationship.

The conversation, as

A

El Carribe (Santo Domingo), Dec. 19, p. 6.

2The text of the draft Constitution is in El Carribe.
January 29, p. 10. Translations of the draft and passages
from El Carribe are by the present writer.
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reported in the Ambassador's book, catalogs most of the fears
in the minds of those who later rejected the 1963 Consti-.
tution:
. . . President Bonnelly, Donny Reid, and Tony
s
Imbert took me aside into a little room and de
manded indignantly to know what I thought of the
new draft Constitution* President Bonnelly . • .
*
declared it was a "Communist Constitution" and
'
would ruin the Republic* As a lawyer, he said
the Constitution was loosely drawn* It would
<
frighten away investment* It did not protect
property rights. * * . It authorized expropria
tion of property without compensation. . * . It
forbade foreign persons and all corporations
from owning property* It said property must
serve the needs of the masses, . . . It pro
hibited latifundio. but left it to Congress to
define latifundio* It legalized concubinage and
made divorce easy, it "rudely" infringed the
Dominican tradition that the man was the head of
the family by declaring the sexes equal, did not
guarantee civil liberties, and did not consecrate
the Vatican Concordat.
Imbert joined in vociferously. So did Reid.
The country was a keg of dynamite with a short,
burning fuse. Throughout the conversation flowed
venom against the new regime.
President Bonnelly agreed— the people were
ignorant and needed to be educated to own land
~
and to participate in business and in government.
When Ambassador Martin tried to placate them, saying
that he did not think Bosch and the PRD intended to turn the
country into a Communist state, Imbert interrupted saying,
"There is already one Communist state in the Americas be
cause the U.S. did not believe Castro would go Communist."

-^Martin, Overtaken by Events, p. 316
^Ibid.. p. 317 .

lt
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Ambassador Martin told the group that the United\

^

States was determined there would not be another "Fidel". in
the Caribbean and pointed out that they were discussing a
mere draft.

However, Imbert and the others made it abso

lutely clear that they did not intend to "sit by and hand

'

the country over to the Communists."-*
The opposition did not confine itself to private
denunciations behind closed doors.

i

As the Assembly debated

in its chambers, the public debated in the home, on the radio,
and in the newspapers.

Most of the attacks came before the

promulgation, during the time the Assembly deliberated. '

''
■
Practically all of the principal arguments arose during that
period.

v

After enactment, severe criticism continued, but

most of the denouncements were a repetition of previously
stated objections.

Almost every day, from January through

April, the newspapers reported the proceedings of the revision
ary body.

In addition the newspapers printed editorials

expressing their own views; not all were critical.

Perhaps

most significant, newspapers such as El Carribe and El Listin
Diario carried numerous paid advertisements sponsored by
various interest groups, voicing disapproval of specific
portions of the draft Constitution and appealing for re
visions.

Some advertisements covered as many as two full

pages.

^Martin, Overtaken by Events, p. 317*
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Always the critics attacked the social welfare pro
visions.

Articles pertaining to the right of property,

private initiative, worker-employer relations, latlfundios,
education, pronouncements concerning marriage ) divorce, and
illegitimate children elicited the moBt controversy.
Some of the differences were resolved during the
debates; but, for the most part, the substantive content of
the document remained unaltered.

When the Assembly did make

changes, such revisions usually consisted of rewording or' ;
elimination of a word, phrase, or a sentence.

V 5

A look at the most controversial portions of the
draft Constitution, the discussions that centered around
them, and the provisions in their final form shows a reveal
ing picture of the basic conflicts revolving around the
Constitution of 1963 *
Perhaps one of the most emotionally charged pro
visions was that pertaining to private initiative.

Article

11 of the draft Constitution states that
Private economic initiative is declared free.
Nevertheless the same cannot be exercised when it
opposes the national utility or when it prejudices
the human security, liberty, and dignity.
The law will provide the necessary measures
and controls in order to obtain complete compati
bility between public economic activity and private
or social interests.
After weeks of bitter debate and denouncements, the
Assembly made some minor changes in the wording.
less, the principle remained the same.

Neverthe

In the final 1963
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Constitution, Article 11 became Articles 3 and 4 and con
tinued to affirm that "property must serve the progress and
welfare of society."
The pronouncement that the right of property is
subject to the social function made leading businessmen
jittery about the new Constitution.

They feared it would

abolish private property, and they especially condemned
Article 2*4- of the draft Constitution which declared that
The state protects and guarantees the enjoy
ment of property and establishes as the general
norm that property must serve progress and the
welfare of society at the same time. For that
reason expropriation may take place in the cause
of the general interest by virtue of the law,
that at the same time fixes corresponding con
ditions and indemnification.
On the day following the publication of the draft
Constitution, El Carribe. in an editorial, said that there
is no doubt that the draft Constitution is establishing a
series of truly revolutionary principles.
We must admit that these provisions might be
beneficial for the Dominican people, but if we
analyze the Constitution objectively, we must
admit other aspects of the changes may result
in the stagnation and regression of the economic
development of the country.6
The next day a headline on the front page of El
Carribe announced that "The Commercial Institutions are
Viewing the Proposed Constitution with Anxiety."

The article

referred to a statement by the Chamber of Commerce of the

^E1 Carribe. Jan. 30, p. 9*
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National District, the Association of Industries of the Repub
lic and the Confederation of Owners of the Republic claiming
;

v S. < -■

that "the new Constitution ignores the rights of owners,and

*

includes provisions, which if adopted, will completely destroy v
the incipient national economy."

It will cause private

^

initiative to totally disappear and will completely dis7

j.

courage investment in stocks of new businesses.1

t

*

Shortly afterwards, El Carribe ran another front page
story summarizing the arguments of the Dominican Association ,
of Landowners and Farm Owners.

The association criticized

the projected Constitution, saying that the national riches
and production would decrease considerably.

It would cause

domestic capital to liquidate itself and foreign capital
would become more difficult to obtain.

*

The Association mem

bers feared that businesses of every kind would begin to
disappear.

Elsewhere a two page advertisement printed the

objections in full.

o

On the other hand, the editorial page of El Carribe
carried an article entitled "Objections Must Be Constructive"
in which Dr. Rafael Richiez Savinon defended the PHD position
on property.

Using philosophical arguments, Dr. Savinon

asserted that "a new attitude toward property is inevitable
as a consequence of the evolution under which the right of

?E1 Carribe. Jan. 31, p. 1; full text, p. 2.
q
■*•
Ibid., Feb. 10, p. 1; full text, p. 10.
i

•jr v

;

<

property has been altered."

He argued that the new theory

toward property comes as a result of progressive' and revo
lutionary legal theory.

According to Savinon, property can

no longer be consigned to the notion of absolute rights J
because the right of property is not only a function of
rights but is also a social function.

He declared that the

French civil legal expert, Josserand, had signified that under
the social and economic pressure that has occurred in the

1

course of this century, the dogma of absolute property has.
been exposed to hard scrutiny.

Its exercise has been human

ized and is seen in terms of social ends.

"The notion of the

right of property has repeatedly suffered limitations imposed
by the collective necessities of society.
g
interest must cede to public good."^

Now the private

Another article of the draft Constitution dealing
with the "collective necessities of society" provoked more
s t e m disapproval.

Article 25 of the draft declares:

For the ends of collective exploitation and
for the benefit of the people, the Public Power
can legislate in the sense of converting the
property into collective or economically collec
tive property by virtue of the law which declares
its expropriation and the value of the corres
ponding inderanification of the land soil, the
subsoil, the natural resources and measures of
protection. In this case methods for proceed
ings established in the section on expropriation
will apply.

^E1 Carribe. Feb. 18, p. 8.
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•>
,*
Here was a call for expropriation of private property ‘
•*,
*
containing natural resources. Both Articles 24 and. 25 became
■

'

*

1

the object of adverse criticism from various social, economic,

f

and political groups as well as the organs of the press.\

i

El Carribe warned that "in the final editing, proposals 24
and 25 may produce serious repercussions in the Dominican
society, especially because of the obscurity of the articles.",
The editor suggested modifications which would clarify

'>■

Articles 24 and 25 and also clarify the sense and make the>
provisions more adaptable to "the democratic system and the ^
traditions of Dominican society."*^
El Carribe also asserted that "The right of property
is essential in a democratic regime.

It will be a great error

if they do not put that sentiment into the document.

The

final text should read that 'the state protects and guarantees
the right of property.1"11

The Assembly listened but only

partially acceded to demands for revision. In its final form Article 24 became Article 22 of the
1963 Constitution, with only the most minor changes.

Article 22. The State recognizes and guarantees
the right of property: Since the ends of property
must serve progress and benefit the welfare of
society, expropriation shall take place in the
course of the social interest by virtue of pro
ceedings that shall be organized by law.

Io

El Carribe. March 20, p. 6.

II

Ibid.
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The Assembly did, however, make one concession pertaining to\
indemnification when property is taken before adjudication"
is completed.

The final form of Paragraph 2, Article 22

provides that the property may revert to the original owner
if the court decides in his favor.

^

In the case of Article 25, pressure brought some
results.

The Assembly made a definite change and eliminated

most of Article 25 of the draft.

The remainder was incorpor

ated into the second paragraph of Article 25 of the final
document, which said that "The resources of the subsoil and
the submarine platform • . . and buried minerals belong to
the state and are inalienable.1* Though perhaps implied, no
specific mention is made of deliberate expropriation for con
verting natural resources into collective property.
Above all, the draft Constitution shocked landowners
by prohibiting latifundio (large landholdings).

Article 27

of the drafts states that **latifundio is completely pro
hibited.

The State will dictate the disposition of the excess

land.11
Angry critics especially focused attention on this
attempt of the Constitution to break up large landholdings.
Advertisements again appeared in the newspapers.

A paid

advertisement by the First National Convention of The Men of
Industry reflected much of the typical concern:
The primary need for improving our socio
economic structure is the right of property to
be solidly maintained with all of its attributes.
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We agree that land distribution is a basic goal
for all of us, but we recognize that such programs
do not justify injustice for some in order to get
justice for others.12

-V

And repeating what many other groups had been reiter
ating, the advertisement contended that in order to have
economic reforms, strong and adequate measures for promoting
economic free enterprise must be created.
In the same statement, the Men of Industry also
proposed a solution, suggesting the creation of an Agrarian
National Bank financed by the state, international organiza
tions and private individuals who would then provide funds
for those among whom the land would be divided.

The Associa

tion proposed that the Bank hold mortgages, guarantee
payments and designate a just price for the legitimate
previous owners of land.

The Men of Industry ended by urging

that the Assembly safeguard the right of freedom of initia^
tive. 1 J
From time to time, El Carribe continued to allow
space for those who desired to defend the Constitution.

On

February 6, Dr. Armando Gonzales Tamayo, the Vice-President
elect of the Republic, declared that "the charter of the
Dominican Republic will be a revolutionary constitution which
will transform the general structure of the country and by so

12E1 Carribe. Feb. 16, p. J*.
13Ibid., Feb. 16, p.

>*.
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doing would prevent the country from falling into Communist
hands."

1 Zl

-

<-

,

■
"
-. ?;- ■; ■
Upon returning to Santo Domingo to prepare for his

inauguration, President Bosch, in a two hour and forty-five
minute improvised speech berated the opposition for its
attacks, and asserted that "the Constitution was proposing ,
measures to terminate the exploitation of the p o o r . E l
Carribe gave full front page coverage to Bosch's remarks."
On February 21, El Carribe allowed Angel Miolan/
president of the PHD, front page space to reply to criticism
of the draft Constitution.

Miolan declared that "the proposed

Constitution is the legal and juridic materialization of
what shall constitute a peaceful revolution in our history."
He said that it was most natural that interests which have
traditionally oppressed the people should feel uneasy and
attribute to the document more gravity than it really de
serves.

This criticism he charged is "nothing more than

criticism of the defeated— inventions of children."

He

indicated that the Assembly wanted time to clear up these
"ridiculous" inventions and added that the draft Constitution
was only a basis for discussion.

Miolan added that the pro

jected Constitution should have been confined to the privacy
of the Assembly chambers, and that the reporters had created

^ E l Carribe. Feb. 6, p. 6.
15Ibid., Feb. 18, p. 1.
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Ma tempest in a teapot."*^

„*

Most of the arguments by the proponents did not
placate critics; the debate continued*

A provision-stipu' '' *
lating who could own land became another area of.dispute* ^ 7?

Paragraph III of Article 27 in the draft declares that ,
"corporations cannot acquire property in land*"

In addition,

Article 28 of the draft announces that aliens cannot own
land:

,

*

-

ft .

Only Dominican individuals, naturalized or
by birth, have the right to acquire land • • •
and obtain concessions. • * * Nevertheless the
nation may grant the right to foreigners who
have Dominican children . . . if they agree to
allow the profits to remain in the nation.

....

Paragraph I. Individuals or corporations
who are not Dominicans may rent land and property
for a period of fifty years.
Commenting on Article 28, two days after the release
of the draft, El Carribe in an editorial said that "perhaps
the spirit of the article is to avoid latifundios. but there
is no doubt that this constitutional principle will bring
with it an anti-legal situation since corporations have the
legal attributes of physical persons."

The editor argued

that no text can discriminate against either without affect
ing "the cement" of the legal structure of Dominican society.
/

The newspaper also criticized the imprecisions and vague
statements of Article 28, and appealed to the Assembly to

*^E1 Carribe. Feb. 18, p. 1.
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hold public hearings, to appoint commissions to study the
Constitution*

Nevertheless, in concluding, the editorial^

V

said, "We are not opposed to all of the proposals of the''.
Constitution." r

>

*

Article 28 later became Article 24 of the 1963 Con
stitution and differed only in the wording of the first
paragraph, which stated that "Congress may authorize within
the law and in the national interest, the renting of lands in
urban zones to foreigners."

Also, in the final 1963 document,

specific time limitations on leases are omitted saying only
that "the law will regulate the renting of land."
Perhaps, more than anything else, the section on work
frightened business management.

Referring to Article 2 of

the draft which stated that "the existence of the nation is
in work," the Association of Landowners and Farm Owners
charged that "it was a preposterous statement ignoring all
of the factors of work."

The organization suggested that the

Constitution was trying to organize the nation for the benefit
of only one class— labor.

As an example, they cited Article

14 of the draft which recognizes the "right of unions to
initiate the formation of laws in regard to labor matters."
The Association suggested that this article be eliminated
since it was unnecessary.

"If not eliminated, at least, it

should be made certain that all economic classes have the

*^E1 Carribe. Jan. 30* P» 9*
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right of representation— owners as well as w o r k e r s . ?
;>/■’V '
. -v 7
T**
The Chamber of Commerce and its associated groups
also voiced their objections.

They agreed that it was t r u l y ,

necessary to create social justice but asserted thatT the
country also needed justice which, in its extreme forms, did
not abrogate the legal rights of capital.

"The prosperity

of the working class," they contended, "is directly related
to the success of business.

If business must comply with

obligations that produce their ruin, it is certain this will
gravely affect the entire working class." 19^
In the case of Article 14, critics succeeded.

‘

The

Assembly completely eliminated Article 14, and no vestige of
it remains.
The opposition was not so successful in its bid to
change other provisions relating to workers.

The proposal

to recognize only one union in a plant, particularly alienated
employers.

Article 13 of the draft declares:

Parallel unions in one center of work are
prohibited, be it federation or confederation.
The State will not recognize more than one
union and that will be the one with which the
majority is affiliated.
Businessmen charged that Article 13 was dedicated
only to workers and not to management.

Some held it tanta-

1^E1 Carribe. Feb. 1, p. 1; full text, p. 10.
19Ibid., Jan. 31, p. 1.
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mount to constitutional authorization of a single centralized >
union*

*

•

Bosch defended the provisions of Article IJi

--

i

The authors of this controversial provision
^ ■c
had no intention of establishing a single central
ized union* Each union was free to affiliate with
r
whichever central body it felt would best further
its interest. The wording merely intended to
prevent the creation of company unions, by which
bosses could organize a union favorable to their
interests and preclude the organization of a union
that would genuinely respond to the needs of the
majority of the w o r k e r s , 20
Although Article 13 aroused bitter disapproval, in its final
form nothing was fundamentally changed.

It became Article 15

in the 1963 Constitution:
In contractual relations between owners and
workers of the same enterprise and always when
dealing with unions of equal nature • • • , the
State will only recognize the one which is
affiliated with the majority of workers.
Even more distasteful to owners was the provision of
Article 15 in the draft, stating that
the State recognizes the right of workers to
collaborate with business in the form and accord
ing to that established by law in order to elevate ,
work socially, economically, and also to respond
to the necessities of production.
The Association of Landowners and Farm Owners criti
cized Article 15, charging that what is meant by collaboration
is not clear, and that the provision gives the workers the
right to intervene in the direction of businesses,

20

Bosch, Unfinished Experiment, p. 130.

"This

102
interference," they charged, "will prejudice not only the
worker but the whole national economy."

The Association

J

recommended the elimination of Article 15 or at least 4that it
be consigned to a simple declaration of principle such as "it
is the right of the worker to collaborate with industries#"

21

In defending Article 15, Dr. Savinon in El Carribe
pointed out that "collaboration" in the article did not refer
to individuals but to labor groups and contended that the
final part of the article indicated that collaboration would
be regulated. 22
In the final Constitution Article 15 became Article
18 and except for the addition of one word, "duty," the pro
vision on the right of workers to collaborate remained the
same.

Thus, the amended portion read, "the right and duty to

collaborate."
This small addition satisfied some of the critics.
El Carribe applauded the Assembly for changing Article 15,
and said that the public had feared that the Constitution was
recognizing the right of workers to interfere in the adminis
tration and direction of business#

The editors said that by

changing the wording, the Assembly had allowed the "democratic
spirit to triumph.

^*E1 Carribe. Feb. 1, p# 1.
22
Ibid.. Feb# 18, p. 8.
23Ibid.. March 11, p. 6.

Nevertheless, most capitalists continued to worry,
$

*

especially about the pronouncements which said that workers
had a right to share in the profits of industry and agri
culture as in Article 16 of the draft:
In any agricultural, industrial, commercial
or mining enterprise, the workers shall have the
right to participate in the benefits of the same,
recognizing the legitimate interest of management
and other factors of production.
The laws, decrees and resolutions of the
Minister of Labor shall fix the limits and form
of this participation.
The Association of Landowners and Farm Owners charged
that the Constitution made the Minister of Labor an economic
2li
dictator.
The Chamber of Commerce and its allied groups
agreed that workers have a legitimate right to participate in
the benefits of business, but they argued that the form and
limit should not be established by laws and decrees but by
the particular circumstances of each business.

They also

suggested that it would be better if the Constitution said
that participation in benefits should be made by collective
pacts or agreements.2^
Defending the PRD position, Dr. Savinon in El Carribe
asserted that allowing workers to participate in benefits
creates an incentive in the work force since workers cannot
participate if there are no profits. 26
2li
El Carribe. Feb. 1, p. 10.
25 Ibid., Jan. 3 1 , p. b.

26 Ibid.. Feb. 18, p. 8 .
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For many weeks discussions on work continued, with
opponents alternating between recriminations and supplications.
When the debates had ended and Article 16 became Article 19
of the final 1963 Constitution, only minor changes were *
visible.

Article 16 incorporated all of the wording of the

draft provisions, and affirmed the right of workers to^par
ticipate in the benefits of industry.

Only one small change

was made; Article 19 stated that the "law* and not the

v

minister of labor "would fix the limits and form of partici- ,
pation."
It is evident that rights of property and private
initiative became a serious source of friction during the
months the Revisionary Assembly met.

Most businessmen and

landowners were not opposed to a certain amount of regulation
of the economy by the government, but they were not willing
to accept the all encompassing interference which they saw
in the PRD Constitution.

Those who opposed the 1963 Consti

tution, especially, believed that it would stifle the economy
and free enterprise.

El Carribe summaries the typical

objections of those who were against the new document:
Social justice based on a weak economy is
counter-productive. The greatest responsibility
of the Assembly is to write a charter that will
assure rapid economic expansion of the country
and guarantee the rights of citizens to act within
the structure of social justice and at the same
time guarantee respect for all fundamental human
rights.27

2^E1 Carribe. Feb. 19 $ P* 6.
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It should be pointed out that disagreements over the
Constitution were not confined to economic principles.

A

great many Dominicans were equally disturbed by certain pre
cepts of the section on education.

Article 19 of the draft

especially provoked consternation among religious leaders.

r

Article 19 became a source of dispute since it stated that
In an absolute manner the school system is
subject to the organization and supervision of
the State.

,,

In private establishments only the parents,
tutors and those in charge of the education of
the child have the right to decide whether or
not to teach religious principles.
Article 19 raised a furor among the clergy, but in
addition it caused confusion as to what the article intended
to do.

Because of the way in which the text was written, the

purpose was not clear.

The clergy demanded addition of

"Freedom of Teaching."

A paradox resulted because some

people believed that adding the statement "Freedom of Teach
ing" would allow religious schools while others believed
"Freedom of Teaching" would permit only lay schools.

El

Carribe proposed that Article 19 should expressly say that
teaching in official schools should be lay, leaving to the
parents and teachers the right to decide whether or not a
child should be instructed in religion in the private
28
schools.

28E1 Carribe. Mar. 1, p. 6.

\ ,
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Despite the confusion, the Church took a definite

.

^

stand demanding that "Freedom of Teaching" be added to pronouncements on education*

The newspapers were filled with

advertisements by groups such as the Catholic Dominican
Institutions, The Committee of Dominican Christians, and

<

The National Union of Catholic High Schools of the Dominican
Republic, all imploring the Assembly to add "Freedom of
>

•

Teaching" and to expressly state that parents have a right
2Q

to choose the education of their children. 7

*

Not only Catholics, but Protestant groups debated the
educational provisions*

A large advertisement sponsored by

the Committee of Schools for the Dominican Evangelical Church
appeared in El Carribe.

This group, too, solicited the

Assembly, requesting the inclusion of a statement saying that
"the Dominican people must have freedom of teaching."^
A short time later, El Carribe began to take a stronger
position asserting that freedom to teach is a natural right
of all men; and, therefore, El Carribe "radically opposes the
monopoly by the State which proposes that private schools may
not operate unless they conform absolutely to requirements
prescribed by the state."

The editor accused the Assembly

of trying to establish one system in the whole nation, obliging parents against "their sacred right" to give their
children only the kind of education the state prescribed.

2^E1 Carribe* Mar. 1, p. 6.
Feb. 22, p. 2; Feb. 26, p. 20.
Ibid.. Mar. 7* p* 8.

Texts Feb. 3* P* ^5

,

"We are not demanding the religious school, we are demanding
the private, the democratic school whether it be lay,
Catholic or Protestant."*^1
Not everyone opposed Article 1 9 .

The Student Christian

Movement in an advertisement criticized the move to change
Article 19, saying that certain sectors are in favor of vio
lating the principles of human rights.

The students group

argued that the existing religious teaching in the public
schools constituted discrimination for those who had other
beliefs.

It created problems and would convert the schools

into a scene of constant religious debate.

The students also

stated that teaching religion had always signified mutual
obligation between Church and State which, in effect, did
away with the separation of both.

The student group urged

that the Assembly "consecrate lay teaching in public schools
as a method of guaranteeing liberty to all in religious
matters. "*^2
The Assembly acquiesced to some of the wishes of its
critics.

Some changes were made in the education section.

In its final form Article 19 became Article 37 which stated
that
Freedom of teaching is guaranteed, and science
is proclaimed as the basic fundamental of education.
The state shall have in its charge the organization,

^ El Carribe. Mar. 7> P* 8 .
-^Ibid. . Mar. 3, p. 4. Note:
record similar patterns of debate.

Other publications
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inspection and supervision of the school system,
in order to procure the achievement of the social
ends of the culture and for the best intellectual,
moral and physical formation of those being
educated.
The final wording did not completely satisfy the
Roman Catholic Church since the Church objected to the state
ment that "science is the basic fundamental of education.”
Sharp clashes also developed over several provisions
relating to the family.

Many Dominicans, especially the

Roman Catholic Church, condemned the pronouncements which
recognized common law marriages and protected children born
out of wedlock.

Many critics also severely rebuked the

assembly for legalizing divorce.
Jottin Curry,

in an article "Divorce in the Consti

tution of the P R D " , criticized the provision which recognizes
all classes of marriage,

legal or not.

Moreover, Jottin

said that he could see no reason for granting property rights
to extra-marital relationships.

Jottin suggested that such

"delicate subjects" as divorce, common law marriage, and
illegitimate children should not be material for a constitu
tion but should be legislated i n s t e a d . ^
After the long and bitter denunciations, the Assembly
revised some of the wording, but most of the provisions of
the section dealing with the family were incorporated into
the final document without any visible change.

33e 1_ Carribe. Feb. 12, p. 16.

On April 25th, 1963, the Dominican Episcopate sent
an official statement to President Bosch, expressing alarm
at the presence in the Constitution of "ideologies against
Christ and human beings and their rights*"

The Episcopate

argued that the new constitution would foster agitation and
terrorism and would bring moral, social, and ideological
chaos— and finally "slavery."

The Church suggested that the

unrest which was prevalent in the country would disappear if
the members of the Revisionary Assembly would decide to
revise the ambiguous and confused articles of the Constitution
or if the Assembly would submit the Constitution to a popular
r>lL

referendum .^

The Episcopate deplored the failure of the 1963 Con
stitution to recognize the Concordat between the Holy See
and the Dominican Republic*

The Church suggested that such

action ignores the "concrete historic Catholic situation of
the Dominican people."

The Episcopate also denounced the

Constitution for its "lack of respect for the sacred rights"
of Roman Catholic marriages, and condemned the provision for
3*5
divorce.
The Church refused to send an official representative
to the promulgation ceremonies.

Bosch argued that "this was

'*Ll
^ Alfau Danilo Brugal, Tragedia en Santo Domingo;
Documentos para la historia (Santo Domingo:
Editorial El
Carribe, 1966), p. 39.
3^Ibid.
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a gesture of rebellion condemned by the Church itself, since
the Church maintains as doctrine respect for legally estab
lished institutions and g o v e r n m e n t s . " ^
Attacking the Constitution from a different point of
view,

some jurists even suggested that the Constitution of

1963 was invalid because it was a product of a Revisionary
Assembly and not a Constituent Assembly.

They argued that

since the Assembly had not merely revised the Constitution
37
but had written another one, the 1963 document was void.-'
So, the debates continued; tensions increased.

Each

proposal brought a barrage of criticism from those Dominicans
who considered the Constitution of 1963 a threat to their
economic and social interests.

-^Bosch, Unfinished Experiment, p. 129
-^Brugal, Tragedia. p. 36.

CHAPTER VI
COUP
As the members of the Revisionary Assembly neared the
conclusion of their labors, polarization widened.

Official

enactment of the new Constitution did not bring harmony to
the Dominican Republic.

Although the PRD dominated Assembly

accepted some criticisms and modified a few objectionable
articles, none of the revisions altered the original character
of the 1963 Constitution.

Moreover, minor modifications

failed to placate the bitter resentments that had emerged
during the past months.

When the Assembly had finished its

work, much of Bosch's earlier moderate support had dissipated.
Criticism increased rapidly after the promulgation
of the new charter.

As soon as Bosch's reform program began

to materialize, opposition intensified.

It was not long

before disapproval of the Constitution became intertwined
with fears of Communism, and the 1963 Constitution became a
rallying point around which to gather forces opposing Bosch's
programs.

Whether imagined or real, those in high political

and economic positions feared that Bosch would lead them down
the road to Communism.

Reforms in the areas of landholding,

taxation, and church and state relations provoked a steady
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stream of charges that Bosch was soft on Communism.
Bosch was accused of harboring Communists when he
allowed twenty political exiles to return, among them Maximo
Lopez Molina who was deported in 1962 after his formation of
the pro-Castro Dominican People's Party.^

Others charged

that Bosch had allowed Communists to infiltrate the govern
ment.

Dr. Viriato Fiallo, the leader of the Union Civica

Nacional (UCN), accused Bosch of placing Communists in key
government positions and letting them use the schools and
government buildings for their political indoctrination#
Fiallo publicly demanded a clear and definite statement of
2
B o s c h 1s position toward the Communist ideology.
Charges of Communism were not confined to those made
by Dominicans.

Armistead Selden, Jr., the United States

Democratic Congressman from Alabama and chairman of the U.S.
House of Representatives subcommittee on Latin American
affairs, told the House of Representatives on May 31> 1963,
that Communist subversive penetration in the Dominican Repub
lic "apparently is not being effectively countered by the
new Dominican Government."^

On the same day, President Bosch

accused Representative Selden of trying to "dictate the best

^ "Dominican Chaos" On Record:
Affairs, II, No. 10 (June 1965), p.
2

Deadline Data on World

Centro de Ensenanza de las Fuerza Armadas. Libro
Blanco (CEAF), pp. 1^7-53, in Moreno. Barrios in A rms, p. 18.
B

-'On Record, p. 9.

w a y 1’ to run the Dominican Government,

k

Some United States journalists also joined in the
indictments against Bosch,

In a story datelined Miami, Jules

Du Bois of the Chicago Tribune and Scrips Howard Chain, wrote
A Communist takeover of the Dominican Republic
is nearing hard reality with extraordinary speed.
President Juan Bosch . • • appears to be neatly
laying out the carpet for the R e d s , 3
Hendrix wrote many such articles and most of them were re
produced in El Carribe and El Llstin Diaro,
Such accusations disturbed the American Ambassador,
John Martin, who was trying desperately to bolster the Bosch
government,

Martin expressed his apprehension,

"Clearly my

effort to win support for Bosch had failed, at least in some
newspapers.

Now our influence was wholly negative— we could

do little but keep telling everybody we supported the constitutionally elected President,"
In defending himself Bosch described the article by
Hendrix as "tattle picked up in saloons" and challenged
Hendrix to substantiate his charges with one single fact.

7

A reporter in the Christian Science Monitor defended
Bosch, saying that

h.

On Record, p. 110,

-'Martin, Overtaken by Events, p. $ 0 •
6 ibia.. p. 510 .
Hispanic American Report. XVI, No. 5 (Events of May

1963), p.

im-

Hr. Bosch is merely trying to push through
the 11social transformations11 called for in the
Alliance for Progress.
They say projected re
forms and the President *s refusal to come out
publicly against communism gave the traditional
ruling classes and conservative opposition an
excuse to sound alarms about the government1s
ideological orientalion.8
Bosch was also severely criticized for permitting
Dominicans to travel to Cuba.

After the first group departed,

Bosch wanted to put a restriction on all new passports, for
bidding such travel, but there was no law he could use to
enforce this restriction.

Moreover, Article 73 of* the Consti

tution specifically permitted freedom of transit.
By July 1963, the opposition tried to create the
impression of massive reaction of the populace against the
policies of the government.

Huge HChristian Affirmation”

rallies were organized all over the country.

Truckloads of

peasants were transported to the city to demonstrate against
the Communists and Bosch's government.

The radio, the news

papers, the talk on the streets were full of "Christian

o

Demonstrations."^

Ambassador Martin,

sensing danger, talked to Bosch

and told him that though he agreed that the extreme right had
gone too far, especially with the "Christiam Affirmation,” the
fact remained that Bosch was in trouble because of his
handling of the Communist problem and suggested that Bosch

8

Christian Science Monitor. June 1, 1963*

Q

7Moreno, Barrios, p. 19*
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punish Guban travellers.

When Bosch protested that the Con

stitution prohibited such action, Martin answered:

"Let the

10

courts decide that.

Do it anyway.”

Before long, not only enemies but also former
supporters began to display signs of disaffection with
Bosch.

In the elections Bosch and his FED pledged economic

and social reform.

The Bosch government had made some im

provements in the economy.

By the end of April the government

budget was in balance; gold reserves, which earlier had
plummeted, were being maintained.

The national debt had been

reduced from $9^ million to $15 million; and net reserves at
the Central Bank had tripled.

11

The economic picture indeed

looked brighter; yet many Dominicans grumbled about the
austerity which made such gains possible.

In addition,

Bosch*s much promised economic development program had failed
to materialize; the promised large scale land reform plan did
not take place.

The plan stalled when large landowners who

had been dispossessed of their lands flocked to the courts,
leaving much of the land for reform tied up in litigation.
Workers, too, became dissatisfied as unemployment persisted,
and some workers became wary of B o s c h 1s proposal to combine
unions into a single labor alliance.

10 Martin, Overtaken by Events, p. 50^.
11 Hispanic American Report. XVI, No. 6 (Events of
June, 1963)# P® 572o
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From the first Bosches bisrsrest handicap was the lack
of experienced and able oectle to help hire run the government•
Scarcity of trained professional and technical personnel pre
vented Bosch and his Americ ax collaborators from making
visible headway in eccncric development projects*
Y.any of Bosch1s critics accused him of inefficiency

and political incompetence.
charges,

There were some grounds for such

but neither inefficiency nor the disastrous legacy

of the Trujillo era were the sole obstacles to progress.

The

long years of neglect and misrule had left problems common
to most underdeveloped countries:
nel,

lack of managerial person

inadequate capital, and little or no political consensus

or institutional continuity.

Prom the cutset B o s c h 1s goals

and ideals were thwarted by the political, social,and
economic realities of a country with widespread illiteracy,
rampant unemployment, and stifling poverty amidst abundant
resources.

But perhaps the most fundamental yet intangible

problem of the Bosch administration was the lack of a sense
of civic responsibility.

7lsO segment of the community seemed

Killing to subordinate its personal claims to the national
■% ■ i
good.
*

£

By the end of July Bosch began

zq

meet further re

sistance whep the Congress modified the Law of Public

i2

“ Abraham P. Lowenbhal, "Limits of American Power:
the Lessons of the Dominican Republic, * Haroers KaarazIne,
June 1964, p. 95*
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Confiscation originally passed under the Council of State.
This law expropriated property owned by the Trujillo family
and other Trujillistas.
Constitution,

According to Article 9 of the 1962

the judiciary had been designated as the sole

tribunal for this procedure.
itself to act as
Property

Now the Congress designated

the tribunal.

J

owners became further alarmed,

when the PHD-

dominated Congress attempted, though unsuccessfully, to pass
a law by which the Minister of Public Properties could seize
any land or property which had been illicitly acquired by
public officials through the use of their public position.
The law also applied to property acquired by. a third person
who had profited from his relationship with a public official.
In addition, the new law placed the burden of proof of
innocence upon the accused.
tution contained

Article 5 of

the enabling provision for

the 1963 Consti
the law.

Since

almost everyone who owned property could not have acquired
it without at least passive cooperation with Trujillo, owners
feared that the law would permit confiscation of any property.
This law frightened them much more than any constitutional
provisions providing for expropriation.
By early September,
newspapers and airwaves.

talk of confiscation filled the

Attempts to alter the confiscation

1R
-'Martin, Overtaken by Events, p. 509»

1^Ibxd., p. 495.
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laws infuriated property owners.

The editors of El Carribe

described as monstrous the Congress's proposition to put the
burden of proof on the accused in matters of confiscation.
El Carribe pointed out that it has always been a universal
law that a person is innocent until proven guilty.

"We are

not saying that Bosch will be the same as Castro, but we are
saying that once converted into law, the project of the con
fiscation will cause all capital and property to be at the
mercy of political caprices.

. •

In the words of El Carribe. "The political ambient
continued to boil all during September."

Tensions mounted

daily as headlines announced new friction between the govern
ment and its critics.

Each day another group renounced the

project of confiscation.

The Association of Dominican Lawyers

charged that the system would violate a series of juridic
and constitutional principles.

1A

At the same time, right-

wing Senators urged that the Constitution be amended to make
Communism illegal.

171

While businessmen and former supporters of Trujillo
accused Bosch of surrendering to the Communists, the far left
also attacked the Bosch government.

The Fourteenth of June

(1J4) accused the Bosch government of capitulating to the

*^E1 Carribe. Sept. 5> P* 8 *
l6 Ibid. . Sept. 11, p. 1.
• ^ Ibld. . Sept. 3, p. 1.
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forces of "Yankee Imperialism."

The ij4 charged that the

country was in a grave economic crisis brought about by the
oligarchy,
ists.

the landowners, merchants, and American imperial

Members of the 1J4 accused those groups of using their

economic power to discredit the government and cry Communist
danger in order that the "Tru.jillista military could justify
calling a state of emergency."

The 1J4 asserted that Bosch

had betrayed the popular masses while doing nothing to im18
prove the economic development of the country.
To add to Bosch's problems,

some of the more power

ful factions of the armed forces had joined the landowners,
businessmen,and the Church in openly opposing the Bosch
government.

The 1963 Constitution had not changed the con

stitutional status of the armed forces.

Bosch had not

attempted to make drastic changes or reforms in the military.
He made no effort to reduce their size or to reorganize them.
In general, he refrained from tampering with the armed forces
for fear that his government would be immediately overthrown.
He did, however, curtail some of the top-level military graft.
Though Bosch in his book claimed such curtailment as a major
reason for his overthrow, most observers contended that it
19
was not. '

^ E l Carribe. Sept. 3, p. 15*

19

^See Donald A. Allan, "Santo Domingo:
The Empty
Showcase," The Reporter. XXIX (December 5* 1963)* 30; Bosch,
Unfinished Experiment, pp. 184-85.
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One issue, however, united all the military officers
who opposed Bosch:

this was the issue of growing Communist

influence in his government.

Howard J. Wiarda,

in his article,

"The Politics of Civil Military Relations in the Dominican
Republic," asserts that for the officers, Communism was
neither an ideological, economic nor imperialistic system,
but only meant, as they recalled the case of the Cuban revo
lution,

"destruction of the armed forces and death to the

officers."

Wiarda believed that it "mattered little that

there were few Communists or Fidellstas in the country, and
that they were disorganized and badly split; what was important was that the armed forces believed otherwise."

20

Despite the growing tensions and fears of Communism
in the armed forces, Bosch did not take any action against
either the ultra-leftists or the military.

Bosch continued

to reiterate that he would not preside over a dictatorship.
Bosch was determined to be the antithesis of Trujillo and to
keep the country completely free from persecution of any kind
unless sanctioned by law.

This helped to speed his downfall.

Bosch hated Communism, but he refused to deprive the Com
munists of their constitutional rights.

In addition, he felt

that Communists in the open were less dangerous than

20

Howard J. Wiarda, "The Politics of Civil Military
Relations in the Dominican Republic," Journal of Interamerican Studies. VII (October 1965), ^80.
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Communists underground.

21

As Wiarda noted,

"While the stand might have been

laudable from an idealistic point of view, politically it
proved disastrous."

Wiarda believed that Bosch was probably

correct in his assessment of the weak Communist position in
the country, but that he was mistaken in not recognizing the
issue as a political matter which "lofty principles could not
decide."^
On the evening
forces

of September 24, 1963#

a group

armed

leaders, headed by Brigadier General Elias Wessin y

Wessin demanded, for the last time, that Bosch do something
to curb Communist activity.
their demands.

Bosch refused to comply with

At 2:30 A.M., on September 25, General Wessin

placed Bosch under arrest and detained him in the National
Palace.

General Wessin and his group then took over the

government.
In a statement

announcing the coup, a

the government for not

taking a firm stand on

communique blamed
the issue of

Communism despite the clear warning given by the military.
The communique also indicated that the new government would
"respect the rights of the individual and of associations,
especially the right to private property and free enterprise,

21

El Carribe. July 9, 1963; Kurzman, Revolt of the

D a mned.
^^Wiarda,
p.

480.

"Politics of Civil Military Relations,"
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so that commerce,

industry and banks, free from fears of

confiscation could contribute to the development of the

21

country." ^

After the coup the military officers immediately
dissolved Congress, abrogated the 1963 Constitution and re
instated the Constitution of 1962.

2-^CEAF. Libro Blanco, pp. 90-91 in Moreno, Barrios,
pp. 90-91*

CHAPTER VII
THE REVOLUTION
On September 26, the day after the coup, military
leaders installed a three man civilian junta, a Triumvirate,
headed by Donald Reid Cabral*

As his first official act,

Reid announced the deportation of former president, Juan
Bosch*
Six hours after the coup, the United States suspended
diplomatic relations and ordered the immediate withdrawal of
all military and economic aid personnel except the peace
corps.

Washington also announced a freeze on economic assist

ance funds*1
In the five years since the assassination of Trujillo,
the United States had committed itself to a wide range of
instruments of power and influence to ensure a democratic
regime in the Dominican Republic.

The Kennedy administration

injected massive doses of economic aid in the form of millions
2
of American dollars and technical personnel.
President

i

U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Rela
tions, Background Information Relating to the Dominican
Republic‘s 89th Congress, 1st Sess. , October 18, 1 9 &5$ Doc.

Ill, 73.
^For the year 1963, the United States spent 53*5
million dollars.
U.S. Congress, Senate, Senator Morse dis
cussing recent events in the Dominican Republic, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess., June 8 , 1965, Congressional Record, p. 12769.
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John Kennedy had hoped to make the Dominican Republic a
"Showcase for Democracy" under the Alliance for Progress,
but the swift overthrow of the constitutionally elected
President, Juan Bosch,

shattered many of the illusions of

the Kennedy Administrat ion.
The State Department publicly condemned the military
coup, and the United States continued its diplomatic, economic,
and military boycott through October and November of 1963*
On November 27, shortly after Reid announced plans for presi
dential elections in July, 1 965, the new Johnson administration
extended diplomatic recognition to the Triumvirate govern3
ment.
President Johnson immediately resumed the United States
aid program, and during the next sixteen months, the United
States and the International Monetary Fund poured nearly 60
million dollars worth of grants and loans into the Dominican
4
Republic.
Nevertheless, such aid did little to alleviate
the steadily worsening situation.
In the aftermath of the coup, political and economic
conditions deteriorated rapidly.

While Trujillo controlled

the nation, he held foreign importations and wages within
strict bounds.

After Trujillo*s death, salaries tripled;

^U.S.,- Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Rela
tions, Background Information Relating to the Dominican
Republic"^ 89th Congress, Fst Sess., October 1&, 1965, D o c •
II, 83.

Il

Lloyd B. Dennis, "Dominican Dilemma, ** Editorial
Research Reports. 14 (April 13, 1966) , p. 267.
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purchasing power increased; and imports rose from 69.5 mil
lion in 1961 to 200 million in 1964.

The foreign debt rose

to alarming heights and completely destroyed the balance of
trade.
To add to Reid*s difficulties, corruption, always a
problem, now ran rampant throughout the nation, especially
in the armed forces.

The armed forces and the National Police

conducted a contraband operation, selling forbidden imported
goods to the public.

One such enterprise, the Canteen Com

pany of the National Police, openly advertised its wares in
the newspapers.

Armed forces abuse of the commissary privi

leges reached such an extreme that the Merchants Association
of Sellers of Vehicles and Household Effects in Santo Domingo
complained that the armed forces technical services were
importing home appliances, duty free, and publicly selling
them in direct competition with merchants.^
The Reid government had inherited many of its problems,
and despite strenuous efforts, Reid made only limited progress
in improving conditions in the nation.

Reid, a member of the

old landholding elite, genuinely desired social change and
even began a successful program of agrarian reform.

Although

^Hispanic American Report. VII, No. 7 (Events of
July 1964), p. 621.
6
Christian Science Monitor. April 28, 1965* V* H >
El CarribeT November 5> 1964, p*
Hispanic American Report.
VII, No. 9, (Events of Sept. 1964), p. 807.
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scrupulously honest, Reid was never popular; and, ironically,
his steps to overhaul the ruined economy and eliminate cor7
ruption ultimately led to his overthrow.'
To alleviate the balance of payment problem and to
bolster the economy, Reid imposed a strict austerity program.
He also took measures directed at eliminating corruption in
the armed forces.

Reid adopted a system of rotating top

commands in an attempt to lessen the authority of the military
leaders.

He imposed a freeze on promotions and demoted some

of the worst offenders who were engaged in corrupt operations.
Reid's actions antagonized the strongest senior forces in the
military and did nothing to placate the younger officers, who
were impatient with Reid because he did not move fast enough
in cleaning up graft and corruption.

Reid's slowness in

retiring senior officers to make way for promotions based on
merit also disappointed junior officers.
At the same time, unemployment reached alarming
proportions.

As strikes became a common occurrence, Reid

suspended civil liberties.
more chaotic.

Conditions in Santo Domingo grew

After the overthrow of Bosch, prospects for

the nation had been gloomy; now they were bleak.

7

Everywhere,

Howard J. Wiarda, "The U.S. and the Dominican Crisis:
Background to Chaos," Caribbean Monthly Bulletin. IX (July
1965 ) f in University Colloquy on Public Issues, After Santo
Domingo What? U.S. Intervention in Latin America. An Inquiry
(Austin, Texas:
The University of Texas, 1966), p.
II.
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in all sectors of the society, frustrations increased.

To

many Dominicans, there seemed to be no visible hope of alle
viation through peaceful, non-violent means.

For one reason

or another, almost everyone in the country seemed anxious to
remove Reid.

Rumors of intrigues and plots for a counter-coup

circulated freely all around the nation.
Indeed,
Molina Urena,

shortly after the overthrow of Bosch, Rafael

speaker of the House under Bosch, began to

organize a civilian movement aimed at restoring the Consti
tution of 1963 and returning Bosch to the presidency.

With

the help of former members of the PRD, Urena gained adherents
from small groups of upper and middle c l a s s .intellectuals and
professionals in Santo Domingo and Santiago.

These new sup

porters were significant because a good many were dissidents
from the conservative Union Civic Nacional (UCN) and other
political parties which had previously opposed Bosch.

Leaders

from organized labor also joined Urena when it became apparent
that Bosch's overthrow was a severe setback for the free
labor movement in the Dominican Republic.

8

In January 1965, leaders of the PRD and the Social
Christian Revolutionary Party (PRSC) met in Puerto Rico and
signed the "Pacto de Rio Piedras," which formally agreed to
"build a common front to re-establish constitutional order

o
For a list of labor leaders and former Bosch oppo
nents who joined Urena*s organization, see Moreno, Barrios,
pp. 22-2*K
Also see "Participants in the Dominican Crisis"
in the Appendix.
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and to attempt to bring a democratic solution to the problems
of the country."

This pact was highly publicized in El Listin

Diario and El Carribe through paid advertisements signed by
9
2000 people, most of them professionals and intellectuals.
On March 16 the Central Committee of the Popular
Socialist Party (PSP) issued a manifesto calling for the
return of Juan Bosch and the restoration of the 1963 Consti
tution.

Because of this manifesto, Bosch has been accused of

conspiring with the Communists.

According to Ambassador

Martin, there is no evidence that Bosch's PRD ever sought the
support of any of the three Marxist parties operating in the
country; and on many occasions Bosch openly rejected the sup
port of the Communists.

As Ambassador Martin pointed out in

his book, "Bosch could hardly be blamed if they £ " Communists
10
decided to support his PRD-Social Christian movement."

J

At the same time that Urena began his civilian
organization, a group of young military officers, many of
middle class extraction, began to organize a movement against
the Reid government.

Most of these younger officers had been

trained in military academies at home or in the United States
or the Canal Zone.

Ironically,

two important leaders, Colonel

9

^Jose A. Moreno, Sociological Aspects of the Dominican
Revolution (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell Univer
sity, 1967), P. 25; El Listin Diario. Feb. 12, 1964; El
C arribe. Feb. 26, 1965*
"^Martin, Overtaken by Events, p. 643* The PSP is the
official Communist Party in the Dominican Republic.
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Francisco Deno Caamano and Colonel Rafael Fernando Domingues,
were sons of Trujillo*s most hated generals;

11 and Caamano

was one of those who participated in the coup which deposed
Bosch in 1963*

At the time of his overthrow, Bosch claimed

to have supporters in the armed forces, particularly among
enlisted men and lower and middle grade officers.

12

By the

fall of 1964, a large number of younger officers from the
Army, Air Force, Navy, and National Police had joined the
pro-Bosch revolutionary movement.
At the end of 1964, four different groups were
plotting to overthrow the government:

The PRD civilian

group; the military group organized by Domingues; and a grass
roots movement among rank and file of the army, headed by
Captain Pena Taveras.

Another group organized by Colonel

Neit Niva Seijas of the San Cristobal military installation,
proposed to bring back former President Balaguer.

Seijas*

group had among its followers high-ranking officers,
ing some generals.

includ-

11
^

By the spring of 1965* rumors of plots and conspira
cies proliferated.

Reid was aware of the intrigues against

him, but did not expect trouble until late May or early June.

11

Moreno, Barrios. p. 25.

1 2Martin, Overtaken by Events, p. 644.
1 -'Moreno,
3
Barrios. p. 26; Martin, Overtaken by
Events, p. 644.
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Unknown to Reid, B o s c h ’s civilian supporters and some younger
officers of the armed forces had scheduled a revolt for
April 26, 1965.

But on the morning of April 2^, Reid took

steps to prevent future difficulties within the armed forces.
He sent his Chief of Staff, General Rivera Cuesta, to arrest
six would-be conspirators,

General Cuesta ordered Captain

Mario Peno Taveras to assist in the arrest, but Taveras was
himself one of the leaders plotting against Reid,

Instead of

following orders, Taveras arrested Cuesta and freed the
prisoners.
rising.

Taveras*s action prematurely triggered the up 

The remainder of the disaffected middle grade junior

officers now declared themselves in revolt against the Reid
government and set the coup in motion by seizing the 27th of
February Military Camp.

1

Early that same afternoon, a group of civilians took

16

over the two radio stations in Santo Domingo. ^

Pena Gomez

of the PRD announced that the Reid government had been over
thrown, and Gomez then appealed to the people to give the
rebels their support.

From the slums of Santo Domingo,

thousands of Dominicans poured into the streets and cele
brated.

1^Moreno, Barrios, p. 27,
1 SU . S •, Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary,
Testimony of Brigadier General Elias Wessin y W e s s i n . Hear
ings before a Subcommittee to investigate the Administration
of the Internal Security Act and other internal security laws,
89th Cong., 1st Sess., October 1, 1965, p. 209.
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The rebellion had taken everyone by surprise, especially the members of the various Communist parties
American Embassy.

1

fi

and the

Members of the American legation had no

inkling of an immediate revolt.

On Saturday, April 2*+th,

the Embassy was almost deserted.

Ambassador W. Tapley

Bennett, Jr. was in Washington on a routine trip and had
taken the weekend to visit his mother in Georgia.

The Ameri

can Naval Attache was on a dove-shooting trip with General
Antonio Barrera Imbert.

Air Attache, Colonel Thomas Fishburn

was playing golf with General of the Air Force, Juan de los
Santos Cespedes.

Eleven of the thirteen members of the

Military Advisory and Assistance Mission were spending the
weekend at a conference in Panama.

Until Ambassador Bennett

returned, Charge d*Affairs, William Connett, who had been in
the country six months, was in charge of the Embassy.

Actively

working with Connett was Second Secretary Arthur Breisky.
By Sunday, April 25th, the situation in Santo Domingo
became increasingly confused.

Reid appealed to the generals

at San Isidro for support but could only rally about UOO
troops.

When General Elias Wessin y Wessin and the other

senior officers of the armed forces refused to come to Reid's
17
aid, Reid announced his resignation and went into hiding. '

16 J. I. Quello and N. Isa Conde, MRevolutionary
Struggle in the Dominican Republic and its Lessons,1' The World
Marxist Review. 8 (December 1965)> PP* 71-81.
17
'Wessin Testimony, p. 213
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Upon the resignation of Reid, the leaders of the
revolt followed Bosch's instructions and swore in Molina
Urena as provisional President.

According to the 1963 Consti

tution, Urena was constitutionally next in line for the
presidency since he had been the speaker of the House under
Bosch.
By this time the revolt, which began as a classic
coup, became a mass uprising.

However, once under way, it

was apparent that the officers involved had differing objec
tives.

The junior element of the armed forces demanded a

restoration of the 1963 Constitution and the return of Bosch
as President.

They also supported the installation of a pro

visional government with Urena as President until Bosch could
return from exile.

The opposing group, mostly top-ranking

officers, refused to accept Bosch's return and insisted on
the formation of a military junta.

Here the two factions

came into open conflict; for while sentiment ran high against
the Reid regime, there was no consensus of what should take
its place.
Most of the junior officers supported Bosch and the
Constitution of 1963; a few favored the 1963 Constitution,
but not Bosch.

Some of the older military officers favored

the return of former President Balaguer.

Still others were

against Reid because of his efforts to reform the armed
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forces, but they also opposed Bosch.

1H

Among the staunchest

supporters of the military junta, there were senior officers
who later claimed that they had supported Reid*s removal
because they ”believed his ouster would bring free elections
and a return to constitutional government.”

They refused,

however, to even consider the return of the 1963 Constitution
and Bosch.

19

7

It was this wide divergence of objectives among

the military officers which finally split the armed forces.
No matter what the reason, divisions within the mili
tary continued to widen, and at this point, everyone could
agree on only one thing:
confused.

The situation had become highly

When the rebels and the representatives of the

senior generals sat down at the conference table on Sunday,
April 25, to discuss a settlement, Colonel Hernando Ramfrez,
speaking for the rebel leadership made one point perfectly
clear to Colonel Pedro B. Benoit, the negotiator for the
generals:

the principle of the return to the Constitution
20
of 1963 with Bosch as President was not negotiable.

18

U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator Selden speaking on
"The Dominican Situation,” 89th Cong., 1st Sess., Sept. 23,
1965, Congressional Record, p. 2^975.
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7Juan Tomas Mejia Feliu, "Prologo,” in Danilo Brugal
Alfau, Tragedia en Santo Domingo:
Documentos para le Historia
(Santo Domingo: Editorial El Carribe, 1966), p. vii.
~
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Moreno, Barrios, p. 28.
A note about terminology: From the beginning, the
rebels called themselves "constitutionalist” and referred to
the loyalists as "anti-constitutionalists." The terms rebels

13^
Outside, the young people chanted,

"Juan Bo Presidente,”

but inside the negotiations reached an impasse.
element of the armed forces remained adamant.
forces, equally determined,

The senior
Pro-Bosch

insisted on an immediate provi

sional government with Urena as President until Bosch could
return from exile.

Pro-Bosch army officers prevailed, but the

senior officers refused to comply, declaring that they would
attack the rebels unless a military junta were installed to
21
prepare for national elections in September.
Around five o'clock on April 25th, as the constitu
tionalist President, Molina Urena, was officially being sworn
in, General Wessin*s pro-junta forces began strafing the
National Palace.

Outraged by the air attacks, pro-constitu

tionalist civilians began looting and firing on the National
Police.

The people from the slums poured into the streets.

Rebels, who had previously broken into the arsenal of the 2?th
of February Gamp, trucked arms and amunition into downtown
Santo Domingo and began distributing rifles and machine guns
to civilians.

The uprising now became a civil war.

The

distribution of arms to civilians was a key element in

and constitutionalists for one side and loyalists and anti
constitutionalists on the other side will be used inter
changeably to refer to the two factions.
No ideological
connotation is intended.
In the early stages of the Revo
lution, the two sides were also designated as pro-Bosch or
pro-junta.
^ Wessin Testimony, p. 209.
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transforming the nature of the rebellion*

It was at this

point that pro-junta forces began to charge that the movement
22
had been taken over by Communists*
In the first hours, hundreds were killed, especially
in fire fighting between the two groups*

As General Wessin

advanced into the city, the rebels dug in behind barricades
in the Ciudad Nueva section of the city*

Fighting remained

indecisive*
On April 26th, Wessin*s anti-rebel forces, which
earlier had been badly disunited and disorganized, again began
to move against the rebels*

The Dominican Air Force bombed

and machine-gunned various rebel held installations.

Rebel

distribution of arms to civilians continued, and the morning
of April 27th saw a complete breakdown of law and order*
At 12:k0 P.M*, that same Tuesday, April 27, Ambassador
Tapley Bennett arrived in Santo Domingo.

During the early

part of the day, pro-junta forces seemed to be making progress
against the rebels but encountered heavier resistance than
they had anticipated*

By afternoon,

junta forces had lost

their earlier momentum, and the situation in the city became
increasingly tense and confused.
effective and junta forces,
crumble.

The police were no longer

tired and disorganized, began to

Nevertheless, Wessin*s forces continued to move

toward the city.

22w essin Testimony, p. 209*
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Already on the 27th, about 2000 people were reported
dead.

Late in the afternoon, as the tanks from San Isidro

advanced upon the city, a group of rebel officers came to the
United States Embassy to appeal to Ambassador Bennett to
mediate.

There are conflicting reports about what was

actually said that afternoon.

The rebels insist that the

Ambassador refused to mediate and suggested total surrender
instead.

Bennett claims to have said that the United States

was neutral and could not interfere.

He told the rebels that

he did not have the authority to mediate, and that the matter
21
should be settled by "Dominicans talking to Dominicans." ^
At first,

the rebels appeared to be shaken by

Bennett's statements.

Urena and a few others, who were

completely demoralized by the recent fighting and the Ambas
sador's refusal to assist in the negotiations, took asylum in
a foreign embassy.

At this point, Ambassador Bennett assumed

that the rebel movement had collapsed and that the uprising
was over.

He advised Washington to that effect.

The next

day, American newspapers printed stories announcing that the
Dominican Revolution had sputtered out.
Unknown to Bennett, most of the rebel military leaders
and a number of civilians had decided to return to the battle
field.

Outraged and feeling there was no other door open to

21
^Center for Strategic Studies, Dominican Action—
1965:
Intervention or Cooperation?
Special Report Series,
No. 2 (Washington, D . C . : Georgetown University, 1966), p. 28.
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them, the remaining rebel leaders launched a counter-attack.
By seven o ‘clock the rebels, under the leadership of Colonel
Caamano and Colonel Montes Arache, regained full control of
the fighting.

That same night the rebels reorganized their

leadership cadres.

Colonel Caamano, who earlier had been

appointed by Urena as Chief of Operations, now became the
highest ranking rebel officer with full responsibility for
the movement.

With the reorganization, a number of civilian

leaders who had joined the revolution in the last two days
began to emerge in important leadership roles.

Many of them

had a high degree of organizational abilities, and some had
military guerrilla experience.

Their participation gave the

rebel movement new organizational expertise, but also tinged
its political goals with a high degree of radicalism since most
of these men could be considered to be to the left of the
original rebel leaders.

The regular army officers insisted,

however, that they always maintained control of their leader
ship positions.

Nelson Goodsell of the Christian Science

Monitor was in Santo Domingo during the first days of the
civil war, and he noted that "while there are Communists in
their midst, top rebel command is in the hands of non-Communist elements who fiercely proclaim opposition to Communism."
2 Ll
,
,
The Christian Science Monitor. May 6, 1 9 6 5 , P» 11*

2II
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The next day Caamano appointed Montes Arache, Minister
of Defense and Hector Aristy, Minister of the Presidency.
From then on, Caamano and Aristy worked as a team.

From the

start the rebels emphasized the fact that they wanted to
return to a legitimate constitutional situation.

On May 3,

the Dominican National Assembly gathered in Ciudad Nueva in
emergency session and elected Caamano constitutional President
according to article 105 of the 1963 Constitution, by a vote
of 49 out of 58 votes.
On Wednesday, April 28, Ambassador Bennett sent an
emissary to San Isidro and found the loyalist commanders in
disarray, discouraged, and disorganized.

Colonel Pedro B.

Benoit informed the American emissary that "the loyalist troops
could not protect United States lives," and Benoit emphasized
that he thought Americans were in danger.

By noon Colonel

Arturo Despradel, of the National Police, told Bennett the
same thing.

Around one or two in the afternoon Bennett

reported Benoit*s views to the State Department by telephone
and sent Despradel*s statements by cable.

Bennett also re

ported that despite the disorder of the Wessin forces,
loyalists were ready to resume attack.

Meanwhile, smother

loyalist leader, General de los Santos, urgently requested
fifty walkie-talkies.

Ambassador Bennett recommended that

2*^Gaceta
>
Official de la Republica Dominicana.
March 4, 1965 > in Moreno. Barrios. p. 40♦
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they be provided,

saying that "he regretted having to turn

to a military solution for a political crisis, but that now
with all responsible rebels in hiding or asylum, the struggle
had developed into one between the Castro Communists and the
loyalists*"^
At noon that same Wednesday, Radio San Isidro an
nounced the formation of a military junta, headed by Colonel
Benoit.

Benoit then telephoned the Embassy to request U.S.

aid in "restoring peace."

Bennett cabled the oral request

to Washington at 3:16 P . M . , but said that he did not believe
27
the situation at that time warranted a landing by marines.
At 3:30 P.M. Benoit formally requested aid to "put
down the rebellion which was directed by Communists armed to

oO
convert the country into another Cuba."

The second request

was in writing, but made no mention of protecting American
lives.
At 5:30 P.M. President Johnson received another urgent
cable from Bennett saying that the situation had deteriorated
rapidly, and that the police could no longer protect the
evacuation of Americans.

2A

Bennett also informed Washington

U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator Pulbright on "The
Situation in the Dominican Republic," 89th Cong., 1st Sess.,
September 15, 1965, Congressional Record, p. 23357*
Also
see Martin, Overtaken by Events^ p7 £>55.
27
Martin, Overtaken by Events, p. 655»

28Ibid. . p. 656 .

1L0
that the Generals at San Isidro were dejected, and that the
Embassy team unanimously believed the time had come to land
the marines, 29
Johnson called in Congressional leaders, and at 8:^0
P.M. went on the

radio to declare that the United States was

sending American

marines to protect Americans and other

nationals who were in danger.
President Johnson
John Martin from

quickly summoned former Ambassador

his home in Connecticut and sent him as a

special emissary to the Dominican Republic.

Martin arrived

on the morning of April 30th, the same day that the Papal
Nuncio, Emanuele Clarizio,

succeeded in obtaining a cease-fire

from the contending factions.

By this time, United States

troops had created an wInternational Security Zone" around
the American and other foreign embassies.
Upon arrival in Santo Domingo, Martin made contact
with Colonel Caamano in the rebel zone and then went imme
diately to see his old acquaintance, General Antonio Barrera
Imbert.

Martin spent seventeen days in Santo Domingo trying

to negotiate a settlement and helping to set up the Government
of National Reconstruction, headed by General Imbert .^

2^U.S. Department of State, Bulletin. Vol. LII,
May 17, 1965, p. 738, pp. 9^1 -b2; June 1^, T965, pp. 9^1-9^.

10

- John B. Martin, "Struggle to Bring Together Two
Sides Torn by Killing, ** L i f e . May 28, 1965, p. 28.
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Forty-eight hours after his arrival, Martin made up
his mind about the Revolution.

On May 2, Martin held a press

conference, and declared that the Revolution had been taken
over by Communists.

That same night in Washington, President

Johnson on nationwide radio and television announced that he
and his State Department advisors were convinced that the
Revolution was in Communist hands.

As President Johnson told

the nation:
The revolutionary movement took a tragic
turn.
Communist leaders, many of them trained
in Cuba, seeing a chance to increase disorder,
to gain a foothold, joined the revolution.
They
took increasing control.
And what began as a
popular democratic revolution, committed to
democracy and social justice, very shortly moved
and was taken over and really seized and placed
into the hands of a band of Communist conspirators.
The American nations cannot, must not, and will
not permit the establishment of another Communist
government in the Western Hemisphere•31
That same evening, marines, who had been waiting on
the nearby carrier, Boxer, poured into Santo Domingo.
the Americans withdrew,

Before

22,000 marines had landed on the

troubled Caribbean island.
The arrival of the United States marines quickly
halted the actual fighting.

A few days later, an Inter-

American Peace force, hastily organized by the Organization
of American States, arrived in Santo Domingo and joined the

^ U . S . Department of State, Bulletin, LII, No. 1 3 5 1 ,
May 17, 1965, p. 745.
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marines.

32

Despite a cease-fire agreement and intervention

by troops of the United States and the Organization of American
States,

sporadic fighting continued throughout the summer.

General Imbert and supporters of the National Reconstruction
government declared that the constitutionalists were Communistdominated,
reactionary.

The constitutionalists called Imbert1s adherents
Each faction accused the other of atrocities,

and claimed that it would have achieved military victory if
the United States intervention had not occurred.
Negotiations conducted by the Papal Nuncio and of
ficials of the Organization of American States, the United
Nations, and the United States continued throughout the summer.
These joint efforts finally produced a settlement, and Hector
Garcia Godoy became the Provisional President of the Pro
visional Government on September 3> 1965Thousands of words have been written about the American
intervention and whether it was justified; whether it was
legal; whether it tipped the balance in favor of one side or
another; and whether the Revolution had been taken over by
the Communists.

The testimony of a number of participants

and observers show sharply differing views on all of these
questions, but especially on the question of Communist infil
tration and control.

12

Most parties involved, even impartial

For a discussion of the role of the Organization of
American States, see U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, LII,
June 7, 1965, pp. 909-919.
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observers,

seem unable to agree on the Mfacts."

The emo

tionally charged nature of the conflict seems to have made
a clearcut assessment almost impossible.

Moreover,

the

majority of reporters and analysts did not arrive in the
Dominican Republic until several days after the uprising was
under way.

As one observer noted,

HIn a very real sense, the

historical record of the Dominican revolt remains beclouded,
and certain key questions . . .
aa
solved.^

probably will never be re-

On one thing, however, all observers could agree:

The

conflict took on a completely different character after the
American intervention®

What had begun as a domestic upheaval

took on international and hemispheric proportions.

But it is

not the purpose of this study, to make conclusions about the
American intervention or whether or not the Revolution had
been taken over by the Communists.

This work will confine

itself to examining the issue of constitutionalism and its
role in the Revolution.

aa .
Richard R c Pagen, et al, Political Power in Latin
America:
Seven Confrontations (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 232„

CHAPTER VIII
HUMAN CONCERNS
An uprising in a tiny island in the Caribbean now
became a matter for international concern— an event fraught
with world-wide implications.

But for the average person in

Santo Domingo, the Revolution continued to be a matter of
simple human concerns.

In the first hours of the civil war,

when participants chose one side or another, they were
primarily motivated by personal goals and desires.

Most

Dominicans were not preoccupied with world affairs or politi
cal ideology.

In most cases, they considered their involvement

in terms of opportunities for a better future— jobs, housing,
self-advancement; or in terms of gaining power or preserving
privileges and position.
Much of the current writing on the April violence
accepts the standard view that the Revolution was simply a
popular uprising against oligarchic-military rule, an out
growth of a widespread desire among the Dominican people for
a return to constitutional, reformist government under Bosch.*
Many of the proponents of this view place particular emphasis

1

See La Nacion. the official constitutionalist news
paper, May 8, May 11, 1965.
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1^5
on the constitutional struggle as the overriding cause of the
2
Revolution.
Such an approach is an over-simplification of
a confrontation of considerably more complexity.
It is true that in the early hours of the Revolution
the rebels adopted the battle cry of "constitutionalism and
the return of Juan Bosch” and began to call themselves con
st! tutionalists.

It is also true that such a slogan forced

Dominicans to take a stand for or against a particular consti
tution.

The Constitutions of 1962 and 1963 were legal and

formal expressions of two different ways of life, two different
value systems, and two different conceptions of the way in
which society should be organized.

To the rebels, the Con

stitution of 1963 and its proposals for a welfare state
promised a fulfillment of personal and national goals.

On

the other hand, those who supported the Constitution of 1962
saw the Bosch document as a stumbling block to the achievement
of their own goals.

Above all, the anti-constitutionalists

viewed the 1963 Constitution as a threat to their previously
attained social, economic, and political positions.
In general, most Dominicans who took a stand in favor
of one side or another, made their decisions on the basis of

2
Howard J. Wiarda, "Contemporary Constitutions and
Constitutionalism:
The Dominican Republic,” Law and Society
Review, II (June 1968), p. *401. This writer rejects Wiarda's
emphasis, but this is not to discredit the excellent work
done by Wiarda in his many studies on the Dominican Republic.
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whether they rejected or accepted the principles of the Bosch
Constitution.

Nevertheless,

it must be made perfectly clear

that constitutional issues alone did not decide all align
ments.

At

the time of the April uprising,

societal divisions

ran deep and wide, not only among the various classes, among
political parties, and among interest groups; but also there
was division and fragmentation within these groups.

Much of

the fragmentation may be directly traced to the chaotic and
turbulent Dominican past.

The Dominican Revolution was more

than a mere struggle to restore the Constitution of 1963*
Actually, the Revolution was fought on two levels.

In one

respect it was a fight for constitutional government and an
attempt to bring the deprived masses into the life of the
nation.

But on the other hand, the Revolution may be viewed

as a struggle for personal advancement or power on the part
of individuals and groups within the society.

As such, the

uprising must be viewed in the context of the old Dominican
pattern of constantly changing political alliances.
Perhaps the key characteristic of recent
Dominican politics has been the predominance of
a very direct, virtually naked, confrontation
among groups in conflict.
The tactics employed
by each group since 1961 have tended toward
increasingly undisguised and unrefined displays
of power, directed more often at replacing
/"italics mine J the government than at forcing
it to take specific action.3

^Abraham F. Lowenthal, The Politics of C h a o s , p. 47.

1^7

All through Dominican history, the country has lacked
institutional means by which groups might present their
demands and obtain satisfaction#

In the Dominican Republic

"Force has always been the arbiter*"

The Revolution was one

more chapter in the long struggle of the "ins" against the
"outs," and the bloody civil war was the culmination of the
long years of constantly recurring turmoil.

h.

And so, not everyone committed himself to the rebel
or loyalist cause because he supported or opposed certain
constitutional precepts.

Although in many cases the principles

of the Constitution of 1963 were of paramount importance, some
participants made their commitments on the basis of what would
best promote their efforts to retain or gain personal power.
To make such distinctions, is not to minimize the
role of constitutionalism.

Constitutionalism was important

because it became a rallying ground for mobilizing forces
behind one group or another, and in that respect, played a
vital role.

It is, therefore, useful to look at the various

sectors of Dominican society to see how they aligned them
selves vis a vis the Constitution.

At the same time, every

effort will be made to point out the instances in which the
struggle for power was the dominating factor.

Hopefully,

such an examination of the tensions and attitudes in Dominican
society should result in a better understanding of the nature
of the uprising.

h

Lowenthal, Politics of Chaos, p.

1^3

How did the various social sectors and interest
groups fit into the overall pattern of the Revolution?

It

has often been suggested that the rebels were fighting against
oligarchic rule.

Bosch, himself, in the official constitu

tionalist newspaper, La Nacion. said, "The Revolution is an
episode in the fight of the Dominican people to overcome the
will of the . . .

oligarchic minority."-*

But there have been

conflicting opinions as to the actual role of the oligarchy
in Dominican society as well as in the Revolution itself.
Abraham Lowenthal, who lived and studied in the
Dominican Republic from 196^ to 1966, noted that mention of
the oligarchy would suggest "a coherent, hereditary elite of
large landowners who tightly controlled economic and political
power."

Such an oligarchy would be expected to be reactionary

in outlook and firmly opposed to social change.

Lowenthal

contends that in the Dominican Republic, there is no such
coherent group.

There is a small group of families de -primera

(first families) who have been prominent in Dominican society
for several generations.

Nevertheless, the elite constitutes

a very small percentage of the population, not more than a
hundred families.

Moreover, Trujillo kept most of them

"atomized and without an independent power base" during his
7
domination.'

^La Nacion. May 11, 1965* P* 3*
^Lowenthal, Politics of Chaos, p. 37*
7
'Wiarda, Dictatorship and Development, p. 99*
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In addition, this upper stratum does not form a
plutocracy, nor does it control the economy*

Even in the

context of an extremely poor country, this most oligarchic
group is not wealthy.

Most of the principal sources of

wealth in the Dominican Republic became the property of the
state after the confiscation of the Trujillo holdings.

The

remainder of wealth is either in the hands of foreigners or
recent immigrants.
Neither is the oligarchy politically powerful; for,
in general it has abstained from politics.

The elite has

often been pictured as a monolithic, anti-reform oligarchy,
but Howard J. Wiarda in a reassessment of Dominican society
after the Revolution, observed that rather the elite was "a
loose coalition of individuals, families, and organizations
which on some issues gave the appearance of working as a
o
unified group."
Ambassador Martin, upon his arrival in the Dominican
Republic in 1962, was of the opinion that most of the members
of the oligarchy were "beyond any question the ablest, best
educated people in the Republic."

Martin described them as

being "realistic at their worst and favoring justice at their
best."

Martin added that it may seem odd "that a liberal

Democrat like myself should come to consider the Dominican
Q
Howard J. Wiarda, "The Dominican Republic After the
Revolution," in Pagen, Political Power, p. 292.
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oligarchy as one of the really hopeful groups in the Re
public.
In fact, many of the elite did not actively oppose
Bosch, and some even protested his overthrow publicly when
few Dominicans did,

A number of oligarchs and their friends

such as Marco Cabral and Carlos Alberto Ricart, the publisher
of El Listin Diario. openly opposed the coup in 1963**^
The important thing to remember about the oligarchy
is that, in general, it does not dominate politics and prefers
to remain aloof in provincial Santiago, avoiding the political
atmosphere of Santo Domingo. 11
In the Dominican Republic, of the various monied
groups, perhaps the new rich of the upper middle class come
closest to playing the role of an oligarchy.

Composing the

social stratum immediately below the elite, most of the new
rich achieved their position through political and economic
force rather than ancestry.

The new rich -are found in high

military posts, high level and middle level political posts,
and above all in business.

Most of those in important

political and military positions ascended the social ladder
during the Trujillo regime; the new rich of the business
community are recent Spanish, Syrian, or Lebanese immigrants

^Martin, Overtaken by Events, p. 134.
10 Ibld.. p. 715 .

Robert, Handbook for the Dominican Republic, p. 6 6 .
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whose fortunes have been made in the past forty years.

It

is this small group of new rich, rather than the traditional
oligarchy, who run the country.

This same group has a con

siderable influence over the Church, educational institutions,
12
the judiciary, and the military and police establishment.
These members of the upper middle class especially felt
themselves threatened by Bosch*s social welfare program in
1 963 .

In 1963 Bosch did not try to depose the older power

structure but tried to implement a reform program by means
of his welfare oriented Constitution,

When the Bosch govern

ment embarked upon specific reforms and moved beyond minimal
adjustments to the system, cries of protest arose from the
property-owning groups.

When the new rich, business-property-

owning elements banded together with some sectors of the
military and overthrew the Bosch regime, they declared that
they were ousting Bosch because he was leading the nation
toward Communism,

Fundamentally, however, it was the social

welfare pronouncements of the 1963 Constitution which actually
triggered their opposition.

Polarization of Dominican society

began with the publication of the draft Constitution of 1963*
The fissure widened in the eighteen months following the
coup, but no one had attempted to conciliate the abrasive
issues which had precipitated the coup.

The same conflicts

which divided Dominicans In 1963 continued to be present and

12

Roberts, Handbook for the Dominican Republic, p, 67,
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unresolved In 1965.

There was no reason to believe that

those members of the upper-middle class who had opposed Bosch
and his program in 1963 would be willing to accept him in
196 5 .

Thus, the new rich of the upper middle class continued

to give strong support to the loyalist anti-Bosch forces*
On the other hand, alignments in favor or against the
rebels cut sharply across the urban middle class*

The middle

class is bounded by the new rich at the top and the lower
class at the bottom.

This range includes a variety of dif

ferent groups, each trying to attain the symbols of status
that differentiate it from the next lower class.

This sector

is small and politically divided, consisting mostly of small
businessmen and white collar workers with education but no
economic independence* 13^
The most significant aspect in regard to the middle
class is the generational split.

This cleavage between

parents and sons intersected all classes,‘but especially that
of the urban middle class.

Even before the Revolution, a

split between the young and the old began to emerge*

After

the death of Trujillo, many adults who had lived under the
dictatorship refrained from political activity, perhaps
because of cynicism or, perhaps because of their sense of
guilt at having passively cooperated with Trujillo*

As a

result, most students broke politically with their parents

13
-^Roberts, Handbook for the Dominican Republic, p* 199*
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whom they saw as discredited by their acquiescence to Tru—
jillo*s rule*
Many of the middle class youth were intensely
nationalistic and desired to revenge themselves for the
compromises of their fathers.

Especially, the urban educated

youth hoped to achieve social progress after the death of
Trujillo, and they committed themselves to creating a new
ik
social order based on social justice and progress.
In 1962, the youth thought the prospects for their
country had improved.

Their personal and national aspirations

for the future were high.

Nevertheless, while hopes were high,

material and political conditions in the nation deteriorated.
After President Bosch was overthrown, frustration of social
and personal aspirations among youth was universal.

By the

time of the overthrow of Reid, students* hopes were sub
stantially disappointed.
Bryant Wedge, who made a psychological survey of
Dominican youth immediately following the Revolution, observed
that by spring of 1965 Dominican students were strongly
motivated toward anger.

Thus, the direct action of the mili

tary forces in shooting and bombing the rebels on April 25,
clearly precipitated violent response.

Paced with a direct

threat, students who had not anticipated participation in
violence suddenly sought and accepted weapons.

"Frustration

1^Roberts, Handbook for the Dominican Republic, p. 171#
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had brought them to protest, fear ensured its violent form."*-*
In April of 1965, the young in the Dominican Republic
mobilized for the first time and played an active and signif
icant part in the Revolution.

About 20 per cent of the

educated middle class youth actively participated on the side
of the rebels, and it was the youth who provided the main
support of the constitutionalist movement.

Almost without

exception, the young supported the social welfare program of
the Constitution of 1963, but not all of them supported Bosch
himself.1^
One interest group, not nearly so cohesive, was the
Catholic Church.

In 1963 Bosch blamed the upper middle class,

the military, and the Church for his downfall.

At the time

of the promulgation of the 1963 Constitution, the Church
officially expressed its disapproval of the Constitution in a
formal statement by the Dominican Episcopate.

In fact, in

1 9 6 3 , the Church actively worked against Bosch*s administration.

In 1965, however, the Church took a less overt stand.

The

official hierarchy did not attack either side but appealed for

1

-'Bryant Wedge, "The Case Study of Student Political
Violence: Brazil 1964 and Dominican Republic 19 6 5 ,* World
Politics, XXI (January 1969), PP* 192-97* Wedge*s observa
tions are drawn from dialogic interviews with students in
their normal surroundings, recording 132 interviews and 32
group interviews involving 653 students, five months after
the outbreak of violence. Wedge's research was under the
auspices of the Center for International Studies at Princeton
University.

l6rt>ia.. p. 187.

peace, and later endorsed the U.S. formula for a government
of "national unity with broad popular support." 17f In general
the Church rallied behind the forces of the loyalists, but it
cannot be stated flatly that the Church totally mobilized
against the rebels.

In fact, conflict over the Revolution

widened already existing divisions within the Church.

It is

true that most of the Church hierarchy were hostile to the
constitutionalists.

Nevertheless, a distinction must be made

between the universal Church on the one hand— officially
represented by the Papal Nuncio and unofficially by the
younger clergy, most of them foreigners trained in the United
States and Europe— and the local Church, represented by the
bishops and the local clergy.

The first group actively tried

to find solutions for the crisis, and the Papal Nuncio,
Emmanuel Clarizio, worked diligently to get a cease fire
agreement.

In addition, the Nuncio and others close to him

distributed food and generally assisted both sides.

Some of

the lesser clergy even moved into the rebel zone after the
older, more conservative priests departed, and some actively
18
shared the rebels' hardships.
It must be pointed out that even before the Revolution
some changes had been taking place in the hierarchy.

Some of

the younger and more liberal administrators showed evidence

17E1 Listin Dlario. April 2, 2k, 1965, p. 11.
18
Moreno, Barrios, p. 161. Also see Patria, May
1965.

lk,
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of being influenced by the progressive movement begun by
Pope John X X I I I . N e v e r t h e l e s s , most clerics viewed Bosch's
social welfare program as a danger to the established order.
In addition, a strong and vocal minority, particularly Jesuits
who had been expelled from Cuba, portrayed Bosch as a MarxistLeninist and Communist sympathizer.

The majority of the

Church hierarchy supported this anti-Communist sentiment,
fearing that a rebel victory would mean a loss of Church
power.

Officially, the Church remained uncommitted; unof

ficially and covertly, the Church hierarchy favored the
loyalists, while many of the lesser clergy favored the rebels.
Constitutionalism and the struggle for power played
equal roles in motivating members of the armed forces.

Tra

ditionally, the military structure has looked upon itself as
the protector of the established order and as the nation's
strongest bulwark against the Communist threat.

The Dominican

military has been pictured as a monolithic force which always
aligned itself with the oligarchy and the Church against the
masses.
During the thirty years of the Trujillo dictatorship,
the military helped to maintain a system of government which
gave members of the armed forces a privileged position in

19
^Wiarda, "The Dominican Republic After the Revo
lution," in Pagen, Political Power, p. 292.
20

Moreno, Barrios, p. 162.

2'
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society; and, indeed, the military was a monolithic force
which helped to impose the will of the dictator on the people.
When the dictatorship ended, the military continued to refuse
to subordinate itself to civilian authority and, instead,
attempted to use its power to perpetuate its monopoly of
political life.

Nevertheless, the death of Trujillo, the

ouster of the Trujillo family, and the exile of many Tru.111lista officers deprived the armed forces of their leadership.
Thus, a power vacuum resulted.

This lack of leadership

ushered in a return to competition similar to that of the
old days before the Constabulary; except that the contemporary
struggle was not between rival bands, but was within the
armed forces themselves.
Meanwhile, Bosch's reform administration threatened
to dissipate the dominance of the military.

Interpreting the

1963 Constitution as a menace to its prerogatives, the mili
tary hierarchy linked itself with civilian groups and staged
the coup which ousted Bosch.

This action created a fissure

in the ranks of the already divided military structure.

Many

of the junior officers and younger enlisted men, as well,
came from the lower classes and approved of the reforms
introduced by Bosch.

They felt a great affinity for civilian

leaders who were demanding social justice and the abolition
of excessive privilege.
Following the overthrow of Bosch, constant strife
continued and caused frequent shifts of key military
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personnel, with the firing or reinstatement of officers and
enlisted men, the exile of some, and the return of others.
While some of the junior officers truly desired reform, others
wrangled for power and a chance at the spoils.

The old

familiar pattern returned with politics in the Dominican
Republic, especially within the military structure, resembling
a "kaleidoscope of constantly shifting groups of 'outs1
against equally temporary alignments of 'ins,* but with very
little consistency with respect to program or ideology."

21

Within the armed forces, there was a constant shuffling and
reshuffling of alliances.

During the years following the

assassination of Trujillo, various military figures appear
again and again in different combinations.

In the Dominican

Republic, switching loyalties or political positions has always
borne little cost. 22
Thus, in the Revolution of 1965# the struggle for
power was as important as the struggle for* social justice.
Many officers fought to restore constitutionalism, but just

Lowenthal, The Politics of Chaos, p. 40; p. 47*
22Further amplification regarding the shifting of
alliances in the military would require a separate essay. To
mention a few: The brothers Rodrigues Echavarria, the
cousins Montas Guerrero, Belisario, Peguero, Fransico Caamano,
Deno, Fernandez Domingues, Francisco Rivera Gaminero, Neit
Nivar Seijas, Pedro Benoit, Elias Wessin y Wessin, and many
others constantly changed groupings. For documentation, see
the biographies of the armed forces leaders in their own
publications, Avance and Revista de las Fuerzas Armadas.
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as many of them fought for reinstatement into the armed forces
from which they had been fired, or to maintain and continue
privileges they had always enjoyed.

Whether for reasons of

power or ideology, by the time of Beid*s overthrow, division
was plainly visible in the armed forces.

The ultimate split

occurred, however, over the question of the Constitution of
1963 and the return of Juan Bosch.

Perhaps, the least divided and fragmented sector of
Dominican society was that of the lower class urban prole
tariate.

It was among these urban masses that a strong

cohesion was most visible.

Juan Bosch and the PHD had

awakened the political consciousness of the masses, and it
was among them and their leaders that an ideological frame
could be detected.

In the case of the urban masses, the

slogan, calling for "a return to the Constitution of 19&3
with Juan Bosch ," played an important role in mobilizing mass
opinion in favor of the rebels.
The organization of the rebels consisted of about
3000 regulars who had participated in the initial uprising
and 4000 irregulars, who organized as commando groups and
became a part of the paramilitary o r g a n i z a t i o n . A m o n g the
urban masses only a small number actively participated, but
in the barrios altos (slums) it is estimated that approximately

2-^Moreno, Sociological Aspects, p. 122.
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200,000, about 80 to 90 per cent, favored the constitutionalist
ideals.
Valuable insight into the rebel psychology may be
found in the research of Jose A. Moreno, a teacher and former
theological student who had been doing field research for his
doctoral program at Cornell University.

Moreno was in the

Dominican Republic in April 1965 when the violence erupted,
and he experienced, first hand, the events of the uprising.
Moreno changed the original subject of his dissertation and
began studying the sociological aspects of the Revolution.
In describing his research, Moreno speaks of the methods he
used in trying to obtain unbiased information:
For four months I lived with the rebels, sharing
their feelings, anxieties, prejudices, fears and
desires. I tried to put my mind into the minds of
the rebels to grasp the ideological process that
was taking place. I was aware that my work as a
participant observer had linked me emotionally and
ideologically to the rebel group. For this reason
I decided through my interviews to build as broad
a picture as possible, by meeting and ‘interviewing
the leaders of both factions, civilians and military.
To check the accuracy I used not one, but several
independent sources of information. I was placed
in a position to check doubtful information and
verify its accuracy.
Moreno drove back and forth through the city, and for
the first two weeks of the war, he lived in the barrios altos
(slums).

He spent many hours interviewing top leaders,

visiting residents in their barrios, and talking with the

o Ll

Moreno, Sociological Aspects, p. 122

2$Ibid.. p. 12.
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commando boys in the parks or at their machine gun nests.
Roughly speaking, he came in contact with thousands of people
from all social classes, strata, groups, occupations, edu
cational levels, and religious denominations.

He attempted

to discover specific traits which would differentiate the
rebels from the loyalists.

It is significant that in his

findings, Moreno observed that two social characteristics were
constantly present in the rebel group, but were rarely found
among the loyalists:

a certain ideological frame and a deep

feeling of alienation.
In defining the term "ideological frame," Moreno
pointed out that generally "an ideological frame may be under
stood . . .

to mean a set of ideas, values, and beliefs which

define society in general, what goals it seeks and which means
should be used in preference to others."

To further clarify

his meaning, Moreno indicated that these beliefs are closely
related, but by no means identical to, official party doc
trines.

Ideological frame here refers to the non-cognitive,

political, economic, and sociological concepts found in the
"rhetoric of the masses."
To discover what motivated the masses to choose the
side of the rebels, Moreno visited with them in their shacksf
ate with them,and helped provide food and medical attention.
All the while, he tried to discover why they favored the

^Moreno, Barrios, p. 86; p. 98*
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constitutionalists.

In simple words, these people clearly

told him that they supported the Revolution because "they
had suffered too much under the Trujillo regime with its
corrupt police and military" and because "the rich had always
had too much while the poor had had too little."

They indi

cated that they thought that by ending the abuses of the past
the Revolution could bring a change for the better.

The

people in the barrios also approved of the Revolution because
it promised a return of Bosch to power.
they liked Bosch because

They indicated that

he spoke their language and did not

steal."27
To properly understand the attitude of the masses
toward Bosch, it must be made clear that in the Dominican
Republic, formal ideological conviction has a minor place in
practical affairs.

When groups and parties are mobilized for

social action, the base for such action is likely to be
formed around a strong personality.

To gain wide support, a

leader must address himself to the predominately illiterate
sectors of the population and must appear as a man they can
trust and one who will be able to further their interests.
Although many Dominicans reiterated again and again that they
were willing to fight for Bosch and the Constitution of 1963>
very few of them knew what was written in either the Con
stitution of 1962 or that of 1963.

27'Moreno, Barrios. p. 89.

The masses knew nothing
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of formal pronouncements, and few, if any, could articulate
the differences between the two documents.
the masses,

In fact, for

such concepts as constitutionalism, freedom, and

human rights did not mean anything.

The masses never thought

of themselves as fighting to restore a formal document or
legal principles.

Even most of the more educated leaders

were not able to think in terms of intellectual!zed concepts
or doctrines.

In the minds of the masses, constitutionalism

was merely a label for something which promised greater
participation in government, a higher standard of living, and
the hope of alleviating the deep feelings of powerlessness
and frustration.

Most Dominicans could only think of the

Constitution in terms of fulfillment of simple human concerns
at the level of everyday existence.

For the masses, it was

not democracy or freedom, but housing,

jobs, and an education.

Moreover, these promises could not seem real to them unless
they were embodied in the person of a leader who could
actually implement their goals.

The only honest government

the proletariate had ever known, and the only one which had
promised them a future was that headed by Bosch.

Therefore,

the masses rallied to the support of Juan Bosch.
Moreno,

in his talks and interviews with rebel

leaders, as well as with the masses in their barrios, ob
served that the men involved in the fighting often expressed
feelings of helplessness and powerlessness.

Bryant Wedge

16 ^
po

in his surveys of Dominican youth noted similar findings.
More than anything else, the participants expressed frustra
tion and fear that their personal goals would never be
achieved.

The rebels were especially disappointed because

they believed that fair competition was not the regular
channel for social mobility.

Above all, many individuals

felt that they were not a part of the political processes,
and that they were powerless to change the institutions that
tied them to the social system.

Therefore, they believed that

by ending the abuses of the past, the Revolution meant a change
for the better.

And most of them believed that the best way

to achieve that change was with Bosch and the Constitution of
29
1963.
It should be pointed out that in the case of the
youth, they supported the return of Bosch as a symbol of
legality, but Bosch personally was often the object of care80
ful critical judgment.
It seems clear that among the urban masses, constitu
tionalism played a significant role and directed many rebels
toward forming some sort of ideological conviction, whether
articulated or implied.

Because they believed the return of

the Constitution of 1963 and Bosch promised a better life,

2ft

See supra note 1^ of this chapter.

29

Moreno, Barrios. p. 126.

-^Wedge, "Student Political Violence," p. I 87 .
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the masses, either actively or passively, rallied behind the
rebels.
Those who joined the rebel cause were a cross section
of the nation:

intellectuals, professionals, younger mili

tary officers, young people of almost every class, the urban
lower classes, and some of the rank and file of the Catholic
clergy.

Opposed to the rebels were the regular armed forces,

the Church hierarchy,

some elements of the middle class, and

most of the nei* rich of the upper strata of the middle class.
In general, the oligarchy did not mobilize itself for or
against the Revolution, but many of them helped others to
31
prepare for it.
In the process of trying to determine what made
participants fight, one discovers that certain themes recur.
It appears that some goals and beliefs were widely held on
both sides.

Most Dominicans agreed that there was a need for

more widespread participation of all classes of the people in
the life of the country.

Most Dominicans also agreed that

there was a need to remove the old Tru.lillista power structure
from political and economic power.

Almost everyone on both

sides stressed the need to return to constitutionality, but
did not agree on which constitution should prevail.

Rebels

and loyalists alike agreed that there should be a more just
distribution of the economic and cultural wealth of the

31

J

Moreno, Barrios, p. 126.
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nation but disagreed about priorities and methods for imple
menting national goals.
Both factions agreed that freedom, work, health, and
education were worthy long term goals, but each side differed
in its ideas about the means of achieving those aims.

As has

been previously stated, not everyone joined the revolution
to fight for constitutional issues.

Nevertheless, for those

who did, the real conflicts came over social justice and the
role of the state in guaranteeing that justice.

Moreover,

these were the same conflicts that had provoked violent dis
cord in 1963.

Primarily, disputes centered around the
"property rights vs. the

concepts of "rights vs. privileges,"

social good," and "private vs. state economic development."
In addition, constitutionalists and anti-constitutionalists
disagreed on the causes of economic deprivation and the
necessary means to eliminate it.
The loyalists seemed to place special emphasis on the
assumption that if the individual is industrious and capable,
he will get an education and work.

The loyalists declared

that "those who don't succeed fail because they are neither
industrious nor able."

The loyalists also believed that the

state should be essentially passive, and that it should merely
guarantee the freedom to work, to be educated, and to receive
assistance when disabled.

Any more positive steps would be

an infringement on individual rights.
32

J

Moreno, Barrios, p. 111.
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The rebels, on the other hand, believed that the
function of the state is to guarantee a job, welfare, and
education.

Rebels believed that an individual cannot be free

unless he has employment and a decent standard of living.
They believed that the only way to achieve these goals is
through positive action by the state.
leaders said,

As one of their

"Let us guarantee the deprived, uneducated

masses not freedom to work and to educate themselves, but
rather let us guarantee them work and education . . .

not

bread and medicine but social security and health."^
Emotional oonflicts also raged over the questions of
"private property vs. the social good," and "private vs.
state development" of economic resources.

Again and again,

property owners reiterated that they did not oppose social
justice, but that social justice must not eliminate property
rights.

Property owners believed that the Constitution of

1963 deliberately ignored their vested interests. ^
Another source of conflict, the problem of private
vs. state economic development was unique in the Dominican
Republic.

There was no need to nationalize any industries

and utilities or expropriate foreign holdings since the state

-^See articles 1 through
35 through ^0 in the
Constitution of 1963 . Also see La Nacion. May 8, May 11;
also Bosch, Unfinished Experiment, p. 131 .
J Moreno, Barrios, p. 11.

■^See debates in Chapter V of this work.
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already owned most of these resources.

After the assassina

tion of Trujillo, most of the best land, power plants,
transportation, utilities,

sugar mills, and some commercial

enterprises reverted to the state.

Nevertheless, cleavages

arose over how to develop these resources in a way which
would best serve the nation economically.

The loyalists

believed that only the private sector had the knowledge and
expertise to do the job.

The rebels were not concerned about

who should develop the resources, but were concerned about
who should share in the profits.

Both sides attributed evil

motives to the other's position.
It is evident that in regard to constitutional issues,
attitudes on both sides had not changed since 19&3*

Basically,

the two consitutions embodied two different philosophies.

To

the constitutionalists, the 1963 Constitution represented
social change in the form of greater participation of all
classes of people in the cultural, economic, and political
life of the country.
To the anti-constitutionalists, only the 1962 Con
stitution symbolized peace and stability and protection of
the rights of property.

Loyalists saw the 1963 Constitution

not only as lawless and godless, but also they viewed it as
the instrument which would deprive them of their privileges
and position.

Above all,

the loyalists saw the 1963 Consti

tution and Bosch as a direct threat to their survival.
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On a simpler level, Dominicans viewed the two consti
tutions in terms of human concerns.

The masses were concerned

with employment, education, housing, and a chance to enjoy
the fruits of their society.

The loyalists were concerned

with power and position, but above all, they wanted to pre
serve that which they had already attained.

CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION
Most of the literature about the 1965 Revolution shows
a strong preoccupation with the words constitutionalism and
democracy*

Yet,

such writing fails to convey that it was

human and not political concerns which were responsible for
the ultimate breakdown in Dominican society.
In Hadley Cantril*s study, The Pattern of Human Con
cerns . he asserts that the concerns of people are patterned
according to the phases of development they are in, in other
words, the stage of social and political organization of a
nation.1
According to Cantril, there are several phases of
development.

In the first stage, which is the slumbering

stage, people are still unaware of their problems or are too
depressed to have many ambitions for themselves.

In the

second stage people awaken and become aware of new potentiali
ties and acquire new purposes and aspirations.

It is in this

phase that people become psychologically mobilized and begin

-t

Hadley Cantril, The Pattern of Human Concerns (New
Brunswick, New Jersey:
Rutgers University Press^ 19&5)> P*
303.
Cantril is a social psychologist at the Institute for
International Social Research at Princeton, New Jersey.
Cantril collaborated with Lloyd Free in studying aspirations
of people in underdeveloped nations around the world.
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to learn what they want out of life.

At the same time, it

is during the second phase that people also begin to acquire
new frustrations.

Cantril says that his data has continuously

shown that "frustration and worry are the other side of the
coin of hope."

As a backward people learns that new satis

factions are available, they goad themselves to be rid of
2
their old constraints.
Cantril notes that there is likely to be an interim
period of relative social chaos, irresponsibility and lack of
discipline following the breakdown of established loyalties,
institutions, and controls.

Old group allegiances and the

appearance of old symbols are weakened.

There may be few if

any roots in the past to which people can cling.

Cantril

observes that
When such psychological moorings and the ties
that bind are temporarily lost, it may take con
siderable time before any new and commonly shared
significances can become articulated and accepted
and organized into some institutional form.
The
transforraation of a people is not always e a s y . 3
In phase three, the people become aware of the means
to realize their goals and begin to perceive the possibility
of achieving them.

In this period the people must have faith

that their visions will come true, or the vision of a bright
future will give way to despair.

o

This is the stage when the

Cantril, Human Concerns, p. 304.

3Ibid.
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political situation in a country is a precarious one, especial
ly "if a parliamentary government stemming from a politically
inexperienced people is trying to cope with the situation."

Ll

Such was the stage in which the Dominicans found themselves
just after the assassination of Trujillo and before the over
throw of Bosch.
Frustration and discontent are bearable as long as
faith is in some way confirmed.

However, impatience is likely

to be the greatest when the goal is "just around the c o m e r . "
Cantril says that it is at this stage that the system will
crack or fall.
The Dominican people were underdeveloped and inex
perienced in political organization.

Through the dramatic

leadership of Juan Bosch, the great mass of the Dominican
populace not only gained an awareness of their new potentiali
ties, but also became engendered with the faith that their
aspirations would be fulfilled.
To the average Dominican, constitutional government
did not mean the promise of idealistic democracy, nor did the
average person think of constitutional government in terms of
social reform.

Cantril1s studies revealed that people in the

underdeveloped world today are rather unconcerned about
political freedom.

Instead they primarily concern themselves

L

Cantril, Human Concerns, p. 305*

"’ibid., p. 306.
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with such things as a decent standard of living and the hopes
for a congenial family life in the foreseeable future.^
After the death of Trujillo, all Dominicans from the
wealthiest to those in the lowest-socio-economic brackets,
both urban and rural, were sensing new possibilities ahead.
All of their hopes and fears, regardless of economic status,
were found to revolve around the idea of well-being defined
in terms of a decent standard of living,

jobs, education, and

7

opportunities for their children.'
Bosch was well aware of the high rate of expectations;
indeed, he helped create the new awareness.

Nevertheless,

Bosch was not realistic in his assessment of the ability of
underdeveloped Dominicans to cope with popular government.
Here was a people with no political experience suddenly
awakened to the possibilities of a better life under the
banner of democracy.

The means for achieving these goals lay

just ahead in the Constitution of 1963.

Unfortunately,

Dominicans, as well as North Americans who were aiding Domin
icans, failed to understand that a political system of
government such as democracy cannot be exported and super
imposed on a politically underdeveloped nation.

Bosch and his

American advisors failed to comprehend the magnitude of the
task they had assigned themselves.

Failing to understand the

^Cantril, Human Concerns, p. 305*
7
Lloyd Free, Attitudes. Also see Chapter II, page
*4>7 of this work.
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realities of Dominican political life, the idealistic Bosch
tried to bring democracy and govern under his new constitu
tion.

It was precisely at this point that Bosch met with

strong opposition from those who had previously wielded social,
political, and economic power.

Perhaps, Bosch might have

succeeded if there had been more time to educate the populace,
or if he had proceeded more slowly in demanding revolutionary
change.

But Bosch relentlessly pressed for improvement and

reform, and moved at a pace faster than those at the top of
Dominican society were willing to accept.
Bos c h ’s strong welfare program antagonized those who
might otherwise have supported some form of constitutional
authority.

Those who opposed Bosch used the Constitution of

1963 as a rallying point around which to muster their forces.
When those same forces overthrew Bosch, the reason given was
his softness toward Communism.

Those people truly feared

Communism (whether or not the threat was real), and the 1963
Constitution increased their fears.

These groups did not

necessarily oppose all government intervention, but they did
reject the all-embracing social welfare program of the 1963
Constitution.

Bosch's opponents could only view his program

as a threat to their H sacred rights.11

Thus, the more powerful

sectors of society refused to yield to the new contenders for
power.

Given Bosch's program, and the long tradition of u n 

stable constitutional practices,

in September 1963 civilians

joined the military in performing the action which had always
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been an integral part of Dominican Constitutional tradition:
They reverted to the age-old Dominican habit of solving
disagreements by revolution instead of through legal, respon
sible means.
In the past such an unscheduled transfer of power
would have met little resistance, but by 1963 the Dominican
Republic was no longer the same nation.

After the death of

Trujillo, for the first time, the people had been made to feel
a part of the nation.
dramatically.

Political participation had expanded

Political awareness had increased as well.

Added to this was the sudden rise in the level of expectations.
Bryant Wedge, in his survey of Dominican youth, coneluded that one of the most firmly established experimentally
and clinically validated propositions in psychological study
of behavior is its frustration-aggression hypothesis:
Experimental animals and men become angry when
their goal seeking purposes are interfered with;
aggressive behavior appears to be an innate re
sponse to such frustration.
Among men, common
social purposes may be more or less widely shared
in societies; interference with the realization of
these purposes constitutes collective frustration
and results in angry effects that are expressed
in aggression toward the frustrating agent. . . .
When the frustrating agent is perceived as a
political authority . . . the outcome is a psycho
logical predisposition toward political violence.^
In the months before the Revolution of April 1965
Dominicans were disappointed in their hopes for their country

f,Case Study of Student Violence," pp. 187189.
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and themselves.

As material and political conditions in the

nation deteriorated, personal frustrations mounted.

Domini

cans were exceedingly pessimistic about their own positions
and their hopes for the nation.

In his study, Wedge suggests

that anger is greatest when there are fewer non-violent means
for satisfying valued goals:

“The extreme case is when all

channels of response are blocked, when the frustrated and
angry man's back is to the wall.

The likelihood of violent

response is expected to rise when opportunities for value
o

fulfillment are narrowed."7
As studies by Cantril also reveal, when a populace
is awakened and improvement and reforms are not sooner or
later accommodated,

impatience and frustration are likely to

turn to violence.
In the spring of 1965 the Dominican Republic was a
tinder box filled with a long record of chaos and instability,
with a legacy of political and economic bankruptcy, with
personal hopes clashing against fears.
and human concerns lit the sparks.

Rising expectations

Frustration then ignited

the flames which burst into the tragic Dominican conflagration.

^Wedge, “Case Study of Student Violence," pp. 19^195.
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APPENDIX 1
PARTICIPANTS IN THE DOMINICAN CRISIS
Aristy, Hector — Former associate of Xmbert and Amiama Tio.
Sided with the rebels at the outbreak of the revolt and
soon became one of its most important leaders. Ap
pointed by Caamano as minister of the presidency.
Highly influential. Later ambassador to UNESCO.
Baez Acosta, Jose — Helped in the hospitals in the rebel
zone during the revolution. Later mayor of Santo
Domingo.
Balaguer, Joaquin — Scholar and politician. Served as presi
dent under Trujillo and the Council of State in 1962.
Ousted from the presidency. Lived in exile in New York.
His Reformista Party has large support in the country
side. Some of his followers organized a coup against
the Triumvirate. His party won the 1966 elections, and
he became president.
Bennett, W. T. — U.S. Ambassador to the Dominican Republic
since March 1964. Friend of Donald Reid. Absent from
Santo Domingo when revolution broke out on April 24.
Returned on April 27 and requested a U.S. landing on
April 28.
Benoit, Pedro B. — Air force colonel. Became head of the
military junta created in San Isidro on April 28.
Requested the U.S. landing. On May 7, he became part
of Imbert's Government of National Reconstruction.
Bonnelly, Rafael — Right-wing politician. Minister of the
interior under Trujillo. President of the Council of
State in 1962. Supported the golpe against Bosch in
1963c
Bosch, Juan. — Mastermind of the revolution. Could not
return to Santo Domingo until the end of the revolution.
Presidential candidate in the 1966 elections. Later ha was
in self-imposed exile In Spain.
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Breisky, Arthur — Second Secretary in the U.S. Embassy.
Took a very active role in the first days of the crisis.
Caamano Deno, Francisco — Army colonel who became the leader
of the rebel forces and was elected constitutional presi
dent on May 3, 1965*
Campagna, Anibal -- Former UCN deputy. Sided with the rebels
to defend the return to a constitutional government.
Appointed president of the Senate.
Casals, P. Manuel — Young politician from Santiago. Parti
cipated in the government of the Triumvirate, but later
resigned. Sided with rebels and tried to stir the revolt
in Santiago.
Cedeno Valdes, Arevalo -- UCN deputy who became independent
after the overthrow of Bosch. Sided with rebels. Ap
pointed president of the Congress. Died of a heart
attack during the revolution.
Clarizio, Msgr. Emmanuele — Papal Nuncio in Santo Domingo.
Managed to have rebels and loyalists sign the first
cease-fire agreement. Became the target of the extreme
right, whose members accused him of being a communist.
Connett, William — Charge d'affaires taking the place of the
U.S. ambassador during the first four days of the revolt.
Sent the first reports of the revolution to Washington.
Cury, Jottin — UCN deputy who proclaimed himself independent
after the coup against Bosch. Sided with rebels. Ap
pointed minister of foreign affairs in the rebel govern
ment *
Del Rosario, Antonio — President of the Social Christians.
Signed the Pacto de Rio Piedras with Bosch. Sided with
rebels, whom he represented before the OAS.
De los Santos Cespedes, Juan — Chief of the air force.
Ordered the strafing of the Presidential Palace on
April 25 and following days.
Despradel Brache, Herman — Chief of Police. Promised loyalty
to Molina Urena, but later sided with loyalists.
Espaillat Nanita, Leopoldo — Leader of group of intellectuals
who protested against status quo on February 27, 19&5»
Sided with rebels. Special adviser to Provisional
President Molina Urena.
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Espinal, Manuel — PRD member who organized revolt among
civilian groups. Now deputy to the Dominican Congress.
Fernandez Dominguez, Rafael — Air force colonel who helped
to restore the Council of State in power. Mastermind
of the revolt from abroad. Returned to Santo Domingo
during the revolt and died on May 19, 1965.
Fiallo, Viriato — Right-wing politician. Head of UCN.
Presidential candidate against Bosch in 1962. Sup
ported the golpe against Bosch in 1963 .
Fishburn, Col. Thomas — Air attache of the U.S. Embassy in
Santo Domingo. Played an important role in the crisis,
helping to establish loyalist stronghold in Santo Domingo.
Garcia-Godoy, Hector — Foreign minister under Juan Bosch,
and vice-president of Balaguer's Reformista Party.
Favorite candidate of the group of entrepreneurs from
Santiago for provisional president. Became provisional
president on September 3> 1965*
Gutierrez, Giovanni — Army colonel who helped organize the
revolt, but later went into asylum. Managed to join
the rebels again at the end of the revolution.
Guzman, S. Antonio — Rich landowner. Minister of agriculture
in Bosch cabinet. Rebel candidate for provisional
president.
Herrera, Rafael — Editor of the independent newspaper El
Listin Diario. Refused to participate in Government of
National Reconstruction.
Heywood, Col. Ralph — Naval attache of the U.S. Embassy.
Played an important role in the Dominican crisis,
helping to establish loyalist stronghold in Santo
Domingo.
Imbert Barrera, Antonio — Honorary general of the army for
having participated in the killing of Trujillo. Power
ful political figure. Chosen by J. B. Martin to head
the Government of National Reconstruction. Resigned
or August 30, 1965.
Jorge Blanco, Salvador — Young intellectual and independent
politician who sided with rebels. Attorney general for
the rebel government.
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Lora Fernandez,

J. M. —

Army major.

One

of theoriginal

organizers
of the revolution. Chief
of staff of rebel
forces. Killed after the revolution in the battle of
the Matun Hotel in Santiago in December 1965*
Mainardi Reyna, Virgilio — Former governor of Santiago.
Opponent of Bosch.
Sided with rebels from the start of
the revolution.
Mann, Thomas C.
— U.S. undersecretary of
state.Went to
Santo Domingo with McGeorge Bundy to
report to President
Johnson on the state of affairs in the Dominican Republic.

Martin, John Bartlow — Former U.S. ambassador to the Dominican
Republic. Went to Santo Domingo as special envoy of
President Johnson. Formed the Government of National
Reconstruction with Antonio Imbert as president.
Mayobre, J. A* — Special UN representative sent by Secretary
General U Thant to observe and report on the Dominican
situation. Managed to have both factions agree to a
second cease-fire.
Molina Urena, Rafael — Former president of the House of
Representatives under Bosch. Main organizer of the
revolt. Became provisional president on April 25» but
went into asylum on April 27. Later he went back to
the rebel zone. Later Dominican ambassador to the UN.
Montes Arache, Manuel Ramon —

Navy colonel and former

director of the navy school of frogmen, the elite fighters
of the Dominican armed forces. Played an important role
as commander of the rebel forces. Appointed minister of
defense in the rebel government.
Mora, Jose A. — Secretary general of the OAS.
Took an active
role in the negotiations.
Became the target of both
factions, who accused him of being biased.
Nunez Nogueras, Manuel A. — Leader of the group of officers
who joined the revolt after being discharged from service
by the government.
Helped organize the revolt and stayed
with rebels until the end.
Pena Gomez, Francisco — Radio speaker and youth organizer of
the PRD.
Remained with the rebels.
Secretary general
of the PRD in 1966.
Pena Taveras, Mario — Army captain who organized the revolt
among non-commissioned officers and the rank and file.
Was instrumental in rescuing the group of officers put
in jail by the loyalist Chief of Staff General Cuesta.
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Pittaluga, S. Lovaton — Foreign minister of the Provisional
Government of Molina Urena. Went into asylum on April 2?
after several attempts to negotiate.
Ramirez, Hernando — Army colonel who was the main military
organizer of the revolution. Took asylum on April 27,
1 965 , apparently for reasons of health.
Later returned
to the rebel zone, but had to leave a second time.
Reid Cabral, Donald — President of the Triumvirate or
civilian junta set up by the military in 1963 after the
coup against Bosch. Overthrown by the rebels on
April 2^, 1965.
Rivera Gaminero, Francisco -- Commodore of the navy who finally
sided with the loyalist troops. Secretary of defense
in the Government of National Reconstruction and in the
Provisional Government. Ordered to leave the country
in 1966 .
Rivera Cuesta, Marcos — General of the army, Head of the
loyalist chiefs of staff. Put in jail by the rebels but
later freed.
Seijas, Neit Nivar — Colonel in the army with ties to the
so-called San Cristobal Group. Follower of Balaguer.
Wessin y Wessin, Elias — General of the army and commander
of the loyalist stronghold at San Isidro. Became the
center of resistance to the demands of the rebels to
reinstate Bosch, whom he had ousted eighteen months
earlier.

APPENDIX 2
POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

June 14th
Movement
(IJjj')

Agrupaclon Politica 1^ de Junio, Political
movement with strong nationalistic ideology,
organized as an underground movement against
Trujillo in 1959# Oriented toward Castro*s
interpretation of Marxism.

MPD

Movimiento Popular Dominicano (Popular Dominican
Movement). Marxist-Lenini st group founded in
1956 with strong orientation toward Mao Tsetung*s brand of communism.

PRD

Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (Dominican
Revolutionary Party). Founded by Bosch and
other Dominican exiles with broad Aprista orien
tation of the Democratic Left. Won elections of
1962 by a large popular majority.

PRSC

Partido Revolucionario Social Cristiano (Social
Christian Revolutionary Party)• Orientation of
Christian Democracy like similar parties in
Chile and Venezuela.

PR

Partido Reformista (Reformist Party). Founded
by Joaquin Balaguer and quite popular among the
peasants. Won the elections of 1966 against
Bosch.

PSP

Partido Socialista Popular (Popular Socialist
Party). Official Communist Party in the country.
Founded during Trujillo*s regime.
Orientation
toward Moscow line of communism.
Relatively small
but well established in some intellectual and
industrial sectors.

UCN

Union Civica Nacional (National Civic Union).
Political group founded as a resistance movement
against Trujillo. Became a political party in
the 1962 campaign and appealed to upper and
middle classes. Lost elections against Bosch.
Instrumental in coup of 1963 against Bosch.
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